March 9, 1882] 
NATURE - 
man, and our astonishment at the feebleness of his pro- 
duction. Taking as fair and unbiased a view as we can, 
it appears to us that, as a mere matter of pleading, if this 
is all that can be said, even by a Lord Chief Justice, in 
favour of abolishing physiological experiment, the physio- 
logists could not well find a better advocate. . Indeed, as 
the paper throughout shows ill-concealed evidence of in- 
tolerable irritation, its manner, as well as its matter, 
suggests that the writer himself begins to feel that he has 
committed a mistale in too early and too warmly espousing 
én irrational cause. But, be this as it may, we shall 
endeavour to state, as fairly as we can, the course of his 
argument. 
We have already seen that he expressly disregards the 
question of utility, and bases his argument “on grounds 
of another sort.” These grounds are that, even if prac. 
tically useful to the extent claimed by physiologists and 
medical men, knowledge gained by vivisection ought not 
to be sought or tolerated, inasmuch as it is “ unlawful,” 
or “pursued by means which are immoral.” Here, at 
least, we have a definite marking out of the “grounds” 
on which Lord Coleridge justifies his determination, as he 
says, “earnestly to support the Bill which Mr. Reid is 
about to submit to the House of Commons,” 7. the Bill 
for total abolition. We think, therefore, that it becomes 
a matter of importance clearly to define what is here 
meant by “immoral” and “unlawful.” The only indica- 
tion given by Lord Coleridge of such a definition is as 
follows: ‘‘I deny altogether that it concludes the ques- 
tion to admit that vivisection enlarges knowledge; I do 
not doubt that it does, but I deny that the pursuit of 
knowledge is in itself lawful; still more do I deny that 
the gaining knowledge justifies all means of gaining it.” 
So far as these general propositions are concerned the 
principles of morality are obvious, and would be disputed 
by no one; but now for the special case of vivisection, 
“To begin with, proportion is forgotten. Suppose it 
capable of proof that by putting to death with hideous 
torment 3000 horses you could find out the real nature of 
some feverish symptom, I should say without the least 
hesitation that it would be unlawful to torture the 3000 
horses.’ Now in the first place, supposing—as we must 
suppose if the illustration is to stand as argument— 
that the knowledge gained concerning the “feverish 
symptom” is to be knowledge useful in the saving of 
human life, we think that a truer note of ‘‘morality ”’ is 
struck by Sir James Paget when he writes of a man whom 
he saw die under chloroform faultlessly given, “he was 
so good and generous a man that I felt it would have 
been right to kill a hundred animals either to save his life 
or to find out why he died, and to be able in the future to 
avert so awful a catastrophe.” And if it is sound morality 
thus to feel that one hundred animals may be sacrificed 
to avert one such catastrophe, can it be otherwise to feel 
that three thousand animals may be “ lawfully” sacri- 
ficed with the certainty of gaining assured knowledge— 
for this is the argument—which is to save many human 
lives ? 
But, in the second place, this brings us to the question 
of proportion, which is rather vaguely presented in Lord 
Coleridge’s illustration. And on this question the physio- 
logists are perfectly ready to join issue ; in fact it is one 
of their strongest positions, and cannot be more tersely 
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stated than it is by Dr. Carpenter, whose very temperate 
and most judicious essay on the “ Ethics of Vivisection,”’ 
appears in the same number of the Fortnightly Review, 
and in this, asin several other points, anticipates Lord 
Coleridge’s arguments in a manner singularly complete. 
He here says: ‘“ My argument then, is that if in all the 
foregoing cases (ze. of animal labour, &c.) the moral con- 
sciousness of those who consider themselves most elevated 
in the scale of humanity justifies the infliction of animal 
suffering for what is obviously a real benefit to man, even 
though the continuance of such benefit involves ¢he cov- 
stant renewal of the suffering, much more is a temporary, 
and limited infliction justifiable, for the discovery of such 
scientific truths as have a clear prospective bearing on 
human well-being, moral as well as physical, since every 
such discovery, once established, is a boon for ever, not 
only in its direct applications, but in serving as a stepping- 
stone to further discoveries, which may prove of still 
more priceless benefit.” 
Again, Sir W. Gull very properly asks: ‘“ Why does 
Lord Coleridge, for the purpose of his argument, select 
horses, and why so large a number as three thousand? 
He must know that the horse has been but little -experi- 
mented upon... so that the supposition of three 
thousand horses and hideous torment is an exaggerated 
expression, out of proportion to the facts—misleading, 
and in no way conducive to a fair judgment of the ques- 
tion at issue.’ The truth is, it would be better for the 
cause which Lord Coleridge has embraced if “ propor- 
tion” could be ‘‘ forgotten” ; for the strongest point in 
the counter-argument is that there is no comparison 
between the ratios—as Pain inflicted on animals for other 
purposes: Pain inflicted by Vivisection: : Prevention of 
Pain resulting from the former: Prevention of Pain, or 
other utility, resulting from the latter. And therefore, 
just because they do of forget the question of proportion, 
physiologists maintain that it is unreasonable in humani- 
tarians to attack the only kind of “cruelty ”’ that is really 
fruitful—and fruitful a hundredfold—in mitigating pain, 
not only in the case of man, but, as Mr. Fleming shows 
by his very astonishing tabular statements, also in the 
case of animals. Yet this essential argument has wholly 
escaped the observation of Lord Coleridge, and as a con- 
sequence he entirely misapprehends the subordinate argu- 
ment of the physiologists who point to cases of admitted, 
wholesale, and useless kinds of cruelty as those towards 
which the energy of humanitarians should be directed. 
For he represents this argument as saying: Because there 
are many other kinds of cruelty of greater magnitude in the 
world, therefore ‘‘something which, consistently with all 
this argument, may be horribly cruel and utterly worth- 
less, is to be let alone.” Truly Lord Coleridge may be 
“ positively mortified to have to notice” such an argument 
as this ; only no one, so far as our knowledge extends, has 
ever advanced it. No physiologist could besimple enough 
to defend vivisection on the supposition that it “‘may be 
horribly cruel and utterly worthless.” The real argument to 
which Lord Coleridge refers is this :—Because there are 
many practices permitted which are without question 
horribly cruel and utterly useless, therefore it is irrational 
folly to waste the energy of humanitarian feeling in a war- 
fare against the only kind of pain-giving practice which is 
directed towards the mitigation of pain, and which has 
