Fan. 25, 1883 | 
NATURE 
291 
instructs the student to plot ov¢ from the base line (which 
is never done in practice) cannot be recommended. 
The method of plotting adopted in practice is to calcu- 
late out from the base line to the extreme points of the 
survey, or to the extreme points that will appear on any 
one sheet of paper, and then to plot zz. Every practical 
draughtsman knows that it is far easier to say, “draw a 
straight line ’’ than to do it, and that an infinite amount 
of trouble is saved by plotting in towards small triangles 
from large, as the errors of the plotter are then being 
constantly reduced, whereas in plotting ow¢ they are 
being continually enlarged. In fact we venture to say 
that no one is competent to write an article on plotting 
who has not been in the habit of projecting surveys 
for no one else can understand the extreme nicety re- 
quired to make three lines from three stations to the 
same object coincide in one point. 
It is possible that Mr. Robinson has compiled this 
work in hopes the Admiralty may order it to be accepted 
as the text-book on surveying at the College. We trust, 
however, that their Lordships may be better advised on 
the point. Already we have one book, ordered to be used, 
which contains a theory on winds, not by any means 
accepted by meteorologists, and this theory has at present 
to be learnt by all the younger naval officers. Now we 
have no objection to any one theorising on wind, or any 
other subject, but what we do object to is that a book 
containing such theories should be ordered to be the 
standard work at the colleges, simply because the gentle- 
man who wrote it holds, and worthily holds, a prominent 
position there. We think that although theories should 
not be absolutely excluded from textbooks, they should 
deal principally with well-ascertained facts, leaving the 
student to develop for himself a theory from those facts. 
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
[The Editor does not hold himself responsible for opinrons expressed 
by his correspondents. Netther can he undertake to return, 
or to correspond with the writers of, rejected manuscripts. 
No notice ts taken of anonymous communications. 
[The Editor urgently requests correspondents to keep their letters 
as short as possible, The pressure on his space is so great 
that it ts impossible otherwise to ensure the appearance cven 
of communications containing interesting and novel facts. | 
Natural Selection and Natural Theology 
A PERUSAL of Dr. Romanes’ article on Natural Selection and 
Natural Theology, in the Contemporary Review for October, 
1882, suggests a few remarks upon one or two points, which 
may not be out of | lace. 
One would quite agree with Dr. Romanes in ‘‘insisting on 
the essentially distinct character of natural science and natural 
theology as separate departments of human thought.” True as 
that is, in a just sense, how does it follow that there ‘‘is no 
point of logical contact between” the two? Does this mean 
that because natural phenomena can be reduced to Jaws and 
sequences of cause and effect, no legitimate or rational inference 
can be made by the human mind to a causa causarum? It 
would seem so, and that it must be o to justify his very thorough- 
going conclusion: (1) That Darwin’s theory explodes particular 
design (which he chooses to identify with special or independent 
creation) ; and (2) that it does not allow us rationally to intro- 
duce the conception of ‘fan ultimate cause of a psychical 
kind pervading all nature,” the theory having ‘‘no point of 
logical contact with the theory of design even in the larger 
sense.” That is, a ratson d’ére in particular is proved to be 
absurd ; behind all secondary cause:, one such may possibly 
exist, but it is not to be legitimately thought of ! 
Or does he mean only that Darwin’s theory need not, and 
legitimately should not, concern itself with philosophy and 
natural theology? Very well: then let the disciples practise 
what they preach, and imitate their revered master, who was 
content fo maintain that species became what they are by 
descent with modification, instead of by independent creation, 
leaving untouched the question whether or not they were 
designed to be what they are. If there be ‘‘no logical con- 
tact”? between Darwin’s theory and the theory of design, then 
this renowned investigator preserved more logical consistency 
than some of his fcllowers: if he refrained because of “‘ the 
essettially distinct character of natural science and natural 
theology,” and because of his determination to consider only 
the former, he was no less consistent. 
But after all, such questions may be consistent enough, and 
moreover they are inevitable ; and so it is not wonderful that 
they are raised—and not rarely prejudged—on the scientific 
about as freely as on the theological side. 
Anyway Darwin did not prejudge the question of design, 
while declining to diseuss it, as is done, for instance, by the 
dictum that if the species of animals and plants were slowly 
evolved, the evidence of design has been utterly and for ever 
destroyed. That has been affirmed over and over, formerly in 
the main by the theologians, 1 ut now, when these have seen 
what it comes to, mainly by the anti-theologians; by both, 
seemingly, under a misapprehension of the real character of the 
evidence for design. 
Dr. Romane,’ view is fairly presented in his denial that, 
under our present knowledge, ‘‘the facts of organic nature 
furnish evidence of design of a quality other or better than any 
of the facts of inorganic nature.” ‘‘ Or, otherwise stated, there 
is nothing in the theory of natural selection incompatible with 
the theory of theism; but neither does the former theory 
supply evidence of the latter. Now this is just what the older 
theory of special creation did; for it would be proof positive of 
intelligent design, if it could be shown that all species of plants 
and animals were created, that is, suddenly introduced into the 
complex conditions of their life ; for it is quite inconceivable 
that any cause other than intelligence could be competent to 
adapt an organism to its environment suddenly.” 
Is the writer of this quite sure that any cause other than in*el- 
ligence could be competent to adapt existing organisms to their 
environment gradually 2 How has the former presumption— 
the contrary of which was quite inconceivable—been done away 
with? For this presumption arose, and had its full force under 
the consideration of animals and plants produced by natural 
propagation ; and the then irresistible inference of intelligent 
design was drawn directly from their adaptations in themselves 
and to their environment ; whence it was ccncluded that the 
series of phenomena must have been instituted somehow and at 
some time or times (-udden creation is no doctrine of natural 
theology) uncer intelligence. How is tis presumption nega- 
tived or impaired by the suppos tion of l)arwin’s theory, that 
the ancestors were not always like the offspring, but differed from 
time to time in small particulars, yet so as always to be in com- 
patible relations to the environment? We do not see how or 
why the inference, which was so cogent, should under the new 
showing become at once irrelevant and out of all logical connec- 
tion with the facts of the case, which guoad design are just what 
they were. Suddenness—if that must needs be entertained—is 
of course incompatible with the Darwinian view, and also with 
the facts as we understand them; but gvadua/ness is in nowise 
incompatible with design, Under the conception of Nature as 
the outcome of Divine intelligence, questions of time and mode, 
of generality and particularity, are well nigh devoid of real 
significance. 
But what may be contended for, and what is probably meant, 
is that natural selection is a rival hypothesis to design, that it 
accounts for all adaptaticns in the organic world upon known 
pbysical principles, and so renders the idea of design superfluous, 
as some would say ; or, as it is better stated by Dr. Romanes, 
renders the evidence of design from these adaptations of no 
other or better value than that from anything else in Nature. 
So that the argument from teleology ‘‘ must now take its stand 
upon the broader basis of the order of nature as a whole.” This 
last, sensible natural theologians are prepared for. But the 
whole is made up of parts; and it is a whole in which the de- 
signed (if such there be) and the contingent can never be accu- 
rately discriminated, in which, indeed, from the very nature of 
the case, limitation is inconceivable. This need not be wondered 
at, since we are equally unable to discriminate the two in human 
