78 



NATURE 



{May 25, 1882 



for example— the characteristic of which may roughly be 

 said to be that the whole determines its parts — is a spe- 

 cies of relation which is unreal, in that it cannot be 

 represented as a fact in space and time. For qud space 

 and time what wc call and must think of as an organised 

 whole, is merely a mechanical aggregate of parts which 

 are external to, and independent of each other. Yet the 

 knowledge of nature implies that the conceptions of 

 organisation are real in the sense that experience suggests 

 and forces them upon us, and without them nature would 

 not only seem quite different from what it is, but could 

 not be a connected whole at all. In other words, while 

 an aggregate of purely mechanical relations is logically 

 conceivable, such an aggregate would necessarily be quite 

 different from the universe as known to us. The recog- 

 nition of nature as beautiful and as organised is essential 

 to its existence as nature, and these aspects cannot be got 

 rid of although they are not real in the sense that the 

 mechanical aspects are real. There are thus different 

 phases in, or kinds of knowledge, all arising out of the 

 ultimate constitution of intelligence. This result carries 

 with it the solution for Kant of a number of difficulties. 

 To ask, for example, how that which is organised springs 

 out of an environment which is not organised, is to mis- 

 take a problem of knowledge for a problem of the relation 

 of the objects of knowledge. For there is no line of 

 demarcation which separates the organism from its en- 

 vironment. We speak as if there were such a line, be- 

 cause, for the purposes of advancing the limited know- 

 ledge of the individuals (which, because it is conditioned 

 by space and time, cannot comprehend the whole uni- 

 verse sub specie aternitatis), it is convenient to abstract 

 now from one sort of relations, now from another, and to 

 talk of things as if they presented the aspects only of 

 mechanism, or only of organisation. Kant declared that 

 the twofold aspect was everywhere potentially present, 

 ber mse of the twofold operation of thought in the consti- 

 tution of things. 



Whether Kant was right in his conclusion that there 

 were different kinds of knowledge, or w hether he ought not 

 to have taught that there were rather different stages than 

 kinds, this is no place to inquire. When the systems of 

 the late German philosophical writers have been stl 

 of what is at the same time most prominent and mo>t 

 useless in them, it will be found that they contain much 

 valuable and detailed suggestion upon this point. It 

 may be that Kant's theory of knowledge is imperfu 

 that his distinctions are in many cases artificial and un- 

 warrantable. But his criticism forms the basis of a new 

 departure in investigation, and it cannot be understood 

 without being to a great extent assented to. Not the 

 least of his achievements is that he has sifted to their 

 foundation and placed in a new light such metaphysical 

 abstractions of science as matter, cause, organisation and 

 mind, and has shown why and in what sense they give 

 rise to problems which appear insoluble. His method 

 was intrinsically the same as that of science generally, 

 and to him belongs the credit of having brought science 

 and philosophy into a definite connection. Those >\ho 

 have best followed his teaching have most clearly under- 

 stood that the future of philosophy is to be looked for, 

 not in a slavish adhesion to Kant's or any other system, 

 but in the detailed application of his principles, to the 



critical investigation of the methods of particular branches 

 of empirical inquiry. Already the effect of such an appli- 

 cation has been shown in the new conception of history 

 which has resulted from it, and there arc indications that 

 the time is not far away when men of science will begin 

 to consider the position of their special departments in 

 the light of the^theory of knowledge. 



It remains to be considered how far Professors Max 

 Muller and Noire" have succeeded in making Kant intelli- 

 gible to an English-speaking public. One cannot help 

 feeling how much better the work would have been had it 

 consisted simply of one volume containing the translation 

 of the first edition of the " Kritik," with that of the 

 passages from the second edition printed in the first 

 volume. Of Prof. Noire"'s Introduction it is difficult to 

 speak with any satisfaction. It presents just such a view 

 of the history of philosophy previous to Kant's time as 

 used to be current in the days of Sir William Hamilton. 

 The author's study of philosophy has apparently been the 

 work of his leisure moments. To suppose, as both he 

 and Prof. Muller seem to suppose, that a further develop- 

 ment of the theory of knowledge is to be looked for from 

 philology. is simply to ignore Kant's distinction between 

 knowledge as a fact of experience and as that which is 

 constitutive of experience. As has already been pointed 

 out, it is in the former sense only that thought can be 

 treated as dependent upon a particular organism, and 

 consequently as related to language. In the latter sense 

 alone, on the other hand, is it that which is the subject 

 of Kantian investigation. Those who desire an historical 

 introduction to German philosophy will do well to consult 

 the pages of Prof. Caird rather than of Prof. Noire". 



As regards the translation, the comparison cf what has 

 been recently published by Dr. Hutchison Stirling with 

 the work of Prof. Muller is not to the advantage of the 

 latter. No doubt the work is grammatically excellent, 

 and the style and accuracy by far superior to that of the 

 old translations, but it lacks that grasp of the subject 

 which enables Dr. Stirling, in translating the fust part of 

 the " Kritik," to reproduce not merely German words by 

 English words, but German ideas by English ideas. Yet 

 while it may be that the " Kritik der reinen Yernunft" 

 remains yet to be translated, this is because the reproduc- 

 tion in the English language of such a work must fulfil 

 ideal requirements before it can be accepted as satis- 

 factory. Prof. Muller has given to students of philosophy 

 much that they did not possess before, and that is far 

 superior to the ordinary work of this suit. His offering 

 is indeed what he intended it to be, a fitting commemora- 

 tion of the centenary of the date on which was pub- 

 lished the treatise which was destined to revolutionise 

 philosophy. A faithful and literal translation of that 

 treatise is a boon for which he will not find the public 

 ungrateful to him. R. B. HALDANE 



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