308 PHILOSOPHY OF ZOOLOGY. 
constitution will be observed, not in degree merely, but in 
kind. Again, if we compare the instincts of brutes, consi- 
dered as consisting of the efforts both of them active and tn- 
tellectual powers, with the reason of man, in his savage state, 
in which the operations of his active powers are chiefly con- 
spicuous, we shall be led to conclude, that there is no diffe- 
rence in kind between reason and instinct, and if we form 
our conception of this instinct, from its collective prominent 
qualities, derived from all the different species of’ animals, 
we shali be tempted to conclude, that the power which 
regulates the manners of the inferior animals, is even su- 
perior to the boasted reason of man *. 
It would serve no good end to produce particular exam- 
ples from the writings of the most eminent cultivators of 
moral and natural science, to prove that the terms Reason 
and Instinct have had assigned to them such varied and 
indefinite significations ; for there is no author whose ob- 
servations on this subject we have had an opportunity of 
examining, who has been sufficiently careful to avoid the 
confusion. 
If we restrict the term Reason, then, to express the 
operations of our intellectual powers, and inquire, is there 
any thing analogous in the constitution of brutes ; and re- 
strict the term Jnstinct to express the operations of our 
active powers, and make a similar comparison, we shall be 
able to point out, not only wherein the difference between 
reason and instinct consists, but between man and the lower 
animals, in reference to mental attaimments. ‘The solution, 
indeed, of the whole difficulty, appears to us to be obtain- 
ed by this simple limitation of the terms. 

* There is evidently a much greater difference between a citizen and a 
savage, than between a savage and many of the lower animals. But still 
we are to bear in mind, the unlimited capacity of the one for improvement, 
and the limited capacity of the other. 
