34 J. D. Whelpley on Philosophical Induction. 
than another, yet they are all strictly analogical; as may be seen, 
when, from our previous notion of chlorine, on witnessing its 
properties a second time, we recognize it. The identification is 
a very complex process, ‘and involves more conditions of thought 
than the aaa aed or naming, of a color, or of any simple 
property of bodie When w we identify yellow with yellow, or 
sour with sour, nee is no idea of a substance conveyed, as there 
is in chemistry. 
So also in the observation of cause and effect; it is no analogi- 
cal induction of cause, to expect that because a thing has hap- 
pened once it will happen again under the same conditions; but 
when the imagination works in close conjunction with the under- 
standing, reason bi cognizance of something more than mere 
sequence—namely, of a principle 1D a whieh goes under 
the general names of elasticity, 
the like, to which, as to the cognate idea of | a canis substance, 
it gives various names in various departments of observation. 
Nor can that induction be esteemed analogical, which merely 
identifies names ;—as of crystals by their forms, or of birds by 
their feathers and dimensions: but when a profound observa- 
tion of a crystal, or animal, shows it to be a species iz esse, i. se 
as composed of certain original forces, as Seo those of gold and 
chlorine, or of certain organic or vital e jes, assembled in a 
certain mode, and constituting a species of a1 animal or plant, should 
we not agree in ety eo snk: this process of the mind as ana- 
logical and inductive—as passing from the known to the un- 
known ina scientific manner ! 
That this distinction of the two methods is true in practi 
seems to me evident from a comparison of the two methods of 
classification, one called natural, the other artificial—one seeking 
the true and essential characteristic of the Pe the other aim- 
ing only at identification of properties and na 
[ have got farther into this distinction fh 7 [ eters and sai 
now compelled, in a manner, to pursue it to the end: oe 
there will be nothing new or “unusual to yourself in these distinc- 
tions, at least in practice, or to any other person as well versed 
in all processes of induction, it may amuse you to see them 
thrown into a shape that is meant to be logical. ie this pre- 
text, then, I will venture to follow the idea as it 
: Now, to distinguish the analogical method pie rhist of mere 
classification, or scientific memory, we may compare the system 
io with that of the modern chemists, and a few modern 
and zoologists: the one ending in an act of pore A 
se an act of judgment: the one merely observing, 
ing, or profoundly knowing. What, for exile, 
und than the science of the simple elementary fore: 
—as of oxygen, hydrogen, platinum, &c., the simple 
ons, as of electricity, heat, light, é&c., and th 
