482 
NATURE 
[| Marcu 24, 1904 
“As regards the telegraphs, it is sometimes said that 
though we have paid dearly for it, at any rate we 
have a more effective system. This is, of course, a 
matter of opinion, but I doubt it. My belief is that 
competition would have given us a better system. 
This cannot be proved, but I may give an illustra- 
{HQ}ol gun o oo” 
The papers on education derive interest from Lord 
Avebury’s position on three commissions and in the 
University of London, and form a strong and con- 
vincing argument in favour of the increased attention 
to science which we may hope is gradually finding 
place; they are marked by the aptly selected quotations 
for which readers of ‘‘ The Pleasures of Life ’’ are 
prepared. 
When a writer publishes essays on so wide a range 
of subjects, he deliberately invites criticism; and, 
indeed, readers of this volume will ask in several 
cases whether this or that address was worth printing. 
But if the papers are not taken too seriously, much 
will be found of interest, if little that is new. The 
book resembles the modern daily paper in many other 
respects; there is a wide range of ideas, something 
for everybody, much hasty writing, and frequent 
repetition of the same items in different guises. 
IN SEARCH OF TRUTH. 
Humanism: Philosophical Essays. By F. C. S. 
Schiller, M.A. Pp. xxvii+297. (London: Macmillan 
and Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Com- 
pany, 1903.) Price 8s. 6d. net. 
Ueber die Grenzen der Gewissheit. 
Diirr. Pp. vii+ 152. 
handlung, 1903.) 
By Dr. Ernst 
(Verlag der Diirr’schen Buch- 
Price 3.50 marks. 
Tat und Wahrheit. Eine Grundfrage der Geistes- 
wissenschaft. By Hans von Liipke. Pp. 35. 
(Leipzig: Verlag der Diirr’schen Buchhandlung, 
1903.) Price so pf. 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series, 
Vol. iii. (London: Williams and Norgate, 1903.) 
Price tos. 6d. 
HE collection of articles and addresses presented in 
Mr. Schiller’s volume exhibits all the character- 
istics familiar to readers of his previous work. Paradox 
is, of course, not wanting ; humour enlivens discussion, 
not shrinking from the antithesis of ‘‘ comic’? and 
“ cosmic,’’ or such a phrase as ‘‘ponderous pondering” ; 
philosophy, literary criticism, and the Psychical 
Research Society are duly represented. Mr. Schiller’s 
style incurs one great disadvantage: it sometimes 
leaves the reader in doubt whether the matter is really 
to be taken seriously; perhaps this is why Mr. Schiller 
has still to complain that philosophers neglect his 
imperatives. 
The keynote to the book is pragmatism, and the 
essays here collected may claim the unity of this one 
theme. The parts vary considerably both in quality 
and subject. The essay in literary criticism, ‘‘ Con- 
cerning Mephistopheles,’’ may claim a first place; it 
is interesting, novel and lucid, in short, our author at 
his best. The first eight essays, dealing with some of 
the most vexed questions of philosophy, have common 
NO. 1795, VOL. 69 | 
characteristics and equal value. Mr. Schiller triumphs 
in destructive criticism; the common-sense element of 
pragmatism is, in his hands, a powerful weapon 
against extravagances not unknown in recent philo- 
sophy; pragmatism is thus justified as a tonic; if we 
object that man does not live by tonics, we are again 
| victims of a triumph, for a collection of essays is not 
a system and not open to a systematic criticism. The 
essay on “‘ Reality and ‘ Idealism’ ”’ illustrates the first 
| point; for the second, let the dialogue on ‘‘ Useless 
Knowledge ”’ plead its occupancy of space. One of 
the most satisfactory essays is ‘‘ Darwinism and 
Design,” and ‘‘Pessimism”? is a subject which, directly 
and indirectly, inspires some of the best passages in the 
book. The closing sections on ‘* Immortality ’’? would 
call for no remark except that such a subject too often 
attracts the uncritical; even they will probably think 
Mr. Schiller’s concept of ‘‘ spirit’? might have been 
definitely explained, while his admission that the 
““state after death ’’ does not form a part of the ex- 
perience of any subject in the sense that ‘‘ real’? and 
‘“dream’’ states do, might well have excused not a 
few of the closing pages. One thing more is also 
a desideratum: that concept of ‘‘ purpose ’’ on which 
pragmatism bases its claim to rejuvenate philosophy 
must be elaborated; for this we wait, not without fast- 
ing, taking the present contribution as earnest of the 
systematic exposition which the introduction seems to 
promise. 
As the title denotes, Dr. Diirr’s book deals with the 
question of boundaries, consequently it is critical rather 
than constructive, negative rather than positive. The 
central problem is, How much may be called certain? 
and, from the author’s point of view, the immediately 
given is alone fully certain. The immediately given is 
the psychical actuality. But we cannot rest in this; 
problems arise which compel us to make distinctions; 
even consistency cannot ensure “ reality,’’ for dreams 
may be consistent and yet life is more than a dream. 
It appears then that the necessity of the immediately 
given coexists with a necessity for that which is not 
immediately given, but that which is not immediately 
given has not certainty—it is the object of belief and is 
not justified by any formal logical proof, but by the 
worth which attaches to our conception of it. Realism, 
for example, is without proof, but itis right as against 
anti-realism by virtue of its superior value as a basis 
for science. 
Having thus found belief at the very roots of science 
we may consider some belief to have some certainty; we 
may further show that cther beliefs, ethical and meta- 
physical, are not less certain than this scientific belief, 
and with that the limit of our author’s work is reached. 
The result is a defence of belief against some, and only 
some, attacks. It might be objected that the ethical 
belief cannot be defended by proving it not less valu- 
able than the scientific belief without giving the concept 
of value an ambiguous significance. The preliminary 
discussions on ‘‘ Erkenntnistheorie ’’? and the question 
of a ** Kriterium ”’ contain much interesting criticism ; 
but the subsequent justification of belief seems built on 
inadequate foundations. 
