i) 
IA TO TE 
[NovEMBER 5, 1896 
| 
fundamental physical ideas. A mere perusal of current 
discussions on variation, correlation, panmixia, will avail 
to show how “right wild and windy” it is in the field of 
English biology also. This is the second stand-point 
from which a consideration of the ideas of Dreyer and 
Volkmann may be of value. Their books may help us 
to realise the condition of affairs at home, and if we 
do that we shall hardly find much ground for national 
self-congratulation. 
During the last ten or fifteen years a very great 
revolution has been more or less silently taking place in 
the philosophical theory of men of science, The 
revolution is very far from being complete, for old 
theories are hard to dissolve when they have crystallised 
into dogmas. The chaotic definitions of the text-books, 
the chaotic thinking of too many biological contro- 
versialists, are all signs of a transition period, of new ideas 
struggling with old modes of expression, with an antique 
terminology suited to a scientific philosophy no longer cap- 
able of satisfying modern intellectual needs. But whether 
we turn to Germany, to France, or to our own country, 
and study the literature which touches on the erkenntnis- 
theoretische foundations of science, we shall alike be 
forced to the conclusion that a revolution in scientific 
thought has been taking place, and that in the minds of 
the more philosophical men of science, it is already 
complete. There are many ways of summing up the 
purport of this revolution. Perhaps the shortest, if not 
the most expressive, is to say’that the old division of 
science into exact and descriptive sciences is now seen to 
be illusory. The immense progress made in the first half 
of this century with theoretical mechanics, the success 
with which mechanical reasoning was applied in the 
third quarter of the century to the great physical dis- 
coveries of that period, led men of science not unnaturally 
to postulate mechanism as the basis of all natural 
processes whatsoever. Particles, molecules, atoms, 
impacts, vibrations, laws of forces were the forms 
under which all nature worked, and by which all things 
were to be explained. The dogma that mechanism 
would explain the universe may have been philosophically 
absurd, but by concentrating men’s thoughts on one 
method of investigation, it led to a whole round of 
splendid discoveries. For all but the great leaders of 
science work under any theory, under any dogma indeed, 
which has produced and is still capable of producing great 
results, is far better than the invention of new hypotheses, 
Fruitful new hypotheses have almost always been the 
product of master-minds, which have worked out old 
theories to the point at which they are seen to 
absolutely contradict phenomena. The ’prentice hand 
finding some new fact at present unaccounted for 
by the old-established theory is generally over-hasty 
with the fabrication of a new hypothesis. The true 
criterion for the modification or rejection of an established 
theory which has produced sound scientific results is 
not its present insufficiency to account for this or that 
isolated group of phenomena—its insufficiency may arise 
from the weakness of our analysis, or from want of insight 
in our application of it—the criterion lies rather in a 
demonstrable contradiction between the theory and some 
particular class of phenomena. The existence of such a 
contradiction can only be satisfactorily proven by a master 
NO. 1410, VOL. 55 | 
with the firmest grasp of theory and the fullest appre- 
ciation of natural facts. “Had the necessity for such a 
criterion been borne in mind, the field of biology would 
possibly not now look so “wild and windy.” Has there 
not been a far too ready invention of new hypotheses— 
on the ground that the theory of natural selection com- 
bined with heredity has not hitherto provided a satis- 
factory account of certain phenomena—while, as a matter 
of fact, the modification or rejection of such a fruitful 
theory ought to be solely based on the absolute contra- 
diction of its deductions by our experience of nature? 
The whole point is, indeed, well illustrated by Herr 
Dreyer’s onslaught on “die moderne Entwicklungslehre 
mit ihrem famosen Darwinismus,” which “noch so 
It is perfectly easy to show 
kannibalisch wohl fuhlt.” 
that neither Darwinism?! nor mechanism in their respective 
spheres have accounted for anything but a small fringe 
of organic phenomena. It is quite easy to postulate the 
possibility of other evolutionary hypotheses and of “ vital 
forces,” which in the future may render account of other 
ranges of phenomena. But take, for example, such a 
concept as “vital force”—the definition of which is so. 
obscure that it is impossible to assert or deny its exist- 
ence—and ask what fruitful results it has contributed to 
biology as compared with what has been achieved by an 
application of mechanical theory—under which term we 
should include chemico-physical laws? Herr Dreyer is 
very stern with Otto Liebmann for ridiculing “vital 
force”; but when we come to investigate what Herr 
Dreyer himself understands by “vital force,” it appears 
to be embraced in a Lebensgesetslichkett, which shall be 
coordinate with, and not superior to the Physikalische 
Gesetzlichkeit. The study of this Lebensgesetzlichkett is 
to form the science of Vz¢a/istik. It would be interest- 
ing to know who has been so rash as to deny the exist- 
ence of yet undiscovered laws of life, which are not 
identical, but coordinate with already established 
physical laws. Herr Dreyer’s position may be thus 
summed up: It is not proven that physics can lead us 
everywhere in the organic field, let us try the fabrication 
of new hypotheses and build up a new science of 
vitalistics. 
Well, and good! A master-mind may some day pro- 
pound an hypothesis of value ; we should have preferred 
the statement of single new Ledensgesetz to all Herr 
Dreyer’s discussion on Lebensgesetslichkeit, We hold that 
for the every-day man of science it is better to work a by- 
no-means exhausted vein of ore, than rush off to the still 
unworked, but highly-puffed field of vitalistics. Science 
as well as commerce has its gold reefs—without gold. 
Nor was the attack of the so hannibalisch wohl fihlende 
moderne Entwicklungsmanner on Lebenskraft without its 
justification. That term embraced an unscientific attempt 
to slur over ignorance, and encouraged loose thinking by 
stealing from mechanics in the word “force” some of 
the clearness and definiteness of mechanical concepts. 
That no knowledge of Lebensgesetzlichkeit came out of 
its use, can we think be historically proven, nor are we, 
indeed, prepared to admit that it even acted for a time 
as a successful bulwark against a materialistic view of 
1 By “ Darwinism” may here be broadly understood the theory which 
supposes evolution to have taken place by natural selection combined with 
heredity. 
