5=4 



NA TURE 



\Sept. 28, 1882 



in its character, like Mr. Galton's composite photographs 

 of the average blackguard ? And if it be a symbol of 

 some kind, must it not be a symbol that stands for strange 

 man in general, since there is nothing to sugge_-t any 

 particular strange man? But if this be so, and if a 

 general conception is one which stands not for a particular 

 object, but for a group of objects, I do not see how we 

 can deny general conceptions, in this sense of the word, 

 to our four-footed friends. And if the word abstract idei 

 stand, as it is sometimes made to do, for general concep- 

 tion, we must admit, I think, that such abstract ideas are 

 possible for the brute. 



We come now to such abstract ideas as result from the 

 process I termed isolation. Are these, too, possible for 

 the brute ? I -have only to say that it has always seemed 

 to me that when we speak of being able to form abstract 

 ideas of redness, emptiness, justice, and the like, all we 

 can possibly me in is that we can make use of the 

 words as symbols in a train of thought I have 

 only to say this to indicate the nature of my answer 

 to this question, I believe such abstract ideas to be 

 impossible for the brute, I believe them to be the 

 outcome of the use of language. We see a plum, and 

 we find that it is round, and blue, and resisting. From 

 these words we form abstract nouns, roundness, blueness, 

 resistance. We then proceed to manufacture a something 

 to which each of these words may answer, and we call that 

 something a quality. Having thus made the quality, the 

 next thing we do is to try and endow it with a separate 

 existence, and to the results of our endeavours we give 

 the name abstract idea. All this is a process which grows 

 out of our use of words under the influence of a developed 

 power of reflection ; it is an attempt to conceive a reality- 

 in-thought answering to certain of our symbols. Without 

 a considerably developed use of symbols such a process is 

 impossible. Hence 1 believe that no animal can form an 

 abstract idea in this sense of the term. He does not pos- 

 sess the only possible means of doing so. To form such 

 abstract ideas as these, is certainly " an excellency which 

 the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to." Here we 

 may agree with Locke and his followers. 



May we say, then, that the power of forming abstract 

 ideas, in this sense, is that which distinguishes the intelli- 

 gence of man from the intelligence of the brute? I think 

 not. There are. I believe, among the lower races of man, 

 whole tribes which are unable to form abstract ideas. 

 Abstract ideas are made possible by language, but the use 

 of language does not necessarily imply the ability to form 

 abstract ideas. Philologists tell us that there are languages 

 or dialects in which no abstract words are to be found. 

 This, however, is certain, that there is no known savage 

 tribe which has no language. Man is the one being that 

 can make use of spoken signs. 



But it may be said that, although their language differs 

 from ours, animals too have their language, imperfect it is 

 true but still a language of their own, a means of com- 

 munication with their fellows. And this is perfectly true. 

 It is true, too, that my dogs can understand my language. 

 But all that a dog can communicate to his fellow — all that I 

 can communicate to my dog is a sign which he has learnt 

 to associate with certain feelings or with certain actions to 

 be performed. The communication deals, too, with imme- 

 diate feeling or action ; its sphere is the here and the 

 now. There can be no doubt that dogs associate with 

 barking in certain tones, special emotional states in their 

 companions. In fact it is probable that dogs can in this 

 way communicate with each other a wide range of states 

 of feeling. But these states are present states, not states 

 past or future. They are their own states, not the states 



of thinking in pictures — pictures far truer and more beautiful than even they 

 could describe in words. All processes of thought, in fact, are carried on by 

 association. And in the chain of association there may be links of all kinds 

 furnished by alt the senses we possess. All that we can say with regard to 

 man is that he adds to the natural symbols which form links in this chain of 

 n, certain arbitrary symbols of his own manufacture. 



of others. A dog can call his companions' attention to a 

 worriable cat, or he may have his attention roused by 

 my exclaiming " cat." But no dog could tell his com- 

 panion of the successful '' worry" he had just enjoyed or 

 suggest that they should go out for a " worry" to-morrow 

 morning. And here we come upon what seems to me 

 the fact which raises man so immeasurably above the 

 level of the brute. The brute has to be contented with 

 the experience lie inherits or individually acquires. 

 Man, through language spoken or written, pro/its by 

 the experience of his fellows. Even the most savage 

 tribe has traditions extending back to the father's 

 father (Sproat). And the civilised man — has he not in 

 his libraries the recorded results of many centurie 

 ever widening experience and ever deepening thought ? 

 Thus it is that language has made us men. By means 

 of language and language alone has human thought 

 become possible. This it is which has placed so enor- 

 mous a gap between the mind of man and the mind of 

 the dog. Through language each human being becomes 

 the inheritor of the accumulated thought and experience 

 of the whole human race. Through language has the 

 higher abstract thought become possible. 



But though I look upon the difference between human 

 intelligence and brute intelligence as very great, / do not 

 believe that there is any one faculty which all men possess 

 and which no brute possesses. I have already stated my 

 views on the subject of abstraction, and to what I have 

 said I have nothing now to add. But concerning the 

 converse process of construction or object — forming a few 

 words may be said. Let me first explain what I mean 

 by construction. Our conception of an object is the result 

 of a synthesis of its qualities. But this synthesis is, I 

 imagine, of two kinds. There is a synthesis by immediate 

 association, and a synthesis by reflection. When a dog 

 sees before him a soaked dog-biscuit, his conception of 

 the object is a synthesis by immediate association. The 

 sight of the biscuit at once suggests by association a 

 certain smell and taste. The object he mentally con- 

 structs is built up of these three, sight, smell, and taste. 

 All other properties are rejected or eliminated. Now, 

 suppose the dog capable of reflecting thus — the biscuit is 

 light enough to carry, soft enough to bite, cool enough 

 not to burn my mouth — he would then add to his synthesis 

 by immediate association, a further synthesis by reflection, 

 and would construct a more complete object. By the 

 synthesis by reflection, in fact, all those qualities are added 

 which are unconsciously eliminated in the immediate 

 construction by association. I do not imagine that brutes 

 have sufficient power of reflection to affect to any great 

 extent this further synthesis. Indeed I imagine that 

 savages and young children do not habitually go further 

 than the construction by association. The further process 

 has been added mainly under the influence of a developed 

 language. The word groups around itself not only the 

 cluster of associated ideas which make up the ordinary 

 unreflecting conception of the object it symbolizes, but 

 also all those further ideas which are the result of scientific 

 study. The word is the peg upon which we hang those 

 abstract qualities which by means of words we have 

 isolated. C. Lloyd Morgan 



AINO ETHNOLOGY 



THE already somewhat voluminous literature of the 

 Aino race has been recently increased by two valu- 

 able memoirs by competent original observers." Hence, 

 if neither Dr. Scheube nor Heir von Siebold has any- 

 thing very new to tell us, it may be fairly concluded that 

 most of the available data have now been collected. Ex- 

 tended research in the unexplored districts of Yeso may 

 doubtless bring to light some further interesting facts 



1 " Die Ainos," von Dr. B. Scheube, Yokohama, 1882 ; and " Ethnolo- 

 gische Studien uber die Aino auf der Insel Yeso, von Heinrich von Siebold, 

 Berlin, 1881. 



