NATURE 



381 



THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, ij 



THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF WAR-SHIES 

 'THE Times of the 19th inst. contains a long and 

 •L vigorous criticism by Sir E. J. Reed, M.P., of the 

 ten largest British ships of war "launched in 1879, or 

 since, or remaining on the stocks.'' These are the Ajax, 

 Agamemnon, Colossus, Edinburgh, and the six vessels 

 which constitute the Admiral class. These vessels are all 

 built upon the central citadel system — i.e. their armoured 

 portions are merely citadels erected in the middle of the 

 length ; the ends being left without armour-plating. One 

 of these ships may thus be considered as being divided 

 into three parts, so far as her out-of-water structure is 

 concerned. The central part is plated completely around 

 with very thick armour, which extends from the upper 

 deck to several feet below the water-line ; while the parts 

 before and abaft this are not protected by armour, but 

 rest upon a thickly plated deck situated at the depth of 

 the lower edge of the citadel armour. This deck protects 

 the hull beneath the armour against the effects of a 

 plunging fire. 



This system of construction was advocated by Sir E. J. 

 Reed before the Committee of Naval Designs in 1871. 

 It was first adopted in the Inflexible ; and immediately 

 gave rise to a discussion respecting the size of the 

 armoured citadel which Sir E. J. Reed has, with per- 

 sistent energy, kept up ever since. The Times' letter 

 above referred to is a continuation of the old, and 

 well-remembered, Inflexible debate. A statement of the 

 points then in dispute will be found in Nature of July 12 

 and 19, 1877. Sir E. J. Reed maintained that the fighting 

 power of the Inflexible was gravely compromised by the 

 shortness of her armoured citadel — which was not long 

 enough to make the ship stable in the event of her thinly 

 plated ends being so much injured as to lose all power of 

 excluding water. A committee was appointed to inquire 

 into and report upon the matter, but Sir E. J. Reed 

 refused to give evidence before it. 



Sir E. J. Reed now says, with reference to the later ships 

 of this type : " I have to state, and am prepared to demon- 

 strate to any competent tribunal, that there is not one of 

 these ten ships, the latest added to the British Navy, that 

 cannot be either capsized and sunk, or sunk without 

 capsizing, without any shot or shell whatever being 

 directed against those parts of the ship which are 

 armoured. . . . The French armoured ships . . . 

 must in all reason be expected to dispose of these 

 English ships in a very few minutes by simply destroying 

 their unarmoured parts. ... I will here repeat in the 

 most public and responsible manner that the Ajax, 

 Agamemnon, Colossus, and Edinburgh, and the six ships 

 of the Admiral class, are all utterly unfit to engage the 

 corresponding French ships ; unfit to enter the line-of- 

 battle at all ; and unfit to be retained on the list of 

 armoured ships." 



This is strong language, but not so strong as that which 

 is used respecting the members of the Board of Admiralty 

 and the Constructors of the Navy. Sir E. J. Reed blames 

 Admiral Sir Cooper Key, the First Sea Lord of the 

 Admiralty, for not setting his face against " the prospect 

 Vol. xxxi.— No. 800 



of British ship after ship capsizing in battle, before their 

 armour had been violated or touched." He fears that the 

 day may be near " when the present betrayal of our Navy 

 by a set of politicians, admirals, and constructors may 

 wring from us a cry which the very ends of the earth will 

 hear.'' The Admiralty of the day is " foolish enough, 

 cruel, heedless, reckless, and faithless enough " to rely 

 upon the skill and vigilance of the seamen " whom they 

 send unprotected to destruction " : and " to substitute 

 them for those actual physical defences which the ship 

 herself should embody." Sir E. J. Reed is " fast coming 

 to feel something very like contempt " for the heads of 

 the Admiralty; and he considers that "they are unequal 

 to the work they have undertaken, and have become a 

 source of grave national danger. . . . Upon the heads 

 of the present Board of Admiralty must continue to rest, 

 after this public warning, the responsibility of delivering 

 ten British ships of the largest class an easy and certain 

 prey to destruction should war arise." 



These are grave charges ; and if the questions in- 

 volved by them could be settled by forcible or scornful 

 language, there would be little remaining to be said. It 

 is desirable, however, to disregard as much as possible 

 the rhetorical effect of the statements made, and to en- 

 deavour to ascertain what are the simple facts of the case. 

 It is important likewise to remember that the comparison 

 instituted between our ships and those of the French is 

 not one between fully armoured and partially armoured 

 ships, but between partially armoured ships on both sides. 

 The armour protection is very limited in the French 

 ships, but it is differently distributed from what it is in 

 ours. The armour of the French ships stops at a very 

 small height above the water-line: and the space between 

 the top of the armour and the upper deck may be de- 

 stroyed as easily as the unarmoured ends of our ships . 

 Any approach to destruction would completely cripple 

 the fighting power, speed, and manoeuvring qualities of 

 these ships. 



If the assumptions upon which Sir E. J. Reed's main 

 argument is based are sound and indisputable, then no 

 condemnation of the Board of Admiralty and of the 

 Naval Constructors could be too strong or unqualified. 

 We are disposed to go a long way with him in believing 

 that all is not so well as might be wished with our recent 

 ships, and that there is incompetency and something very 

 like indifference to be found in high quarters at the 

 Admiralty : but, before adopting, in all their breadth and 

 fullness, the views so vigorously and ably advocated by 

 Sir E. J. Reed, there are one or two points upon which we 

 feel that more light is needed. Indeed, we are convinced 

 that the present widely discordant views that are held by 

 the different parties to this naval discussion are im- 

 possible of reconciliation until the points referred to are 

 cleared up. 



The chief one of all is, Can the thinly-plated ends of 

 these citadel ships be readily destroyed in action and 

 made useless — or worse than useless — for the purpose of 

 contributing buoyancy or stability to the ship ? If they 

 can, it is obvious that the ship's safety may be speedily 

 endangered without the thick armour plating of the citadel 

 being penetrated. Sir E. J. Reed assumes that this is 

 unquestionably the case, and he emphatically asserts that 

 our ten most powerful ships of recent construction might 



