NATURE 



265 



THURSDAY, JANUARY 23, 1902. 



AN "ENERGETIC" VIEW OF EXISTENCE. 

 Vorlesungen iiber Naturphilosophie. By Wilhelm 

 Ostwald. Pp. 457. (\'eit and Co., 1902.) 



LEIBNITZ once remarked that if we could imagine 

 a human brain so magnified, without disturbing 

 the relations of its parts, that we could move about in it 

 as " in a mill," and could learn and understand all the 

 mechanism of brain-atoms, we should see merely atoms 

 in motion and should learn nothing of the thoughts which 

 correspond with these motions. Du Bois-Revmond, in an 

 address on the limits of our knowledge of nature, ex- 

 presses a similar thought. Imagining that we could 

 acquire knowledge of the processes occurring in the brain 

 similar to that which we possess of the heavenly bodies, he 

 says : — "As regards the actual mental processes, it is evi- 

 dent that even with such an astronomical knowledge of 

 the organ of thought (Seeles-organ) they would elude our 

 comprehension, just as they do now. In possession of 

 such knowledge, we should still stand before them as 

 before something completely intangible. An astro- 

 nomical knowledge of the brain, the highest we can ever 

 attain to, reveals to us nothing but matter in motion. By 

 no conceivable arrangement or motion of material par- 

 ticles can a bridge be constructed which will lead us into 

 the region of consciousness." 



" I know of no more convincing proof of the philo- 

 sophic value of the application of the doctrine of energy 

 to our method of viewing the external world," continues 

 Ostwald, after quoting the above paragraphs, "than 

 that in the light of that doctrine, this ancient problem 

 loses all its terror. For the difficulties are owing to 

 the fact that Leibnitz and Du Bois-Reymond, following 

 Descartes, make the assumption that the physical world 

 is constituted entirely of matter in motion. In such a 

 world there is no place for thought. We, who regard 

 energy as the ultimate reality, perceive nothing of such 

 impossibilities. We have seen that the effects of nerve- 

 conduction can be referred without contradictory ideas 

 to energetic precursors ; and we have seen, too, that 

 nerve-processes involving consciousness are continuously 

 connected with those in which consciousness plays no 

 part. 1 have tried my best to find anything absurd or 

 unthinkable in the assumption that certain kinds of energy 

 involve consciousness ; but I have been unable to dis- 

 cover anything of the kind. We shall shortly be con- 

 vinced, by an investigation of the most important 

 phenomena of consciousness, that they are conditioned 

 by transfer of energy ; and it is no more difficult for me 

 to think that one of the conditions of kinetic energy is 

 motion than that the energy of the central nervous system 

 must be accompanied by consciousness." 



This quotation will give the reader a glimpse into the 

 nature of the material considered by Prof. Ostwald in 

 these lectures. In the present review I do not intend to 

 offer critical remarks, but merely to present to the readers 

 of N.\TURE a sketch of the system of philosophy which 

 appears to Ostwald to be the outcome of the present 

 position of our knowledge of physical phenomena. It 

 would be ungracious, however, not to congratulate the 

 author on the great interest which his book awakens, and 

 on the exceedingly clear and lucid style in which he 

 presents his ideas, in spite of the somewhat involved 

 NO. 1682, VOL. 65] 



constructions which the nature of the language in which 

 it is written necessitates. In his preface Prof. Ostwald, 

 after asking the indulgence of his readers for many im- 

 perfections and omissions, e.xpresses the hope that in the 

 new journal, the Annals of the Philosophy of Nature, the 

 false may be corrected, the imperfect completed, and the 

 ideas of doubtful interpretation discussed. 



The earlier portions of the work deal with a critique of 

 the older philosophical methods which attempted to fore- 

 cast and explain phenomena by thinking ; Ostwald sets 

 out with the aim of controlling and regulating thought 

 by constantly keeping phenomena in view. Yet in order 

 to convey our thoughts to others we must make use of 

 words and conform to certain laws of thought. In fact, 

 we employ our intellectual apparatus to fathom the depths 

 and investigate the working of precisely that intellectual 

 apparatus, a problem similar to the one solved by 

 Baron Munchausen when he extricated himself from 

 the bog into which he had sunk by pulling himself 

 out by his own pigtail. The ordinary methods of 

 science, however, are here applicable ; we can 

 examine various assumptions and accept that which 

 appears best to fulfil its purpose. We can never 

 attain certainty, or a knowledge of the absolute, in 

 philosophy, nor can we, indeed, in any natural science ; 

 but we may arrive at conclusions which possess a high 

 degree of probability. And in philosophy, as in science, 

 we must be content with a gradual approach to truth, 

 rejecting, in many cases, conceptions found to be at 

 variance with experience. Philosophy, like science, is 

 empirical ; but as it progresses, the region of empiricism 

 is narrowed, although it will never ultimately disappear. 



The signification of certain terms is next expounded ; 

 experience, memory, comparison, conception, thing, 

 object ; and the nature of language and the danger of 

 mistaking words for things. A plea is here entered 

 for the adoption of an artificial language to be used only 

 for science and business, avoiding ambiguities and 

 attaching definite meanings to all its words. Some 

 words of such a language have already been adopted, as, 

 for example, meter and gram ; our musical notation and 

 our system of ciphering are universal, and to devise a 

 universal language would be a distinct gain for the 

 human race. A short account of the principal parts of 

 speech and of the changes in meaning of words concludes 

 the chapter. The part played by our senses in receiving 

 impressions from without is next considered, and here 

 the particular views adopted by the author first become 

 prominent. In every affection of the senses a transfer 

 of energy has occurred. It is in receiving impressions 

 through the tactile sense that this is most obviouF, and 

 here, too, we are impressed by the existence of a ivill. 

 The question whether the " external world " is not to be 

 regarded as a mere phase of consciousness or as reality 

 is solved thus ; "We have not to ask. Is there an external 

 world ? but. What phenomena must we class under the 

 name external world P' "Those which are independent 

 of my will " is the answer ; or again, " Those in which 

 my organs of sense take pare." 



The formation of conceptions (Begriffe) requires five 

 operations — receiving an impression, distinguishing it 

 from others, connecting it with others, comparing it 

 with others and, finally, reaching a conclusion. A 



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