Aug. 25, 1870) 
NATURE 
333 
science of mind in particular, the name of philosophy 
should have clung, and if the reason be good, philosophy 
may not be on the road to become the mere poetry of 
abstracts that M. Ribot foresees. Let us look a little 
way into this matter. 
Psychology is a natural science if it deals with a definite 
class of phenomena constantly occurring in nature, deals 
with them on approved principles of scientific method, 
and marches steadily from old to fresh results : and that 
it does conform even to the last of these conditions, M. 
Ribot often in the course of his exposition has occasion, 
as he always is properly anxious, te show. What, then, 
is peculiar in the natural science of psychology? The 
phenomena dealt with are, beyond all others, complex, 
subtle, and obscure, requiring a finer tact and a larger 
scientific vision to single them out with any effect; but 
this, if it explains why psychology has lagged behind the 
other sciences, gives it no claim to stand apart. The 
phenomena, however, are quite peculiar, in being, as it 
were, two-faced, in haying not only a side by which, like 
all other phenomena of nature, they (or, at Jeast, many of 
them) fall under external observation, but also a side by 
which, unlike any other natural phenomena, they fall 
under so-called internal observation. This is, indeed, a 
peculiarity ; and, further, let this go with it, that, as 
amongst such double-faced phenomena are all facts of 
human cognition, the subject of psychology extends, in 
a sense, to all things known or knowable; viewed, 
namely, as they are or may be known. Nothing to the 
same degree, nothing of the same kind, can be said of 
any other science ; for though the general sciences, going 
backwards from biology, have an ever wider and wider 
sweep, extend, that is, to more and more objects viewed 
in the special aspects that each considers, psychology in 
this respect surpasses the most general of them all more 
than any of them, and in a way that none of them sur- 
Passes another, The science of mind does, therefore, 
stand on a certain level of its own. It has a place 
among the general sciences, and a place far down, namely 
after biology, from dealing with phenomena as much 
more complex than vital phenomena, as these are more 
complex than chemical phenomena. But it also has a 
place before all the sciences, from dealing with the growth 
of consciousness, and specially the laws and limits of 
those mental processes whereby all knowledge, scientific 
or other, mustcome. So that, if asascience it ought to be 
studied in its place among the sciences, in the light of 
their results as far as these bear on its subject, and in the 
spirit of rigid inquiry which they are best fitted to 
engender, its subject is still such that its results, when 
thus obtained, are not as theirs. Its results have not only, 
like theirs, a value in themselves and a forward reference, 
but they have a backward reference also. From the psycho- 
logical stage, once reached, all the science that went before 
is seen over again in a new light. The true sense of the 
very language of the sciences—of such a word, to take 
but one instance, as “ phenomenon ”—is then first under- 
stood ; and what before was mere practical assumption is 
turned into intellectual conception. Or,may we not say that 
there is gained a certain p%zlosophicinsight? A multitude 
of questions, M. Ribot truly said, were left unsolved at 
the root of the sciences, at the root of psychology itself 
among the rest. But some of them can be solved psycho- 
logically, and such of them as cannot are perhaps not all 
real questions. Where it is possible, the deeper psycho- 
logical reading of an objective physical fact may not without 
reason be called metaphysical. It would seem, then, that 
there may be a metaphysic that does not break with 
science, and that one kind of science still, in some sense, 
deserves to be called philosophy. Psychology, in short, is 
Science in its method and Philosophy in its scope. 
G. CROOM ROBERTSON 
OUR BOOK SHELF 
Dictionary of Scientific Terms. By P. Austin Nuttall, 
LL.D., editor of “The Classical and Archeological 
Dictionary,” “Standard Pronouncing Dictionary,” and 
numerous Educational Works. (London: Strahan and 
Co., 1869.) 
WE are thankful to be able to say that we know nothing 
more of Dr. Nuttall than we learn from his title-page. 
We never even heard of him till we read his book, 
and we most sincerely hope that, as an author of scien- 
tific works, we shall know him no more. What the 
“numerous educational works ” that he has published are 
we cannot tell, but if they are at all like his “ Dictionary 
of Scientific Terms,” the sooner they are consigned to the 
trunk maker and the butter-man, the better will it be for the 
welfare of the unhappy youths for whose benefit they were 
composed. These may seem hard words to apply toa 
writer who hopes to “receive every indulgence from a 
generous public” (p. xi.) ; but when that writer outrages all 
our better feelings by stringing together a series of idiotic 
absurdities, and calling the result a ‘“ Dictionary of Scien- 
tific Terms,” how are we honestly to deal with him, except 
by exposing a few of his blunders? We will begin by test- 
ing his chemical knowledge. It will hardly be believed 
that he regards black-lead, brass, magnet, ochre, pewter, 
and steel as constituting “a few of the principal metals ” 
(p. xvill.) ; that nitrogen is “unrespirable” (p. 230), although 
he has previously told us at p. 12 that it forms about 80 
parts of atmospheric air); that oxygen “generates acids” 
(p. 239); that alum is “an earthy chalk, a sulphate of 
alumina o7 of potash” (p. 18) ; and that “ culinary, rock, 
or sea salt, is chloride of soda” (p.277). His natural history 
is as peculiar as his chemistry. We will merely put his 
zoology to the test, assuring our readers that in so far as 
accuracy is concerned, his zoology, botany, and mineral- 
ogy are much onapar. “ Zoology,” he tells us, ‘embraces 
an account of all animal creation, the principal classes 
being the Mammalia, Aves, Reptilia, Pisces, Invertetrata, 
and Insects.” The first class is subdivided into nine 
orders, of which one is “ Ed@enfata, or animals wanting 
some of the teeth of other animals” (p. xiii.) Being anxious 
to learn more of these covetous, commandment- breaking 
creatures, we turned to Edenfates, and found that they 
are “an extensive order of the class Mammalia, compre- 
hending those unguicolated quadrupeds which have no 
front teeth, and divided into three tribes, the Tardigrada, 
the ordinary Edentata, and the Monotremata.” Weleave 
our zoological readers to decide how far this description 
is an accurate definition of the order, according to recent 
views, such as our author might have learned by consult- 
ing the works of Owen, or of Huxley. 
“Invertebrate animals are divided into A/ol/usca, Arti- 
culata and Radiata” (p. xiv.) We had hoped that by this 
time the “ Radiata,” having done their work, had modestly 
withdrawn themselves from their old position, and had 
been replaced by other classes; but Ccelenterata, Hy- 
dro-medusze, &c., are terms unknown to Dr. Nuttall. 
“ The Mollusca is (szc) so called from the body being soft 
and molluscous. It is divided into four classes, the Mo/- 
lusca, Conchifera, Tunicata, and Cirrifeda” (p. xiv.) 
How this marvellous division is accomplished we are un- 
