S. Tyler on Philosophical Induction. 321 
ducted, may be divided into analogy and identity; though of 
course, subordinate divisions may be made of these. For exam- 
ple: a child that has been burnt by the flame of a candle, will 
expect the same effect from the same cause—to be burnt by the 
same candle. This expectation is founded upon identity of evi- 
dence. But when the child expects the same effect from a simi- 
lar cause, as for instance, to be burnt by the flame of another 
candle, (though this may almost be called the same cause,) or by 
the flame of wood, or gas, or by every flame, the expectation is 
founded upon analogy. Whenever the inference is from same to 
same, it is founded upon identity; and whenever it is from like 
to like, however great the likeness, it is founded upon analogy. 
It is clear then, that induction beginning with the simplest clas- 
Sifications is founded upon analogy. As long as the subject of in- 
Vestigation is merely probable, no matter how great the probabili- 
ty, the process is founded upon analogy. As in the case of the the- 
ory of dew, the whole process was founded upon analogy, until 
instance, then we are on the boundless sea of mere conjecture. 
_ Although we have thus pointed out the function of analogy 
in the inductive process, an important point still remains to be ex- 
plained: the nature of analogy itself. 
The conviction produced by analogy between facts or phenom- 
ena, has the same foundation for its verity, that the conviction of 
the existence of the most familiar object has. Both convictions 
are founded on our mental constitution, on what metaphysicians 
call fundamental laws of belief. If we see an object, we cannot 
but believe in its existence: so if we perceive an analogy between 
phenomena, we cannot but believe, that they are produced by a 
Similar or common cause. But why the conviction is pr 
inference. Some philosophers, not understanding the nature of 
the inductive process, and confounding philosophical analogy with 
