NATORE 
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1886 
HISTORY OF ETHICS 
Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers. 
By Henry Sidgwick, Knightbridge Professor of Moral 
Philosophy. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1886.) 
ROM the earliest times of Greek thought the foremost 
philosophic minds of Europe have restlessly sought 
for sanctions of the moral code ; and the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century sees but little unanimity of opinion 
on the subject. The purely intuitional moralist dreads, 
in the determinist ethics of evolution and of utilitarianism, 
the deathblow of virtue properly so called. The followers 
of Bentham and of Spencer foresee the downthrow of 
morality unless some sanction more solid than the in- 
tuitionalist can supply be found for the ethical creed, 
unless “morality be established on a scientific basis.” 
Neither can bring himself to understand how the creed of 
the other can really influence conduct ; and both believe 
in their inmost hearts that the conduct of the other is 
really determined by something that goes deeper than 
the outward profession of faith. 
Amidst the divergencies of ethical opinion, however, 
practical morality has undergone but little modification. 
Notwithstanding the momentous change wrought by the 
introduction of Christianity into Europe the ideal at 
which the good man aims to-day differs but little from 
that towards which the ancient Greek directed his 
endeavours. It is true that the Christian virtue of 
humility takes the place of the Greek Azghmindedness ; 
but it is questionable whether the standard of excellence 
practically set before himself by the bishop who preaches 
the one differs materially from that of the philosopher 
who inculcated the other. This uniformity of practice 
amid diversities of faith, notwithstanding that the practice 
is in a high degree the outcome of the faith, receives 
perhaps sufficient explanation when it is remembered 
that the conduct of the individual is determined by a 
triple service—the service of Self, the service of Man, and 
the service of God. But the service of God—medizval 
monkism notwithstanding—takes practical expression in 
every-day life in the service of Man, while the pure service 
of Self is rendered impossible by the exigencies of the 
social life. In this way conduct is practically reduced to 
a subtle compound of Egoism and Altruism. Whether 
the welfare of others is sought from motives of self- 
interest, or the improvement of self is ennobled by the 
thought that in this way the level of humanity is being 
raised, matters not practically. The material morality is 
the same, however wide may be the essential and formal 
difference. 
But man is an inquiring animal, especially in the scien- 
tific and philosophical varieties of the genus. He cannot 
rest content with the mere possession of moral intuitions, 
he must also endeavour to ascertain their cause and mode 
of origin. He is also in his higher developments essen- 
tially a rational animal. He is not satisfied with the 
promptings of ethical desires, he must also justify the 
resulting conduct on rational grounds. Hence the science 
of ethics, which deals with the questions “ What is right?” 
and “ Why?” 
VoL. XxxXIv.—NOo. 887 
613 
In Prof. Sidgwick’s “ Outlines of the History of Ethics” 
we have a remarkably clear and succinct account of the 
answers that have been given to these questions. In 
dealing with the subject as a separate province of thought 
there is this peculiar difficulty, that ethical theory is in a 
very high degree determined by philosophic creed. The 
ethical theory of the Platonist for whom the Universe has 
thought itself out from the abstract to the concrete, in- 
evitably differs from that of the modern evolutionist who 
believes that material and mental groupings have gradu- 
ally advanced from the simple to the complex until the 
extraordinary complexity of the human brain and human 
thought-processes has been reached. Prof. Sidgwick has 
met this difficulty as fully as the space at his disposal 
rendered possible, and by not unduly narrowing the limits 
of his province has presented a tolerably complete bird’s- 
eye view of the history of ethical thought. 
His work begins with an Z¢évoductéon intended to assist 
the reader in grasping and arranging the somewhat com- 
pressed historical matter presented to him in the body of 
the book. The student who comes fresh to the subject 
will probably find the study of this introduction more 
valuable at the end of his first perusal of the work than at 
the outset of his labours. Then follows in Chapter I. a 
general account of ethics, in which the subject is defined, 
and its relations to theology, politics, and psychology are 
clearly indicated. It may be useful to give here the 
“summary view of ethics” with which this chapter 
closes :— 
“The subject of Ethics, most comprehensively under- 
stood, includes (1) an investigation of the constituents 
and conditions of the Good or Well-being of men con- 
sidered individually, which chiefly takes the form of an 
examination into the general nature and particular species 
of (a) Virtue or (4) Pleasure, and the chief means of 
realising these ends ; (2) an investigation of the principles 
and most important details of Duty or the Moral Law (so 
far as this is distinguished from Virtue) ; (3) some inquiry 
into the nature and origin of the Faculty by which duty is 
recognised, and, more generally, into the part taken by 
Intellect in human action, and its relation to various 
kinds of Desire and Aversion; (4) some examination of 
the question of human Free Will. It is connected with 
Theology, in so far as a Universal Good is recognised, 
inclusive of Human Good, or analogous to it ; and again, 
so far as morality is regarded as a Code of Divine ap- 
pointment. It is connected with Politics, so far as the 
well-be ng of any individual man is bound up with the 
well-being of his society; and again with Jurisprudence 
(or Politics), so far as morality is identified with Natural 
Law. Finally almost every branch of ethical discussion 
belongs at least in part to Psychology ; and the inquiries 
into the origin of any moral faculty and the freedom of 
the Will are purely psychological.” 
The three following chapters form the main body of 
the work. The first deals with Greek and Graeco-Roman 
ethics. In this chapter the author brings out clearly the 
Socratic paradox, that men’s ignorance of justice is the 
sole cause of their unjust acts, that, in a word, no one is 
voluntarily bad ; and its justification as the outcome of a 
-pair of apparent truisms, (1) that every one wishes for his 
own good, and would get it if he could, and (2) that those 
who knew how to do just and righteous acts would prefer 
nothing else, while those who did not know could not do 
them if they would. Unfortunately, as a practical fact, 
men too often desire in their moments of passion what in 
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