312 PHILOSOPHY OF ZOOLOGY. 
this volume, and, if satisfactory, demonstrate that Apa- 
thique animals do not exist. With regard to the distinction 
between Sensible and Intelligent animals, founded on the 
circumstance of the ideas of the former being all simple, 
and in the latter both simple and complex, we can regard 
it in no other light than an arbitrary assumption of a cha- 
racter which has no existence in nature. Among his Sen- 
sible animals, the sense of hearing, taste, smell, and touch, 
are well known to exist; and if an animal derives ideas 
from all these sources, is it conceivable that each class shall 
be preserved distinct, and no combination take place where 
the ingredients are already in contact. When a bee de- 
parts from its hive to collect food at the place where, on the 
preceding: day, it obtained a bountiful repast, it is obvious 
that both the distance and direction must previously be 
contemplated, intimating the existence of complex ideas 
both of time and space. But it is not our intention to oc- 
cupy the time of the reader in a refutation of the theoreti- 
cal opinions of an author, who, in his delineation of the 
mental powers of animals, substitutes conjectures for facts, 
and speculation for philosophical induction. Fortunately 
for bis reputation, he possesses much real merit as a syste- 
matical naturalist. 
In conclusion we may observe, that the different mem- 
bers of the body are equally subservient to the purposes of 
intellectual and the instinctive powers. We open our mouths 
by instinct to eat, and we execute, by means of the same 
muscles, a similar movement as an act of the will, in conse- 
quence of reflection. ‘The impression made upon the sen- 
ses by external objects, excite the movement of the intellec- 
tual powers, and they operate equally on our instincts. 
The instinctive powers may be said to comprehend the 
relations of our impressions almost intuitively. The 
will can excite the senses to action, and the instincts can do, 
