NATURE 



261 



THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1877 



THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF MIND 

 The Physical Basis of Mind, with Illustraiions, being 

 the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind. By 

 George Henry Lewes. (Triibner and Co., 1S77.) 



WHEN the first volume of "Problems of Life and 

 Mind " appeared, I ventured to say that perhaps 

 Mr. Lewes promised too much in undertaking to exhibit 

 " how the sentient phenomena may be explained by 

 neural phenomena." I also directed a criticism, as 

 pointed as I could make it, against a proposition placed 

 by Mr. Lewes at the foundation of his psychology ; 

 namely, that " actions are prompted and really guided by 

 feeling." The present volume is, in addition to much 

 else, Mr. Lewes fulfilment of his promise and his reply 

 to the criticism. 



Considering the limited amount of space at my dis- 

 posal, I shall, I believe, put it to most advantage by con- 

 fining myself to these two points. As regards the first — 

 the possibility of finding a physical basis of mind — a 

 sentence in the preface rouses misgivings : " Materialism, 

 in attempting to deduce the mental from the physical, 

 puts into the conclusion what the very terms have ex- 

 cluded from the premisses ; " " the attempt to interpret 

 the one by the other" is a legitimate undertaking only 

 " on the hypothesis of a physical process being only the 

 objective aspect of a mental process." This is of ill 

 omen ; that which can be done as science does not seek 

 its justification in metaphysics. But let the interpre- 

 tation be taken on its merits. What is it ? Though pre- 

 pared for disappointment, readers will doubtless be 

 surprised to hear that when looked for, it is nowhere to be 

 found. "The sensation, or state of consciousness," says 

 Mr. Lewes, " is the ultimate fact ; we can only explain it 

 by describing its objective conditions." In place of the 

 second proposition, "we can only explain," &c., most 

 thinkers prefer to say we cannot explain it, we can only 

 describe its objective conditions. The difference, then, 

 between Mr. Lewes and others, is not that he has any 

 new light to offer, but that he insists on calling that 

 an explanation which others cannot see to have that 

 character. The sense in which Mr. Lewes thinl-.s he 

 can correctly call a description of neural processes an 

 interpretation of mental facts rests on his statement of 

 the metaphysical hypothesis that these are but " different 

 aspects," " the two faces of one and the same reality." 

 " It is thus indifferent," he continues, " whether we say 

 a sensation is a neural process or a mental process ; a 

 molecular change in the nervous system, or a change in 

 feeling." Suppose all this to be understood and granted, 

 where is the explanation or interpretation of the one by the 

 other ? Is a description of one aspect of a thing an ex- 

 planation of a very different aspect of the same reahty .' 

 Not even metaphysical legerdemain can give the illusion 

 of a physical basis of mind. Mr. Lewes sees that it is 

 impossible to conceive a neural process as causini; the 

 mental process. He does not say that molecular move- 

 ment becomes, or is transformed — in any sense, conceiv- 

 able or inconceivable — into sensation. Mind is not the 

 Vol. XVI. — No. 405 



outcome of physical conditions], or combinations ; it is 

 an aspect, " the spiritual aspect of the material organism." 

 Readers may now judge whether Mr. Lewes can claim 

 to have explained sentient phenomena by neural pheno- 

 mena, to have shown the manner in which the Self and 

 Not-self "are combined in feeling and thought." 



Against Mr. Lewes' proposition that the movements of 

 living beings are prompted and guided by feeling, I urged 

 that science has carried us to a point at which we have 

 but to pause and reflect to see that all movements must 

 be the consequents of purely physical antecedents ; that 

 the amount and direction of every nervous discharge 

 must depend solely on physical conditions. And I con- 

 tended that to see this clearly is to see that when we 

 speak of movement being guided by feeling, we use the 

 lantjuage of a less advanced stage of enlightenment. 

 This view has since occupied a good deal of public atten- 

 tion. Under the name of Automatism it has been advo- 

 cated by Prof. Huxley, and with a firmer logic by Prof. 

 Clifford. It has been argued about in the Spectator, 

 zealously combated by Dr. Carpenter, and now Mr. 

 Lewes makes it the subject of one of his Problems, 

 devoting seven chapters to its discussion. 



Mr. Lewes cannot think that Prof. Huxley really holds 

 the repulsive doctrine in question, though " supposed to 

 hold (it) by those whom his expressions mislead." Yet, 

 curiously enough, it is against Prof. Huxley's statement 

 that Mr. Lewes' polemic is specially addressed. It is 

 not my affair to reply for Prof Huxley. Mr. Lewes has, 

 however, mentioned me as having insisted " with iterated 

 emphasis " on the view he now " most earnestly desires 

 to refute." I must give my own statement. Here it is as 

 given in my review of " Problems of Life and ISIind ' 

 (I'he Examiner, March 14, 1874): — "Using the word 

 feeling in its ordinary acceptation, as a name for subjec- 

 tive phenomena alone, we assert not only that no evidence 

 can be given that /£•('//«<,' ever doesprompt or guide action, 

 but that the process of its doing so is inconceivable. How 

 can we picture to ourselves a state of consciousness 

 putting in motion any particle of matter, large or small ? 

 for this is really what it comes to. . . . Puss, while dozing 

 before the fire, hears a slight rustle in the corner, and 

 darts towards the spot. What has happened ? Certain 

 sound-waves have reached the ear, a series of physical 

 changes have taken place within the organism, special 

 groups of muscles have been brought into play, and the 

 body of the cat has changed its position on the floor. Is it 

 asserted that this chain of physical changes is not, at all 

 points, complete and sufficient within itself ? Mr. Lewes, we 

 believe, will not assert this ; he will admit that the material 

 succession is unbroken. Once more, then, in what sense 

 can we take the proposition that actions are prompted 

 and really guided hy feeling ? " Putting in the place of 

 my cat hunting for a mouse, the analogous'case of a wolf 

 springing on a sheep, Mr. Lewes replies : " Unless the 

 term physical is here used to designate the objective 

 sequence, as contemplated by an onlooker, who likens 

 the process to the sequence observable in a machine, I 

 should say that from first to last the process has been not 

 physical, but vital." The word " unless," with which the 

 reply opens, might be objected to, as implying that the 

 term " physical " might be here employed to designate 

 something else than the objective sequence — that succes- 



