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THURSDAY, JANUARY 18, 1906. 



THE HIGHER TELEOLOGY. 

 The Interpretation of Nature. By C. Lloyd Morgan, 

 LL.D., F.R.S. Pp. 164. (Bristol: J. W. Arrow- 

 smith; London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1905.) 

 Price 2.s\ net. 

 pROF. LLOYD MORGAN stands as a daysman 

 *■ between the naturalistic and the teleological in- 

 terpretations of Nature, and the result of his arbitra- 

 tion is that both are valid, though neither by itself is 

 satisfying. Naturalism aims at an analysis of occur- 

 rences in terms of the simplest possible formula; — 

 mechanical by preference— at a genetic description of 

 the stages by which any particular configuration — the 

 solar system, the scenery of Scotland, the simplest 

 organism, Man and his mind— has come about. " It 

 finds its principle of unification in the universality and 

 inter-connection of world-events; it works inwards 

 from external nature to the life and mind of man 

 which it interprets as expressions of natural law." It 

 is a -urn way of looking at things, knowing nothing 

 of beginnings or ends, never asking " why? " and 

 never really answering even the question "how?" 

 It flourishes William of Occam's razor, searching as 

 he who shaved Shagpat for the periodically sprouting 

 "identical," "principle" or "entity" to lop it off. 

 It speaks not willingly of "causes," but deals with 

 "antecedent conditions." "It regards the state of 

 the whole universe at any given moment as a con- 

 figuration of very great complexity, involving acceler- 

 ations of many different orders co-existing in natural 

 relationship, and it believes that the cause or con- 

 dition of this configuration is that of the preceding 

 moment, while the configuration of the succeeding 

 moment is its effect. This involves a splendid act of 

 faith, for it assuredly outruns what can, in the present 

 slate of knowledge, be definitely proved." 



While many thinkers have sought to stay the pro- 

 gress of the triumphant chariot of Naturalism by 

 exhibiting notices " No road this way," the chariot- 

 drivers have paid no heed, but have gone nonchalantly 

 on through the policies of Life and Mind, of Morals 

 and Society, only pausing, as courtesy demanded, to 

 say that they wen- giving no explanations, merely 

 genetic descriptions. What is particularly inter- 

 esting in Prof. Lloyd Morgan's attitude is that he 

 wishes them God-speed, and is entirely disinclined 

 to call a halt at any particular difficulty in the way of 

 naturalistic formulation. It is true, he says, that the 

 antecedent conditions of the genesis of protoplasm, for 

 instance, are unknown, but they may not remain un- 

 known, and " those who would concentrate the 

 mystery of existence on the pin-point of the genesis 

 of protoplasm do violence alike to philosophy and to 

 religion." Or again, in" reference to the naturalistic 

 doctrine of the ego, that what we call mind is, from 

 the restricted point of view of scientific psychology, 

 the name we apply to a sequence of mental configura- 

 tions, the author writes : — " But — it can't be proved. 

 Never mind that. Some day it may be proved. And 

 NO. 1890, VOL. J T,] 



in any case to believe more than can be reduced to 

 actual demonstration is not only a characteristic of 

 human nature, but often one of the prime conditions 

 of progress." It is evident, then, that this arbiter fully 

 appreciates the naturalistic universe of discourse, and 

 has no timidity in wishing that its ideal of formula- 

 tion may be realised. For in proportion to the 

 realisation of the naturalistic aim, which is to formu- 

 late our routine of experience in terms of the simplest 

 possible ideal constructions, in proportion to its dis- 

 closure of determinate evolution all along the line, in 

 proportion to its elimination of "purpose," "causal 

 agency," and "end" from its universe of discourse, 

 it will become clear that this mode of interpretation, 

 however necessary and valuable for scientific work- 

 manship, is too partial and abstract to satisfy those 

 who feel that the purpose of their life is the most 

 intimate and fundamental reality of which they have 

 any knowledge. In other words, it is the aim of 

 Lloyd Morgan's eirenicon " to show that a belief in 

 purpose as the causal reality of which nature is the 

 expression is not inconsistent with a full and whole- 

 hearted acceptance of the explanations of naturalism 

 within their appropriate sphere." 



This little book deals with big questions, and many 

 who have pondered over them will be grateful to the 

 author for the lucidity of his argument, which is an 

 expression of his own clear vision, and is also perhaps 

 partly due to the fact that the book took shape as 

 the Lowell lectures for 1904. Many will be grateful, 

 we believe, for more than the pleasure of reading a 

 vivid and stimulating course of lectures, namely, for 

 a liberation from the obsession of a mechanistic 

 outlook. The author expounds the naturalistic scheme 

 with great sympathy, while disclosing its implications 

 and limitations, but he maintains convincingly that 

 " a complete and satisfactory interpretation of nature 

 is, so far as it is attainable by man, partly scientific 

 and partly metaphysical." We look, as it were, for 

 a greatest common measure as well as a lowest 

 common denominator of the fractions of reality which 

 make up our experience. We cannot remain satisfied 

 with a description of the observed moves among the 

 pieces on the chequered chess-board of experience; we 

 cannot but ask " how there comes to be a game to 

 be played, and when this is settled how, or by what 

 unseen agency, castles and knights and pawns are 

 moved, each with a distinctive path, across the 

 board." But this is beyond science; it is the other 

 side of the shield; and the problem is :— By what ideal 

 construction, valid in reason and valid in life, can we 

 supplement the partiality of the naturalistic outlook? 

 In a way of his own the poet feels that the whole 

 universe "trembles with song"; the artist in his 

 outlook, certainly not the least sane, has as little use 

 for mechanistic categories as the mechanist has for 

 wood-nymphs; the religious mood sees the iron chains 

 of determinate evolution transmuted into golden 

 chains which bind all things about the feet of God. 

 But what more universal outlook is there for plain 

 men dwelling in tents? 



The answer given in this eirenicon is simple in 

 expression but far-reaching in its outcome. It is that 



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