!8a 



NA TURE 



\_Fcb. 26, 1885 



be disposed of" in a very few minutes by simply destroy- 

 ing their unarmoured parts." It is upon this assumption 

 that his charges against our ships and their constructors 

 are mainly based. If it be correct, the Admiralty stand 

 convicted of culpable neglect or error ; but if it be in- 

 correct, or very doubtful, then Sir E. J. Reed's charges 

 are pointless and unjustifiable. 



The question is one of most vital importance to the 

 fighting efficiency of our principal ships of war ; but how- 

 is it to be settled ? It is not one with which mere theory 

 or abstract science can deal : actual experiment can alone 

 answer it. Sir E. J. Reed believes, and asserts, that such 

 structures as the thinly-plated ends of our recent ironclads 

 may be effectually destroyed in a few minutes, and that 

 single shells may shatter large portions of them into 

 fragments. He says: — "It is not a mere question of 

 riddling the ends, but also one of blowing them up by 

 shell fire : and how effectually they may be thus destroyed 

 was shown at Alexandria, where a single shell, bursting 

 against the unarmoured part of the Superlrs side, tore a 

 hole in it 10 feet by 4 feet in extent.'' 



The apologists for this system of construction say, on 

 the other hand, that if the area is increased over which 

 the armour is spread, as would be the case if the citadels 

 were lengthened, the thickness of armour throughout 

 would require to be reduced ; and the armour protection 

 would therefore be less in the central portion of the ship 

 which incloses the boilers, engines, and other essential 

 elements of fighting efficiency. Many naval artillerists say, 

 further, that unless the ends can be plated with the very 

 thickest of armour, it is better to include everything which 

 contributes to fighting power within the armoured citadel 

 or below the armoured deck, and to make the ends as 

 thin as possible. They argue that shells which meet with 

 considerable resistance in penetrating armour of moderate 

 thickness will shatter the ship's side, and make holes which 

 cannot be stopped : whereas they almost invariably make 

 clean holes through thin plating, and would, in the vast 

 majority of cases, pass through the ship and out upon 

 the other side. Such an instance as Sir E. J. Reed 

 calls attention to in the case of the Superb would not, 

 it is said, occur in practice more than once in one hund- 

 red times. The clean holes made by shells in thin 

 plating can be stopped effectually and quickly by men 

 stationed inside with shot-hole stoppers. These are made 

 of india-rubber, and open and close like an umbrella. 

 They are pushed out from the inside, and then pulled 

 back and opened over the outside of the hole. The 

 buoyancy and stability afforded by the ends can, it is 

 confidently stated, be preserved by these means ; whereas 

 the damage done to any but the very thickest of armour 

 plating would be so much greater that the holes made by 

 shells could not be so effectually dealt with. 



It is also pointed out that it is extremely difficult to 

 strike a ship exactly at her water-line. The great majority 

 of projectiles strike at some distance above it. If they are 

 aimed too low they ricochet from the water surface and 

 strike the ship above the water-line. It is most difficult 

 to penetrate a ship exactly at her water-line ; and if she is 

 so penetrated, the holes may be much more readily and 

 effectually stopped when the plating is thin than when it 

 is thick. This is the argument which forms the answer to 

 Sir E. J. Reed's charges. 



Sir E. J. Reed says that "the reply to the British ships 

 which are being made to depend for their flotation and 

 stability upon their unarmoured ends will inevitably be 

 small-gun attack," and he considers that even the fire 

 from machine-guns may be sufficient to cripple them. 

 This opens up a complicated question and one which 

 cannot be fully considered in all its details from a merely 

 abstract point of view. There is obviously, however, a 

 limit to the effective use of small gun and machine-gun 

 fire, which is imposed by the necessity of protecting them 

 by armour if they are to fight at short range. If the guns 

 are not protected by armour they can only be relied upon 

 at long ranges ; and even then they may as readily be 

 placed hors de combat by the fire from the enemy as 

 succeed in penetrating, still less in destroying, the 

 unarmoured ends of the latter. 



These are points which experience alone can throw any 

 clear and definite light upon. Each party may continue to 

 advocate its own view with great show of reason, but 

 neither will convince the other till the effect of artillery fire 

 upon such structures as the unarmoured ends of the ships 

 in question has been thoroughly, tested. In the meantime 

 the public mind is only being bewildered and wearied by 

 the reiterated discussions of questions which cannot be 

 settled by mere argument or force of words. 



A structure similar to the unarmoured ends of one of 

 our ships might easily be built and placed afloat. It 

 should then be fired at from various distances with guns of 

 different sizes. Valuable data might then be obtained 

 upon two crucial points : (1) the percentage of shots 

 which would strike sufficiently near the water-line to 

 affect prejudicially the buoyancy or stability ; and (2) the 

 nature of the holes that would be made ; whether such as 

 are capable of being easily stopped from the inside, or 

 such as admit of no effectual stoppage, but practically 

 constitute a disintegration or destruction of the fabric. 

 This simple experiment might surely be made in such a 

 way as to set at rest the discussion that has now been 

 going on for so many years respecting the efficiency of 

 the system upon which the safety and fighting power of 

 our most powerful ships depends. Still, " water condi- 

 tions " would be the most favourable for such'experiments ; 

 because it would obviously be more difficult to make 

 good practice at a vessel's water-line in action — under 

 the ordinary circumstances, at sea, of rolling motion and 

 the relative movements of the vessels engaged — than at a 

 quiet and carefully arranged trial. 



The only logical and effective answer that can be 

 made to Sir E. J. Reed's letter is that which would be 

 furnished by the results of experiments such as we have 

 indicated ; and that answer cannot be made too soon, or 

 too complete, either for the reputation of the Admiralty 

 and of the Constructors of the Navy — who, to say the 

 least, appear to be greatly in the dark respecting the 

 practical merits of the system to which they are com- 

 mitted — or for the satisfaction of the public mind. 



This question, upon the merits of which Sir E. J. Reed's 

 charges must either stand or fall, is one which only Science 

 can settle by experimental tests ; but there is an important 

 point underlying another assumption contained in his letter 

 which may be discussed with advantage from a more ab- 

 stract point of view. He says : "The Admiralty Director of 

 Naval Construction, in the article 'Navy,' in the 'Encyclo- 



