332 
also set away. The younger French minds are again 
coming under the influence of English thought, as more 
than a century ago their forefathers came; and yet far 
otherwise than then. For, whereas then the triumph of 
Lockian ideas in France was, in truth, the overthrow of 
one national system of thought by another, now that 
mental philosophy in England bears the cosmopolitan 
character of science, it is but a case of one nation being 
suided by another into the path of progressive inquiry. 
Lighting the way in this work, M. Ribot expounds and 
summarises with all the arts of a Frenchman, and, for 
the most part, with good insight. Nor, though evidently 
in accord with the direction of thought which he 
makes known, is he a slavish expositor: serious gaps in 
the work both of individuals and of the school he 
does not fail incidentally to note. His very art, how- 
ever, may be thought to lead him somewhat astray, when 
he seeks at the close to strike a general balance of 
Scientific results, presuming upon the idea of a community 
of thought aniong so many inquirers. 
scientific value of their labours, that in a matter so great 
and difficult, their work thus far is more distinguished for | 
the many fruitful lines of inquiry that it has fairly opened, 
than for the number of questions that it has finally and | 
unanimously closed. 
The author's introductory chapter deserves more par- 
ticular notice, having a lesson not for Frenchmen only. ' 
In England, where the cast of philosophical thought | 
has all along been psychological, and well, as even Ger- 
mans have come to see, where, also, psychology has first 
and most conformed to the conditions of science, there is 
yet a certain tendency, and not only in themindsof common 
people, to think and speak slightingly of mental inquiries. 
Philosophy (meaning mental philosophy, not, of course, 
natural philosophy in the land.of Newton) is opposed to 
science, chiefly in the sense of being quite unscientific, and 
“metaphysics,” vaguely supposed to be the same thing or 
the same nothing, is even a time-honoured term of abuse. 
This is a state of opinion on which M. Ribot’s remarks 
bear so directly, that there may be an advantage in shortly 
giving the point of them ; and perhaps they may suggest 
an observation or two not unseasonable at the present 
moment. 
Philosophy, according to M. Ribot, was originally 
the name for science universal; at present, it isa name in- 
definitely and irregularly applied to an aggregate of several 
sciences, having relation chiefly to mind ; in the future, it 
will again have the character of universality, but not be 
science. In other words, it was once the sum of human 
knowledge, such as that was ; it is now, in part at least, 
a special kind of knowledge, real and scientific, but 
vaguely defined ; it will become (under the name of mcta- 
physics strictly understood) an extra-scientific, but neces- 
sary, complement of knowledge. The sciences, such of 
them as have not grown out of mere arts, have, in fact, 
detached themselves from philosophy as a great trunk ; 
mathematics as early as the third century B.C., physics as 
late as the last three centuries, and not, perhaps, com- 
pletely until the last. Detached, these havea being quite 
apart from what was called philosophy; they advance, 
and grow ever more special, untroubled by philosophic 
questionings about their foundation ; indeed they advance 
NATURE 
It is no reflection | 
upon the English thinkers, and hardly even upon the | 
[Aug. 25, 1870 
because, and from the moment when, they have left all 
such aside. And this is now not more true of these than 
of other sciences concerned less with external nature than 
with man, and has become true even of sciences like psy- 
chology, still confusedly spoken of as philosophy. For 
already in England, and in Germany also, there is an in- 
vestigation of mind conforming to all the conditions of 
scientific progress. It deals with actual phenomena, and 
attempts to explain them by discovering laws ; troubling 
itself no more about an ultimate essence of mind, than 
mathematics or physics about the ultimate nature of space 
or motion, and only labouring by every resource of scien- 
tific method—observation of individuals, external as well 
as internal, and of masses through history and statistics, 
comparative study of the lower animals, investigation of all 
abnormal mental conditions, and artificial experiments as 
far as possible—to master the exceptional subtlety and 
complexity of the phenomena. For the rest, in philosophy 
proper, or metaphysic, there must ever remain to nobler 
minds a boundless sphere of consideration and mental 
endeavour. The underlying questions, which the sciences 
must ignore in order to advance, are nevertheless there, 
and will be answered somehow by all but narrow intellects. 
Speculation on the first principles and last reasons of 
things, so far from being superseded, is rather more deeply 
stirred as the sciences become greater, which is to say, 
more special. Only, verified science such metaphysical 
speculation can never be. Like poetry (and no more to 
be got rid of than poetry) it must always have a certain 
| personal and subjective character. In truth, the metaphy- 
sician ‘differs from the poet just in this, that in reconsti- 
tuting the synthesis of the world, he works with abstract 
ideas instead of concrete pictures. So far, M. Ribot. 
There is muchthatis noteworthy in the view thus roughly 
sketched. Some things, regarding the origin of the special 
sciences, could not easily be said better than by M. Ribot ; 
and, in particular, his whole excursus on the question of the 
conditions, sources, and method of scientific psychology 
—a question that has perhaps been less considered by 
English than by German psychologists—may be ‘com- 
mended as highly suggestive. In point of actual achieve- 
ment in psychological science, distinguished from meta- 
physical speculation, this country is frankly placed first. 
It seems time, then, that we should cease to be blinded 
by any mere associations of language to one of our best titles 
to national fame. Nay, it even becomes our duty, if philo- 
sophy is no more than M. Ribot (to say nothing of others) 
declares, to lift the shadow of the name from off an 
arduous line of inquiry, sharply enough defined, clearly 
cnough admitting, as it requires, scientific treatment, and 
already carried to no mean length in spite of popular mis- 
apprehension and the graver indisposition of physical 
inquirers to recognise in it a true branch of science. 
There is a science of mind, call it by whatever name, that 
has come into being like other sciences 5 and itis a natural 
science too, unless we are prepared to assert that man, 
on the most characteristic side of him, is an unnatural 
object.* Still there is likely to be some reason why, to this 
* In the newly-constituted Faculty of Science in University ‘College, 
Psychology, under the name of Philosophy of Mind, is included along with 
Logic. Already for some years the two subjects have been recognised in the 
Science-programme of the London University; the Bachelor ‘of Science 
must pass in both, and the Doctorate of Science may be taken for onl 
| paca’ in them, along with certain subsidiary subjects, such as Political 
conomy. A knowledge of them is réquired ‘also for the degree of M.D, 
