262 



NA TURK 



{August 2, 1877 



sion of external events which can be seen or imagined in 

 terms of vision. Quite irrelevantly, as it seems to me, Mr. 

 Lewes specifies a particular kind of on-looker — one who 

 likens the process to the sequence observable in a machine. 

 I will only say that for myself I decline the honour 

 of a place among those physiologists and philosophers 

 who, according to Mr. Lewes, have failed to per- 

 ceive the " radical difference between organic and in- 

 organic mechanisms." However, Mr. Lewes has put it 

 on record that // when I spoke of a series of physical 

 changes taking place within the organism I meant 

 series of iiwri^anic changes — that the movements of 

 the cat resulted from something of the nature of a 

 combination of levers, springs, and pulleys, then, he 

 " should say that from first to last the process has 

 been }iot physical but vital.'' And who will question 

 that Mr. Lewes would be quite right in so saying ? But 

 why suppose anything so unlikely ? Yet this is the mean- 

 ing Mr. Lewes gives to the word " physical " when it 

 occurs in the mouths of those against whom he directs 

 his arguments. For instance : physiologists are in the 

 habit of describing unconscious reflex movements as 

 physical processes. Of this description Mr. Lewes says : 

 " Restate the conclusion in different terms and its fallacy 

 emerges ; 'organic processes suddenly cease to be organic, 

 and become purely physical by a slight change in their 

 relative position in the consensus.' " But to proceed. 

 Not having used the word " physical " in any peculiar 

 sense, but in accordance with ordinary usage, my question 

 remains — " Is it asserted that the chain of physical 

 changes is not, at all points, complete and sufficient 

 within itself ? " So far is Mr. Lewes from denying the 

 physical succession to be unbroken, that he states this, 

 or something very like it, over and over again, as a truth 

 almost too self-evident to require expression. Thus we 

 read : " So long as we are dealing with the objective 

 aspect we have nothing but material processes in a mate- 

 rial mechanism before us. A change within the organism 

 is caused by a neural stimulation, and the resulting action 

 is a reflex on the muscles. Here there is simply a trans- 

 ference of motion by a material mechanism. There is in 

 this no evidence of a subjective agency ; there could be 

 none." But we also find statements that seem to have a 

 contrary implication. Here is one : "The physiologist is 

 compelled to complete his objective observations by sub- 

 jective suggestions ; compelled to add feeling to the 

 terms of matter and motion, in spite of the radical diver- 

 sity of their aspects." How is he coiiipclU-d to infer that 

 of which Mr. Lewes has just told us there could be "no 

 evidence"? Again, while the volume abounds with 

 detailed descriptions of the behaviour of dogs, frogs, 

 and men, given as instances in which it is " evident 

 enough," to Mr. Lewes, that their actions were "deter- 

 mined by sensations, emotions, and ideas," yet Mr. Lewes 

 is equally positive that we are " passing out of the region 

 of physiology when we speak of feeling determining 

 action. Motion may determine Motion, but Feeling can 

 only determine Feeling." Where, then, are we, when we 

 talk of feeling determining action ? In, I maintain, the 

 gray morning of that intellectual light which is still far 

 from having reached its noon-day splendour. 



In the minds of our savage ancestors fei'liiii; was the 

 source of all movement. Every one of them had what Mr. 



Lewes, after all he has written about scientific method, can 

 call " the irresistible evidence each man carries in his ov/n 

 consciousness, that his actions are frequently — even if not 

 always — determined by feelings ; " and they spoke accord- 

 ing to their light. But while we shall continue to speak 

 of feeling determining action, it will only be as we speak 

 of the rising and the setting of the sun. Mr. Lewes is of 

 a different opinion. He says ; " We do so speak and ar^ 

 justified. For thereby we implicitly declare, whit 

 psychology explicitly teaches, namely, that these two 

 widely different aspects, objective and subjective, are but 

 the two faces of one and the same reality." If Mr. Lewes 

 did not go farther than this I should not care to quarrel 

 with his endeavour to put a new metaphysical meaning 

 into the language of old error. But he thinks that on the 

 strength of this hypothesis the material succession may 

 be regarded as [unbroken, and yet a rational interpre- 

 tation found for the proposition — actions are prompted 

 and really guided by feeling. Because the molecular 

 changes in the brain which form part of the series of 

 material changes involved in the production of motion 

 may be held to be, in a metaphysical sense, the other side 

 of what we know as feeling, Mr. Lewes somehow con- 

 cludes that " we must declare consciousness to be an 

 agent (in the production of motion), /// the same sense that 

 ii>e declare one change in the or&^anism to be an agent in 

 some other change" (the italics are by the author). Let 

 us see. The word " consciousness " here denotes two 

 things assumed by Mr. Lewes to be two faces of one 

 thing. If we substitute for this word one of these deno- 

 tations and say " we must declare the molecular changes 

 involved in the production of motion to be an agent, &c.," 

 the statement becomes the most empty tautology. If we 

 give to the word " consciousness " its other meaning — 

 feeling — the proposition becomes what Prof. Clifford calls 

 " nonsense ; " and is, as Mr. Lewes says, placing feeling 

 where "there is obviously no place for it — among material 

 agencies." If by "consciousness" Mr. Lewes means 

 neither the molecular changes nor the feeling, but the 

 something of which both are but aspects, then he is alto- 

 gether beyond science, and for the moment it is enough 

 to say that this metaphysical entity is not an agent " i?i 

 the same sense," &c. 



Corresponding to those feelings, which Mr. Lewes will 

 have it inspire and guide movement, there are conditions ' 

 of the organism which can be conceived as the causal I 

 antecedents of the movements — the feelings, as admitted, 1 

 cannot. Our instinctive faith in the unity and constancy 

 of things leaves us no room to doubt that identical organic 

 conditions will ever be accompanied by identical feelings 

 and followed by identical movements ; but this does not 

 bring into view any scientific sense in which the feelings 

 can be said to inspire and guide the movements. The!;e 

 for ever remain parts of an infinite series of physical con- 

 sequents following on physical antecedents. This is the 

 thesis at present so repulsive to many minds. Against 

 this Mr. Lewes has nothing to advance. If any look to 

 him for comfort they will find that, promising them bread, 

 he gives them a stone — the same stone that has already 

 set their teeth on edge. 



One word to correct a false impression that the fore- 

 going critical remarks would leave on minds unacquainted 

 with Mr. Lewes' writings. Let no one supposethat I have 



