April 5, 1883} 
origination these manifested were seen in the things themselves,” 
and after the hypothesis of their physical origin had been arrived 
at, were ‘‘to be seen there still.” Yet we should have deemed 
the brothers Darwin very unworthy representatives of their 
family if, after having arrived at the physical hypothe-is, 
they had continued to argue in favour of a teleological enthu- 
siasm for mud pies, on the ground that ‘‘the inference was not 
one from an intelligent originator to design in the (in-)organic 
world, but from marks. . . in the latter which indicated design 
to an intelligent originator.” In other words, a change in the 
hypothesis concerning the origination of the mudballs entirely 
changed the logical cogency of the teleological inference. 
Now I have purposely chosen this illustration because it is 
of so simple a character, and therefore serves in a clear manner 
to show how greatly a teleological inference may be modified by 
a change of hypothesis concerning the mode of origin of a 
structure, even though the structure remains the same ; if there 
had been no evidence of a purely physical mode of origin in this 
case, it might truly have been said of the teleological interpreta- 
tion, ‘‘the inference to most minds was convincing; at least it 
was legitimate.” Of course in organic nature the apparent 
marks of design ‘‘in the things themselves” are much more 
numerous, varied, and complex than any that we meet with in 
inorganic nature; but no matter how numerous, varied, and 
complex such marks of design may be, if we see good reason to 
conclude that they have al/ been produced by physical causes, they 
are no more available as evidences of special design than are the 
mudballs—although both they and the mudballs, being alike 
formed under an orderly system of causation, may be due to a 
general design pervading the cosmos. And here I understand 
that Prof. Gray is in agreement with me, for he says that when I 
assign the whole results to known [or unknown] physical causes 
and discard the factor of intelligence, I am bound to render their 
adequacy at least conceivable. This appears to show that Prof. 
Gray is at one with me in holding that physical causes as such 
do not constitute other or better evidence of design in the 
organic than in the inorganic world; and it is only because he 
cannot conceive how such causes are adequate to produce the 
results observed in the former that he deems these results unique 
as evidence of ‘‘the factor of intelligence.” In other words, 
supposing for the sake of argument that all these results have 
been due to purely phy-ical causes, and supposing further that 
all these causes were as perfectly well known as the less compli- 
cated physical causes of the inorganic world, then I take it Prof. 
Gray would agree with me in saying that under such circumstances 
the former would constitute no other or better evidence of design 
than the latter. 
If so, our only difference resolves itself into a difference in the 
estimate which we respectively form of the probable adequacy 
of purely physical causes to produce all the results which are 
observable in organic nature. To me the probability appears 
overwhelming that in respect of method ‘‘all nature is of a 
piece,” and therefore that the terms ‘‘ physical” and ‘‘ natural,” 
when applied to causation, are logically, as well as etymologically, 
convertible. To Prof. Gray, on the other hand, the probability 
appears to be that such is not the case, but that, when we meet 
with the ‘‘ direction of action to ends,” we have special evidence 
of ‘‘the factor of intelligence,” which therefore makes nature “ of 
at least two pieces,” and so makes the term ‘‘ natural” to mean 
more than the term ‘‘ physical.” 
Supposing that I am right in understanding this as the only 
difference between us, I may point out that if, while following my 
ideas of probability, I have erred on the side of rashness in 
drawing “the downright conclusion” that the facts of organic 
nature present no other or better evidence of design than the 
facts of inorganic, Prof. Gray, in following his ideas of proba- 
bility, can scarcely be able to shut out the suspicion (more espe- 
cially in view of abundant historical analogies) that, in resorting 
to “the factor of intelligence ” as a hypothesis wherever physical 
causation is found to be complex or obscure, he may be merely 
supplementing our present ignorance of such causation by an infer- 
ence which is at leastasrash as my statement.! And here I should 
t I suppose it will be admitted that the validity of an inference depends 
upon the number, the importance, and the definiteness of the things or 
ratios known, as compared with the number, importance, and definiteness of 
the things or ratios unknown, but inferred. If so, we should be logically 
cautious in drawing inferences from the natural to the supernatural; for 
although we have the entire sphere of experience from which to draw an 
inference, we are unable to gauge the probability of the inference when 
drawn—the unknown ratios being confessedly of unknown number, import- 
_ ance, and degree of indefiniteness: the whole orbit of human know- 
ledge is insufficient to obtain a parallax whereby to institute the required 
NATUKE 
529 
like to observe, with special reference to the natural or physical 
causes summed up in the term ‘‘natural selection,” that although I 
speak with all the respect which I sincerely feel for so distinguished 
a naturalist and so able a dialectician, I am not able to follow 
Prof. Gray in his understanding of this subject. For he says of 
the theory of natural selection that it is destitute of any preten- 
sions to act as the substitute of the theory of special design, 
“until it is explained how the physical destruction of a part 
should have set the rest into varying at all, into varying advan- 
tageously, and into varying into the very special ways they have 
done.” But surely it is no part of the theory of natural selection 
to suppose that the physical destruction of unfit organisms is, or 
has any need to be, the cause of advantageous variations arising 
in other and allied organisms. The theory merely supposes 
that variations of a/l kinds and in all directions are constantly 
taking place, and that natural selection seizes upon the more 
advantageous. Therefore, so far as this theory is concerned, 
there is no call to explain why promiscuous variation occurs ; it 
is simply a fact that it does occur, though not necessarily made 
to occur by the destruction of other organisms. Neither is there 
any call to explain why the variations occur in special and advan- 
tageous ways, for they are not supposed to occur in special and 
advantageous ways, but only to appear to do so on account of 
all other variations being eliminated, while those which happen 
to occur in the specially advantageous ways are preserved. 
Again, Prof. Gray says in his postscript that the theory of 
natural selection supposes successive generations to be slowly 
changing, ‘‘ yet always so as to be in compatible relations to the 
environment.” Now it is true that where the changes in the 
environment are gradual, and the variations of specific type are 
being slowly accommodated to them, each generation is, on the 
whole, in compatible relations with its environment. But it is 
not true that such continuous compatibility in itself points to 
design; it only points to the plasticity of the varying type, 
which, if not sufficiently plastic to meet the new demands upon 
it in this respect, simply becomes extinct. 
In conclusion, I agree that ‘‘ natural science leaves aside the 
question whether evolution and design in nature are compatible 
or not,” and I agree that, ‘‘if science has no call to settle the 
question, it has none to prejudge it,” But I do not agree that I 
have prejudged this question by saying that in my opinion the 
theory of evolution, in supplanting the theory of special crea- 
tion, has necessarily removed the special evidence of des‘gn in 
organic nature, by showing that in respect of causation organic 
nature and inorganic nature are one. GEORGE J. ROMANES 
The High Springs of 1883 
THE high springs of the present year, consequent upon the 
excessive rainfall of the past winter, are an event that ought 
not to pass unrecorded in the pages of NATURE. I can speak 
only of phenomena which I have observed upon my native 
chalk hills of Hampshire, but I doubt not that similar facts 
have attracted attention elsewhere. 
The Candover, a confluent of the Itchen from the north, burst 
forth this year in a field near Preston Candover, where it has 
not been known to rise for the last fifty years, and has flooded 
the road between Preston Candover and Chilton Candover. 
The Itchen itself rose in the valley above Cheriton beyond its 
recognised source, and has flooded fields on the road to Kilmes- 
ton, where no one recollects to have seen water before. 
‘The Hampshire tributaries of the Thames have acted in 
exactly the same manner. The Whitewater has issued forth in 
the valley just below Upton Grey, far above its usual origin 
even in the highest springs, and has flooded the whole road 
between Bidden and Greywell. Another branch of the same 
stream has risen in the fields on the left of the main road from 
Odiham to South Warnborough, where spring water has never 
been known within the memory of the oldest inhabitant. In 
like manner ‘the Wey, which, in wet seasons, takes its rise in 
the meadows adjoining Chawton House, has issued forth this 
year at a much higher level in the fields below Farringdon. 
These facts are the more worthy of notice because it has been 
generally believed that, in the Hampshire hills at least, owing 
to more efficient drainage and other causes, the springs were 
measurement or proportion between the terms known and the terms un- 
known. Or, otherwise phrased, we may say—As our knowledge of a part is 
to our knowledge of a whole, so is our inference from that part to the reality 
of that whole. Who, therefore, can say, even upon the supposition of 
Theism, that our inferences or ‘‘idea of design’’ would have any meaning if 
applied to the ‘ All-Upholder,’’ whose thoughts are not as our thoughts ? 
