PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN. 195 



infinite number of wise acts. And so when we speak of 

 infinite intelligence, we have not the slightest warrant, either 

 in logic or in common sense, for supposing that such intelli- 

 gence is not similar in kind to that finite intelligence which 

 we know in man. 



If all this be granted, it would seem at first sight as if all were 

 granted which the defender of the design argument claims. 

 If the phenomena of nature really exhibit purpose, intelli- 

 gence, is not this the goal of our inquiry % It would seem 

 as if it might be fairly expected that we had now reached 

 the end of our tedious and intricate journey. But yet some 

 of those vvho follow us to this point hesitate to go one step — 

 a necessary step — further. The remarkable developments of 

 what is called in Germany the Philosophy of the Unconscious 

 have produced yet another class of objections, about which a 

 word must be said. 



Nature, it is admitted, works towards an end ; yes, that 

 has been proved, but, does it work consciously towards an 

 end? Is there any conscious force behind the intelligence 

 that pervades its operations ? And it has been argued that 

 though the workings of nature may certainly be described as 

 intelligent, for they plainly have a purpose, yet we have no 

 right to describe them as conscious workings. Nature may 

 be intelligent, but not governed by any conscious Power. But 

 it is hardly too much to say that if human language has any 

 meaning at all, intelligence implies consciousness ; if there 

 be a purpose in any process it must be a purpose in and for 

 some mind. For what is intelligent action ? It is that action 

 as Dr. Martineau puts it, in which the future dominates the 

 present — the future consequence determines the present 

 operation. But the future can only be thus influential if it 

 is present in idea, and Avhere there is an idea there must be a 

 conscious mind. Of course it is easy to say that this com- 

 monplace and simple argument is anthropomorphism disguised ; 

 and no doubt it is unpleasant to have any argument on which 

 we rely described by so long a word. But what does the 

 charge amount to, what does the statement mean'? If it 

 means that I use the words intelligence and purpose when ap- 

 plied to the mysterious force at the basis of nature in the same 

 sense in which I use them when applied to myself, then the 

 argument is anthropomorphistio. But if, I do not so use the 

 words I am playing fast and loose with language ; if words 

 are not constantly used in the same sense, our theories and 

 our syllogisms are absolutely without value. The point is: 



