NATURE 



441 



I HURSDAY, I IKK! \KY 6, 1919. 



MIKTD-STl /•/•' REDIVH I S. 

 The Origin 0) Consciousness. .\>i Attempt to 

 Conct . , the Mind as a Proctuai of Evolution. 

 Bj Prof. C. A. Strong. Pp, yiiin 330. (Lon- 

 don: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1918.) Price 

 12s. net. 



THIS is a very important book. Whether or 

 not we are able to ai 1 epl its thesis; the 

 acute and exhaustive exploration <>l the problem 

 of knowledge, and the thoughtful and sympathetic 

 criticism it offers of the present-daj theories oi 

 new realism and qt post-Kantian idealism, must 

 be reckoned with, h Is sunn' fifteen years since 

 Prof. Strong gfave us a book bearing the fascinat- 

 ing title, "Why the Mind bus a Body," and the 

 present work is a development of the theory 

 therein expounded. Perhaps we should rather 

 say that it is a continual ion ol the author's reflec- 

 tions on that theory, tor lie acknowledges im- 

 portant changes in his view. The influence of 

 Bergson's theory of creative evolution is very 

 evident in this development, although Prof. 

 Strong is not to be classed as a Bergsbnian. The 

 title and subtitle of the present volume indicate 

 that influence. Granting thai the fact we name 

 consciousness (meaning awareness) is a product 

 of evolution, what sort of stuff must reality be in 

 order that such evolution should be possible? 

 This is the problem. The answer is that it cannot 

 be any kind of body-stuff of which mind is an 

 epiphenomenon, but it must hi- a kind of mind- 

 Stuff of which the body and the physical universe 

 of which it is part and with which it is continu- 

 ous ire an epiphenomenon. 



It will be seen, therefore, that Prof. Strong's 

 theory is panpsychism; indeed, he uses the 

 terms " panpsychism " and "mind-stuff" as syno- 

 nymous. This marks a complete difference from 

 the mind-stuff theory with which the late Prof. 

 Clifford electrified an older generation. Clifford's 

 theory was a form of psycho-physical parallelism. 

 lb supposed a mind-Stuff or mind-dust dispersed 

 in the universe as widely as physical matter and 

 correlated point to point with it. Dualism in any 

 form is insupportable to Prof. Strong, its rejection 

 is for him axiomatic; indeed, knowledge ttseli 



implies the inconceivability oi the independent 

 real. While rejecting alike the " direci object" 

 of the naive realist and the "block universe " 

 of the post-Kantian idealist, bis own view yet 

 shows so strong an affinity to some forms of new 

 realism (that, for example, which accepts 



Berkeley 's esse^percipi principle, but interprets 

 it realistically) that it is sometimes difficult to 



see wherein the difference lies. What comes 

 perhaps nearest to it, and max very probably have 

 suggested it, is the theory which James described 

 as neutral monism, the theory that conscious- 

 ness as a stuff or entity does not exist, and that 

 there is one substance which can appear eithet 

 XO. 25;i. VOL. I02] 



as physical 01 as psychical. Prof. Strong, how- 

 ever, rejects thi di I 1< aspect or two modes 

 theory, and stands definitely for a mind-stuff pure 

 and simple and ultin 



When we watch a bumble-bee making frantic 



efforts to escape llirou. oi glass, though 



an open casemenl max be i [ Fi h in< lus away, 



we ate astonished at what appears to us the 

 creature's stupidity. Is it a similar failure to 

 pay attention to the obvious which 'looms to 

 failure our age-long efforts to solve Hie problem 

 presented in the simple fact of knowledge? It 

 may be, but so far everyone who bis (tied 

 " Eureka ! " has experienced the impossibility, even 

 if he has satisfied himself, of bringing conviction 

 to others. Prof. Strong is not under the. illusion 

 that he can solve b\ a simple formula what has 

 battled the ages. Our mistake, he tells us, is in 

 supposing that truth must be simple and direct, 

 whereas it is, in fact, complex and infinitely com- 

 plicated. The main part of his book is a careful 

 and elaborate discussion of difficulties, real and 

 not imaginary, which can lie urged against pan- 

 psychism. 



The thesis itself is simple. What we know 

 directly in sense-perception are essences, not exist- 

 ences. Consciousness is the "givenness" of 

 essences. Existences have absolute spatial and 

 temporal determinations and occupancy. The 

 essence given to us in sense-perception is not 

 representative of the existence; it is not a tertium 

 quiil which intervenes between the mind and the 

 reality; it is the "vehicle" oi knowledge, the 

 object of which is the existence. Further, the 

 consciousness itself is not an existence; it is 

 "attention" to the "givenness" of tin- essence. 

 But besides sense-perception there is another 

 mode of knowing, another avenue to the real 

 object; this is introspection. The essences given 

 to introspection are feelings, and the existence to 

 which these are the vehicle is the psyche. The 

 argument is that the object of introspection, the 

 psyche, is the same existence as the object of sense- 

 perception, the spatio-temporal existence, and 

 only the essences are different. A very happy- 

 illustration is afforded by the case ol the brain. 

 The brain is the unique condition of knowledge, 

 \el il is itself a part of and continuous with the 

 object of knowledge, the body and the physical 

 universe of which the body is a part. It is not 

 possible, of course, lo appreciate the argument in 

 a bare epitome. I can only say that it is lucidly 

 expounded, and no difficultv is consciously 

 shirked. 



There is, however, to me a serious difficulty of 

 which Prof. Strong, in common with most of the 

 philosophers to whom his arguments are chiefly ad- 

 dressed, appears lo lie wholly unconsi ions. When 

 philosophers talk about the independent existence 

 of the objects of knowledge they almost invariably 

 refer to the common-sense objects of daily life — 

 to tables and chairs, mountains, horses, and men 

 — and they discourse about the primary and 

 secondary, and perhaps also tin- tertiary, quali- 



