on 
6 NATURE 
[Marcu 19, 1914 
instead of stating that one event A is always fol- 
lowed by another event B, is to state functional 
relations between certain events at certain times 
(these are determinants), and other events at 
earlier or later times, or at the same time. No 
a priori category at all is involved. 
One of the most elementary philosophical ideas 
is that of purpose in evolution. Another is evolu- 
tion. Mr. Arthur Lynch criticises the latter 
(papers of the Aristotelian Society) in an interest- 
ing and anecdotic essay. Very much in point 
is one of his texts, viz., the remark of 
Kirchhoff : “‘ There is only one science (mechanics).” 
But Mr. Lynch’s plea for a wider and deeper 
application of the idea of an all-pervading Purpose 
is unconvincing, though rhetorical. 
The idea of Will dominates the psychology of 
the day; it belongs, of course, to the Purpose- 
idea. We could wish that some critical philo- 
sopher, such as Mr. Russell, would subject it to 
a merciless analysis. The same may fitly apply 
to the philosophy of chance and probability. The 
papers on these subjects read before the Aristo- 
telian Society show the over-elaboration which 
often precedes the simplification of an idea. In 
the first volume of ‘The Encyclopedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences” (2) there is a_ similar 
elaborate treatment of logic. Prof. Losskij thus 
states the ‘‘new conception of consciousness which 
is leading Philosophy out of the cul-de-sac of 
psychological Idealism”: ‘Consciousness is the 
sum-total of everything which stands in a certain 
unique relation to the Ego. Every faeton 
consciousness is made up of at least three 
moments ; every such fact depends for its existence 
upon the presence of an Ego, of a content of 
consciousness, and of a relation between the two.” 
This is the old logic writ large. Prof. Couturat 
more hopefully applies mathematics to the prin- 
ciples of logic. His notion of ‘propositional 
functions ” is worth serious consideration. The 
plan of the Encyclopedia is suggested, no doubt, 
by the inconsistencies of the previous works. It 
consists, “‘not of brief articles summary in char- 
acter, dealing with a great variety of topics, 
but of original and relatively exhaustive discus- 
sions of fundamental aspects of each main sub- 
ject.” The index, significantly, is of authors only. 
(3) Mr. Reinheimer agrees with the late M. 
Novikow in emphasising positive factors in evolu- 
tion against such negative factors as selection by 
survival. 
factor ; 
According to Darwin, death is a main 
nutrition and work, according to Mr. 
Reinheimer, are more important. 
good one; _ biological cooperation, 
economic cooperation, must 
NO.) 2316), VOL. "93)| 
His thesis is a 
to 
into 
similar 
be taken 
| ether, corresponding to material ! 
' human 
account. Nutrition represents stored-up organic 
capital. It is parallel to reproduction. He has 
interesting observations on the fallacy of in-feed- 
ing, which is ‘parallel to in-breeding. The book 
is suggestive, but, as a key, it only unlocks a 
side-door of the subject. Some elaboration of the 
orthogenesis doctrine seems more likely to open 
the main portal. 
(4) Mr. Jamyn Brooks has already received 
careful critical consideration. In “The Science 
of the Sciences” he undertakes to correlate the 
three principal sciences of “Chemistry, Physics, 
and Metaphysics, or Matter, Force, and Mind.” 
| Thus, in his first prefatory sentence, he shows 
confusion, which becomes worse confounded as 
the argument proceeds. If he has a new idea, he 
ought to explain it, but when about to explain 
he goes off at a tangent to something else. The 
one idea I have gathered is the existence of mental 
The author’s 
notion of construction and expansion as primary 
motion, and of translation as secondary, is not 
new. As for the testing of the hypothesis, con- 
tinually mentioned, it fails to materialise. 
(5) Herr Meyer, on the evolution of mind, 
brings together the latest results of animal-psy- 
chology, and treats of them in reference to the 
mind. His expository method has the 
merit of being general; he abstracts the insect’s. 
mental life and applies it, in comparison with 
man’s, to the forms of thought, such as space 
and time. This is a big book, closely reasoned 
and most comprehensive. 
(6) The distinguished botanist, the late Prof. 
Potonié, has written a charming series of “easy- 
chair’’ essays on science. The popularisation of 
science, the art of explanation, the power of habit, 
dogma and criticism, knowledge and _ belief, 
imagination and science, the concept of purpose, 
are old subjects treated with freshness. In sub- 
jects which bring science and society into relation 
he is not afraid to speak out. 
A. E. CRAWLEY. 
OUR BOOKSHELF, 
Das Relativitatsprinzip ; die jiingste Modenarrheit 
der Wissenschaft. By Leo Gilbert. Pp. 124. 
Wissenschaftliche Satyren. Band I. (Brack- 
wede i. W: Dr. W. Breitenbach, 1914.) Price 
3 marks. 
THE satire as a means of propaganda for 
scientific ideas is not of modern usage. Fechner 
was probably one of the last scientific satirists. 
Its revival in the present instance is the result of 
the considerable amount of mystification to which 
the electromagnetic principle of relativity estab- 
lished by Lorentz, Einstein, and Minkowski has 
