298 
found that of monuments na i: all that can be said 
will be “‘ Etiam periere ruinz.” 
In France it is certainly the case that where a building 
or other ancient structure is “classé comme monument 
historique,” it is regarded with some degree of pride and 
affection by those who live near it, and the necessary ex- 
penses for the preservation of such monuments do not 
appear to be grudged. 
In this country, also, what small expense the Treasury 
might incur in the defence and preservation of our na- 
tional monuments would, we are sure, be cheerfully met ; 
but we are inclined to think that it will only be in rare 
and exceptional cases that any outlay whatever, beyond, 
perhaps, the expense of a few notices, will be necessary. 
Among the multitude of private Bills brought in at 
the commencement of a Session, it is not always that the 
doctrine of the “survival of the fittest” applies. In this 
instance, however, we trust that the Bill will be exposed 
to neither neglect nor mishap. It is supported by mem- 
bers on both sides of the House; it does not appeal to 
Party, but to the patriotism of the whole nation, and it is 
brought in under the auspices of a member whose repu- 
tation as an archzologist, though great throughout the 
country, is exceeded by his popularity as the author of the 
most successful measure of private legislation in modern 
times—the Bank Holiday Act, 
HERBERT SPENCER’S PSYCHOLOGY 
The Principles of Psychology. By Herbert Spencer. 
Second Edition. (London: Williams and Norgate.) 
Me 
O give readers some idea of the contents of a good 
book is very often the most useful thing a reviewer 
can do, Unfortunately that course is not open to us in 
the present instance. The subject is too vast. We can- 
not exhibit the grandeur ; we can only in a few general 
phrases express our admiration of the profound, all- 
embracing philosophy of which the work before us is an 
instalment. The doctrine of evolution when taken up by 
Mr. Spencer was little more than a crotchet. He has 
made it the ideaof the age. Inits presence other systems 
of philosophy are hushed, they cease their strife and 
become its servants, while all the sciences do it homage. 
The place that the doctrine of evolution has secured in 
the minds of those who think for the educated public 
may be indicated by a few names taken just as they occur, 
Mr. Darwin’s works, the novels of George Eliot, Mr. 
Tylor’s “ Primitive Culture,” Dr. Bastian’s “ Beginnings 
of Life,” and Mr. Bagehot’s “ Physics and Politics,” have 
almost nothing in common but the idea of evolution, 
with which they are all more or less imbued. In a word 
we have but one other thinker with whom in point of 
influence on the higher thought of this, and probably of 
several succeeding generations, Mr. Spencer can be 
classed :—it does not need saying that that other is Mr. 
J. S. Mill. 
As we cannot present such an outline of Mr. Spencer’s 
system of psychology as would make it generally intelli- 
gible, the purpose of directing attention to the work will 
perhaps be best served by selecting as the subject of 
remark one or two points to which the presence of the 
controversial element may lend a special interest. After 
NATURE 
[Fed. 20, 1873 
pointing out that the cardinal fact brought to light when 
nervous action is looked at entirely from the objective point 
of view, is, that the amount and heterogeneity of motion ex- 
hibited by the various living creatures, are greater or less 
in proportion to the development of the nervous system, 
Mr. Spencer comes to the vexed question of the relation 
between nervous phenomena and phenomena of con- 
sciousness. This is a subject about which in its more 
subtle aspects there is much uncertainty and some 
confusion of thought. It may be taken as established 
that every mode of consciousness is a concomitant of 
some nervous change. Given certain physical conditions 
accompanied bya special state of consciousness, and 
there is every reason to believe that physical conditions 
in every respect identical, will always be attended by a 
similar state of consciousness. This, and not more than 
this, we think, was intended by Mr. Spencer in his chapter 
on A®stho-physiology. Nevertheless, several able men 
have, it would appear, been led to suppose that he coun- 
tenances a kind of materialism (not using the word to 
imply anything objectionable, for why not be materialists, 
if materialism be truth ?), which forms no part of his philo- 
sophy. To give precision and emphasis to what we say, 
we would take the liberty to refer to the position taken 
up by Dr. Bastian in his remarkably able and’ important 
work on the “ Beginnings of Life.” The expression that 
definitely raises the issue of which we wish to speak, and 
which at the same time fixes Dr. Bastian to a view not in 
harmony with the teaching of Mr. Spencer, is the 
following :—“‘ We have not yet been able to show that 
there is evolved, during brain action, an amount of heat, 
or other mode of physical energy, less than there would 
have been had not the Sensations been felt and the 
Thoughts thought ;” but he believes that this is the case, 
Our present object isnot so much to show that here 
speculation has got on a wrong track, as that, if we 
understand Mr. Spencer, it is not his opinion that any- 
thing of this kind takes place; though certainly some 
ambiguous phrases might be held to convey this meaning. 
We have mentioned the significant fact that the size of 
the nervous system holds a pretty constant relation to the 
amount and heterogeneity of motion generated. The impli- 
cationis that none of the motion evolved during nervous 
action disappears from the object world, passes into 
consciousness in the same sense that physicists speak 
of momentum passing into heat ; that whether conscious- 
ness arise or not, there will be for the molecular motion 
set up in the nerve substance, exactly the same mechani- 
cal equivalents. Whether, for example, those ganglia 
that in the body of each one of us are employed in carry- — 
ing on what we call reflex attion, are so many distinct 
seats of consciousness, like so many separate animals, an 
idea for which much has been said, or whether the nerve- 
changes that go on in these ganglia have no subjective 
side ; in either case the objective facts will remain the 
same. If consciousness is evolved, it is not at the expense 
of a single oscillation of a molecule disappearing from 
the object world. No doubt it is hard to conceive. con- 
sciousness arising in this apparently self-created way ; 
but if any suppose that by using phrases that would 
assimilate mind to motion they ease the difficulty, they 
but delude themselves. It is as easy to think of con- 
sciousness arising out of nothing, if they will, as to 
