NATURE 



577 



A SCIENCE OF THE SCIENCES. 

 The Groundwork of Science; a Study of Episfemology. 

 By St. George Mivart, M.D., Ph.D., F.R.S. (The Pro- 

 gressive Science Series.) Pp. .wii + 331. (London : 

 John Murray, 1898.) 



IN.^SMUCH as science is an organised knowledge of 

 the phenomena of nature and the laws which govern 

 these phenomena, and since this knowledge is acquired 

 through the senses and interpreted by the intellect of 

 man, it is obvious that the groundwork of science must be 

 sought for in the human mind. To many this may seem 

 a self-evident proposition, but it nevertheless furnishes Dr. 

 Miv.\rt with material for the ten chapters of which the 

 present work is composed. The aim and objects of the 

 book are set forth in a preliminary way in the introductory 

 chapter, from which we give the following extract as 

 fairly representing the author's position : 



1 " It is not enough for the true man of science to be 

 'acquainted with many sciences, and to reflect on the 

 knowledge he so possesses. The rational mind sooner 

 or later seeks to know what is the basis of his own know- 

 ,ledge and the ultimate groundwork of all science. It 

 ithus calls for a science of science, and cannot rest satis- 

 ified without a pursuit of Epistemology, or the study of 

 I the grounds of all the learning the mind of man can 

 i acquire " (p. 3). 



In the second chapter the author sets out with the 

 .object of discussing the classification of the sciences, but 



wisely comes to the conclusion that instead of classifying 

 , it is sufficient to simply enumerate the sciences as being 

 I the raw material with which epistemology has to deal. 

 iThe arguments which lead to the conclusion that it is 

 j futile to attempt to classify the sciences in any satisfactory 

 I way are ingeniously marshalled, and will, we imagine, be 



convincing to most scientific readers. After all there is 

 I only one science of nature ; all our divisions are more or 

 i less arbitrary, and necessitated only by the finiteness of 

 I the human intellect. 



I In the third chapter, entitled " The Objects of Science," 

 i Dr. Mivart discusses at great length the idealism of 

 I Bishop Berkeley, to whose influence he traces "the whole 

 I of the philosophy of Germany and Holland, from Spinoza 

 I to Hartmann." So fairly does the author state the case 

 1 for the idealists, that the reader might at first be disposed 



to imagine that Dr. Mivart is identifying himself with 



that school. It is not till we reach p. 43 that the first 

 ' breath of realism appears, and from thence on to the end 

 i of the chapter we find ourselves in a healthier scientific 

 I atmosphere. Here again the arguments used against the 

 I pure idealist, although somewhat unnecessarily lengthy, 

 I are well considered and cannot fail to leave the reader in 

 I a more rational state of mind as regards his scientific 

 I position : 



1 " The conviction, then, that science is really concerned 

 not alone with thoughts, but also with external, inde- 

 pendent, and extended realities, is so far justified" 

 [ (P- 64). 



Having arrived at this conclusion, and having inci- 

 dentally (p. 84) disposed of the new Monism, the author 

 NO. 1538, VOL. 59] 



sums up the chapter by describing in general terms the 

 objects of science as mental, physical and metaphysical ; 

 and in the fourth chapter he discusses the methods of 

 science, which methods are summed up under ten fund- 

 amental propositions (pp. 106-107). The author con- 

 siders that the truth and certainty of these propositions 

 is implied by the methods of science ; and we do not sup- 

 pose that many scientific men will join issue with him 

 here. Some of the said propositions — such as " nothing 

 can at the same time both be and not be " and " some 

 axioms are self-evident " — may appear to many readers 

 as truisms. 



In the fifth chapter, having the title " The Physical 

 Antecedents of Science," the author sets out from the 

 proposition that since knowledge consists of mental 

 states or feelings, and since feelings are the result of 

 physical organisation, it is necessary to have an ac- 

 quaintance with the physiological machinery by which 

 psychical results are made possible. This chapter 

 accordingly deals with what may be described as an out- 

 line sketch of classification and morphology with more 

 special reference to the structure of the nervous system of 

 man. In discussing instinct the author states that " in- 

 stinctive movements differ from reflex actions in that they 

 are not merely responsive to a stimulus felt, but respond 

 to that stimulus in such a manner as to serve a future un- 

 foreseen purpose" (p. 127). The same definition is ex- 

 panded at greater length on p. 132. The sixth chapter 

 discusses the psychical antecedents of science, and opens 

 with the following paragraph : 



"The time has now come to leave behind us, as far as 

 may be, questions of mere physics and physiology, and 

 turn our attention to what concerns the declarations of 

 our own consciousness with respect to our feelings and 

 cognitions" (p. 139). 



In other words the real business of the book begins 

 here, and the five chapters which the reader is supposed 

 to have mastered by the time he reaches this point must 

 be regarded as dealing more or less with preliminary 

 considerations. One of the main features of this chapter 

 is the discussion of the differences between the lower and 

 higher mental processes, the former comprising mere 

 feelings or sensations, and the latter the intellectual per- 

 ceptions. It is conceded that the lower psychical facul- 

 ties exist in animals other than man. It is suggested 

 that the term consentience should be applied to the un- 

 conscious manifestation of sensuous impulses of diverse 

 kinds in the individual. The question whether animals 

 possess the higher faculties, lower in degree, but similar 

 in kind to those possessed by ourselves, is answered by 

 Dr. Mivart in the negative. He denies them the faculty 

 of reasoning, and the ethical or moral sense, and con- 

 siders that "consentience" explains all their actions. 

 The human faculty of reason is considered to be different 

 in kind from anything possessed by lower animals 

 (p. 162). In support of this contention some pages are 

 devoted to arguing away those acts of animals which 

 have been and are still considered by many psycho- 

 logists to be due to intelligence. The subject of 

 instinct is again discussed in this chapter, and the theory 

 of natural selection is considered to be inadequate both 

 pr the explanation of the origin of the instincts of 



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