January i, 1903 



NA TURE 



199 



Ireland, as well as in introducing some rational system 

 of management into the forests of the colonies. Let us 

 hope that his words will fall on fruitful ground. 



In conclusion, we cannot omit expressing our admira- 

 tion for the cheerful way in which the author went 

 through most fatiguing journeys and the healthy tone of 

 his remarks on the love of nature. We feel sure that the 

 attractive way in which the book is written will secure 

 for it many readers. 



THE ASCENT OF MIND. 

 Mind in Evolution. By L. T. Hobhouse. Pp. xiv + 



415. (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1901.) 



Price iar. net. 

 T N this able and thoughtful work, Mr. L. T. Hobhouse 

 *- distinguishes five stages of correlation in the ascent 

 of mind, from the first glimmerings of consciousness in 

 some lowly organism of primeval times to the systematic \ 

 thought of the man of science or the philosopher and the 

 intuitive insight of the poet or artist. The first of these, 

 placed in a category by itself, is the pre-intelligent stage, 

 wherein there is an indirect correlation of experience, re- 

 action and welfare before intelligence (which is defined 

 as the capacity of the individual to learn from experience) 

 comes into play. The behaviour of the organism is, at 

 this stage, the outcome of inherited structure, and if any 

 variation of structure secures a more suitable response, 

 that is, one better adapted to preserve the organism or its 

 offspring, such a structure would tend to be " selected," 

 since the individual in which it occurred would have an 

 advantage in the struggle for existence. In this way, 

 inborn tendencies to a given method of response may be 

 correlated with the past experiences of the race. 



It will be noticed that the word "experience'' is here 

 used in a non-psychological sense. Instinctive reactions 

 are the culminating products of this stage of pre-intelligent 

 development. Above and beyond this comes the com- 

 prehensive category, the second of the two which Mr. 

 Hobhouse distinguishes, wherein the correlation is based 

 on individual (psychological) experience. This category 

 comprises four stages ; first, that of the unconscious re- 

 adjustment, where the pleasure or pain consequent upon 

 instinctive or random response to stimuli modifies sub- 

 sequent reactions in a manner determined by the nature 

 of the feeling ; secondly, that of concrete experience 

 and the practical judgment. Here behaviour becomes 

 purposive, and the appearance at this stage of actions 

 definitely directed to, and determined by, the ends which 

 they serve, is regarded by Mr. Hobhouse as perhaps the 

 most critical moment in the evolution of mind. In pur- 

 posive action, so far as it is purposive, there is no fixed 

 habit, but the response to the surroundings is determined 

 by the effect which it will have in the particular case ; 

 that is to say, by the relation between act and conse- 

 quence. Hence the organism at this stage does not re- 

 spond uniformly to similar surroundings, but takes into 

 account anything that, though outside the range of im- 

 mediate perception, is relevant to the object to be 

 attained. Within this stage are reached the limits of 

 animal intelligence. 



The connection between the perceived relation and the 



NO. 173I, VOL. 67] 



action based on it remains, however, unanalysed. The 

 steps by which this bond of connection is analysed out as 

 a distinct content of thought lead us to the third stage, 

 that of conceptual thinking and will, and of the correla- 

 tion it involves, language, both as cause and effect, is the 

 central feature. In scope, the correlation that is now 

 made possible is immeasurably widened. In the concep- 

 tions of this stage, thought first finds itself possessed of 

 contents set free from the line of practical interests and 

 also from strict conformity to the perceptual order. In 

 this way a " world of ideas " is formed, going beyond as 

 well as behind experience, and the conceptions which 

 people this world form ideal schemes to which grouped 

 experiences may be referred. Conduct is adjusted to meet 

 the requirements of self or others as persons, of society 

 as an abiding structure, or of morality as a system of 

 universal rules. In fine, the correlation is now between 

 the focussed results of connected bodies of experience 

 and broad purposes of life or general standards of con- 

 duct. 



The fourth and last stage — that of rational system — 

 arises when the formation of a coherent, self-supporting, 

 exact and exhaustive body of knowledge begins to be an 

 explicit object of mental effort. The stage would be 

 complete when such a system should embrace the con- 

 ditions and possibilities of evolution, and should reach a 

 complete synthesis of reality as a whole. 



Such, stated for the most part in his own words, is a 

 summary of the successive steps which Mr. Hobhouse 

 traces in the ascent of mind. His work is characterised 

 by breadth of view, logical development and fertility of 

 illustration. It is an earnest attempt to grapple honestly 

 and fairly with difficult problems in a spirit of serious in- 

 vestigation. Personally, I am of opinion that Mr. Hob- 

 house's psychological stages one and two — those of un- 

 conscious readjustment and of concrete experience — are 

 much more closely related than is concrete experience to 

 conceptual thinking, which again shades off into that of 

 rational system. Dr. Stout's broader division into per- 

 ceptual and ideational phases of mental development 

 seems preferable. Within these might fall Mr. Hobhouse's 

 subdivisions. The generic differences between the 

 broader categories are not difficult to trace ; but the 

 specific differentiation of the subgroups is a less easy 

 matter and one which leaves room for more difference of 

 opinion. 



A noteworthy feature of Mr. Hobhouse's work is the 

 careful record of observations conducted under experi- 

 mental conditions on cats, dogs, a rhesus, a chimpanzee, 

 a seal and an elephant. His method seems preferable to 

 that of Dr. Thorndike, since the conditions are less 

 cramping to the intelligence ; and though his interpreta- 

 tion is in some cases open to criticism, his honesty of 

 purpose is unquestionable. If, making due allowance for 

 differences in the usage of technical terms, for diversities 

 of outlook, in a word, for the personal equation, we com- 

 pare his results — for example in the study of monkeys — 

 with those of Dr. Thorndike and of Mr. Kinnaman, we 

 cannot but be struck by the large measure of agreement 

 that may be found in views which, to some readers of 

 their works (and perhaps still more to the writers them- 

 selves), may seem divergent. C. Lloyd Morgan. 



