2 3 8 



NA TURE 



\_July 10, 1884 



vibrio, because a vibrio, and particularly a Vibrio rugula 



(sp. Colin), is the organism which he describes as a 

 " comma-shaped " bacillus. E. K. 



SULLY'S "OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY" 

 Outlines of Psychology \ with Special Reference to the 



Theory of Education. By James Sully, M.A. (London : 



Longmans, Green, and Co., 1884.) 

 A T the present time no one is so well qualified as Mr. 

 Sully to write in the English language a text-book 

 of psychology. Himself not committed to any of the 

 systems of philosophy, he is unsurpassed in his knowledge 

 of all, while we do not think it is too much to add that 

 there is no one in this country who can be said to equal 

 him in his acquaintance with the literature of pure 

 psychology. Moreover, the weight of his information is 

 ably balanced by that of his judgment, and therefore we 

 were prepared to expect that in the often difficult task of 

 drawing the lines between philosophy and psychology, 

 he would furnish in this text-book and in this particular 

 a brilliant example of scientific discrimination. After 

 having carefully read his work with this consideration 

 before our mind, we are glad to allow that our expectation 

 has been fully realised, so that in no case can we say that 

 we have found a philosophical theory doing duty for a 

 psychological fact, or a psychological doctrine unduly 

 coloured by the use of any philosophical spectacles. 

 And this carefulness of method is the more creditable to 

 the author, inasmuch as he nowhere avoids pointing out 

 the relations in which this and that truth of psychology 

 stands to this and that system of philosophy. 



The work, which runs to about 700 pages, is 1 'mo- 

 mently arranged in large and small print paragraphs, with 

 headings in large type, while copious foot-notes give 

 references to all the more important literature on each 

 point as it arises. " Outlines of Psychology" is thus a 

 treatise well adapted to fulfil one of the most important 

 functions of a text-book, viz. that of reference. But the 

 main object which Mr. Sully has in view is that of supply- 

 ing a text-book for educational purposes, and in order to 

 further its usefulness in this respect he systematically 

 tra\ els beyond the " outlines of psychology'' in seeking, 

 as he says in the preface, " to give a practical turn to the 

 exposition by bringing out the bearings of the subject on the 

 conduct and cultivation of the mind. With this object I 

 have ventured here and there to encroach on the territory 

 of logic, aesthetics, and ethics, that is to say, the practical 

 sciences which aim at the regulation of mental processes. 

 Further, 1 have added special sections in a separate type 

 dealing with the bearing of the science on education." 



It will thus be seen that the work is designed to meet 

 the wants of divers classes of readers — teachers as well as 

 students, and professed psychologists as well as beginners. 

 But, owing to the arrangement of the subject-matter 

 and to the employment of different kinds of type, con- 

 fusion between the several "bjects which the writer has 

 in view is avoided, while each class of reader can imme- 

 diatelj fi I what 1; i intended that he should read. For 

 our own part we have found profit in not skipping any- 

 thing : there is advantage to be gained by reviewing even 

 the elementary truths of psychology when these are s,, 

 ■ li arly marshalled in logical order. 



If we were asked to indicate in what one respect more 

 than another the present text-book of psychology differs 

 from its predecessors, we should say that it does so in 

 giving prominence to the principles of development. 

 Without expressly espousing the theory of evolution, Mr. 

 Sully carries through his exposition a latent reference to 

 it, and clearly shows that he considers one of the most 

 important duties of the present-day psychologist to be 

 that of tracing on the one hand the probable influences of 

 heredity upon mental constitution, and on the other the 

 historical order of events in the psychogenesis of the indi- 

 vidual. This leads him to assign a prominent place to 

 the literature which of late years has joined the philo- 

 sopher to the sect of baby-worshippers ; and it is evident, 

 from the number of original observations which are 

 scattered through the book, that Mr. Sully must himself 

 have spent no small amount of time and devotion at the 

 shrine. Here is one of his experiences, in which " a 

 little girl of 4jr years once drove her mother to one of 

 the most difficult problems of philosophy." On asking why ■ 

 a wasp could not hurt a window-pane with its sting, and 

 on being told in answer, " Because the window-pane has 

 no nerves and so is not able to feel," the child perplexed 

 the learning of the household by asking — " Why do nerves 

 feel?" We quote this little incident in order to cap it 

 with one of a still more embarrassing kind, which we were 

 told a short time ago. Another little girl of the same age 

 was silently watching her father write his sermon, and 

 after protracted observation put to him the somewhat dif- 

 ficult question — " Papa, does God tell you what to write 

 in a sermon ? " With some little hesitation our clerical 

 friend replied in the affirmative, whereupon he was igno- 

 miniously nonplused by the further question — "Then, 

 papa, why do you scratch it out again ? " 



Where so much work has been so well done, the function 

 of criticism would be an ungracious one. Nor, indeed, is it 

 an easy thing to pick, and still less to find, a hole in Mr. 

 Sully's armour. The most important of the doctiines 

 which we are disposed to question is the one which says, 

 " In later life we rarely if ever judge without making a 

 verbal statement or proposition externally or internally " 

 (p. 392). This doctrine is no doubt one that is very gene- 

 rally accepted, but it appears to us, with as little doubt, 

 absolutely untrue. Unless we limit the term Judgment 

 to the very act of Predication (in which case the term is 

 divested of all its distinctive meaning), it appears to us as 

 obvious as anything can be that in order to form a judg- 

 ment there is no need to frame a proposition. Thus, for 

 instance, to adopt Mr. Sully's illustrations, whether by an 

 immediate act of observation I judge "This rose is 

 blighted," or conclude from certain signs in the sky that 

 it is going to rain, in neither case is it necessary for me to 

 clothe the judgment in words, "externally or internally" 

 spoken. The judgment (as distinguished from the state- 

 ment of it) is in both cases formed quite independently of 

 speech, in the same manner as are the so-called " practical 

 judgments" of infants and animals. But not only so. 

 Even with respect to the more elaborated judgments which 

 belong to what Lewes called " the logic of signs," we do 

 not believe that, when once the needful structure of con- 

 ception has been erected by the scaffolding of verbal 

 signs, it is then always necessary to revert to this scaffold- 

 ing every time that the conceptions are required for the 



