













































aceiaaa ari; 
_ Fepruary 10, 1923] | 
like the French and English advocate diametrically 
opposite methods of dealing with the same problem. 
Reason is but the instrument for the safer and more 
‘successful carrying out of a reaction which will satisfy 
the prevailing emotion, and it is to the emotional 
- conditions of the electors or of different nations that 
_ politicians and statesmen have to appeal if they wish 
| to get support for any particular line of action. Voli- 
- tion itself is another word for desire. A man with a 
y _ strong will is one in whom all the faculties of the mind 
are slaves to the satisfaction of a dominant desire, 
_ which may be easily attained or may take years for 
its achievement. The author points out that what a 
man does is the resultant of what he feels. and since 
feelings are themselves dependent on external con- 
of the individual, character is but an abstrac- 
on, a name for the average mental manifestations 
d not representing anything fixed or constant. 
_ Theoretically it might be thought possible to build up 
a logical account of character, starting from the primi- 
ive instincts tending to the preservation of life, to 
‘reproduction, and to the association with other indi- 
s in communities (the herd instinct), by showing 
these are modified to produce the manifold 
riation of impulsive behaviour observed in man. 
ich an attempt would, however, involve us in constant 
cross-reference, since every quality of the mind is 
bound up with other qualities, just as every part of 
the brain is associated in its activities with those of 
all other parts. The only method left is that adopted 
the author, namely, taking the more complex 
otional conditions, to analyse their composition, 
aeir relationship to other mental states, and their 
manifestations in conduct. Such a method renders 
t difficult to preserve logical continuity in the treat- 
ent of the problem. Each chapter becomes an 
ssay in itself, as is evident from a consideration of 
pending: in the table of contents. The first seven 
pters, for example, are labelled as follows : General 
cip a, The Major Passions, Egoism, Love, Social 
nd Moral Feeling, Jealousy, Religion. 
a; are altogether twenty-two chapters, but the 
ment is much more connected than would appear at 
Btsight from the headings just detailed. Throughout 
= book the point of view of the author is that of the 
sducated amateur, so that the reader feels that he is 
of following the arguments and appreciating 
m critically, and indeed that he is entitled to differ 
rom the author without presumption. After all, the 
pst readable books are those in which the reader 
is only half in agreement with the author, so that he 
is incited to think for himself, and to form his own 
conclusions on the subjects dealt with. It will do no 
one any harm to try to analyse in the same manner 
No. 2780, VoL. 111 | 
| 
sae 
ditions 
“ 
NATURE 
175 
in which the author has accomplished it the motives 
for his own actions and for those of other people. It 
may indeed tend to make reason play rather a larger 
part than has hitherto been the case. 
It is curious that the author at the beginning of the 
work abandons the analytic method when speaking of 
the moral feelings. He says: ‘‘ The moral emotions 
are a deep and powerful instinct, buried in every mind, 
and so much part of our constitution that we are 
almost unaware of their very existence. We refrain 
from wrong-doing as the result of a deep emotion 
which controls our actions, very often unknown to 
ourselves.” This is in other words the popular idea 
of conscience, which is regarded as implanted in 
man from his birth. But surely, when the author 
speaks of “ wrong ”-doing he is begging the whole 
question. The moral instinct is the impulse to act 
in accordance with the rules of the tribe of which the 
individual is a member, and is developed by education, 
in its broadest sense, from the herd instinct. On this 
instinct depend the appreciation of approval and the 
seeking of support from the other members of the 
community. By education, by mimicry, by the 
repetition of .enforced actions, by the experience of 
the painful results of some and the pleasurable results 
of other actions, the herd instinct is so moulded that 
the easiest reaction to commonly recurring circum- 
stances is one that is in accordance with the rule of 
the tribe, and any anti-social action is attended with 
mental discomfort or anticipation of punishment or 
disapproval. This is what is commonly called con- 
science. The moral sense will thus be quite different 
in men of different races, according as they have been 
brought up in a Hindu or Christian community or 
among savages. The potentialities of development 
of this moral sense, this Sitilichkeit, will vary from 
individual to individual, but the content of the sense 
and its results in action will depend on the environment 
of the man from his birth. 
The book is copiously illustrated with quotations 
from Shakespeare, Dante, and Goethe. The author 
points out that great writers, far more than men of 
science, penetrate human nature, and that of all 
writers Shakespeare possessed the most profound 
insight into character. The upshot of the whole work 
is that a man’s character depends on his feelings. 
Feelings are the springs of action ; education is above 
all a development and training of feelings. It matters 
more what a man does than how he does it, and it is 
probably on this account that the English system of 
education, so deficient on the intellectual side, can 
boast of results in many ways more successful than 
those achieved by the Lycée or Gymnasium. 
E. H. S, 
