Dec. 2, 1869] 
NATURE 
133 
mental phenomena, and this is so difficult a conception 
that it must be presented in the author’s own words :— 
“T believe the unconscious intelligence that directs the for- 
mation of the bodily structures is the same intelligence that 
becomes conscious in the mind. The two are generally believed 
to be fundamentally distinct: conscious mental intelligence is 
believed to be human, and formative intelligence is believed to be 
Divine. This view, making the two to be totally unlike, leaves 
no room for the middle region of instinct ; and hence the marvel- 
lous character with which instinct is generally invested. But if 
we admit that all the intelligence manifested in the organic creation 
is fundamentally the same, it will appear natural, and what might 
be expected, that there should be such a gradation as we actually 
find, from perfectly unconscious to perfectly conscious intelli- 
gence; the intermediate region being occupied by intelligent 
though unconscious motor actions—in a word, byinstinct. . ... 
The intelligence which forms the lenses of the eye is the same 
intelligence which in the mind of man understands the theory of 
the lens; the intelligence that hollows out the bones and the wing- 
feathers of the bird, in order to combine lightness with strength, 
and places the feathery fringes where they are needed, is the same 
intelligence which in the mind of the engineer has devised the 
construction of iron pillars hollowed out like those bones and 
feathers. . . . . It will probably be said that this identification 
of formative, instinctive, and mental intelligence is Pantheistic. 
. ... I am not a Pantheist: on the contrary, I believe in a 
Divine Power and Wisdom, infinitely transcending all manifes- 
tations of power and intelligence that are or can be known to us 
in our present state of being. .... Energy or force is an effect 
of Divine power; but there is not a fresh exercise of Divine 
power whenever a stone falls or a fire burns. So with intelligence. 
All intelligence is a result of Divine Wisdom, but there is not a 
fresh determination of Divine thought needed for every new 
adaptation in organic structure, or for every new thought in the 
brain of man. “Every Theist will admit that there is not a fresh 
act of creation when a new living individual is born. I go a 
little further, and say that Ido not believe in a fresh act of 
creation for a new species. I believe that the Creator has not 
separately organised every structure, but has endowed vitalised 
matter with intelligence, under the guidance of which it organised 
itself; and I think there is no more Pantheism in this than in 
believing that the Creator does not separately cause every stone 
to fall and every fire to burn, but has endowed matter with energy, 
and has given energy the power of transposing itself.” 
I am not myself able to conceive this impersonal and 
unconscious intelligence coming in exactly when required 
to direct the forces of matter to special ends, and it is 
certainly quite incapable of demonstration. On the other 
hand, the theory that there are various grades of con- 
scious and personal intelligences at work in nature, guiding 
the forces of matter and mind for their purposes as man 
guides them for his, is both easily conceivable and is not 
necessarily incapable of proof. If therefore there are in 
nature phenomena which, as Mr. Murphy believes, the 
laws of matter and of life will not suffice to explain, 
would it not be better to adopt the simpler and more con- 
ceivable solution, till further evidence can be obtained ? 
The only other portion of the work on which my space 
will allow me to touch, is the chapter on the Classification 
of the Sciences, in which a scheme is propounded of great 
simplicity and merit. Mr. Murphy does not appear to be 
acquainted with Mr. Herbert Spencer’s essay on this subject, 
and it is somewhat remarkable that he has arrived at so 
very similar a result, although less ideal and less ex- 
haustively worked out. In one point his plan seems an 
improvement on all preceding ones. He arranges the 
sciences in two series, which we may term primary and 
secondary. A primary science is one which treats of a 
definite group of 7afural laws, and these are capable of 
being arranged (as Comte proposed) in a regular series, 
each one being more or less dependent on those which 
precede it, while it is altogether independent of those which 
follow it. A secondary science, on the other hand, is one 
which treats of a group of xatural phenomena, and makes 
use of the primary sciences to explain those phenomena; 
and these can also be arranged in a series of decreasing 
generality and independence of those which follow them, 
although the series is less complete and symmetrical than 
in the case of the primary sciences. The two series some- 
what condensed are :— 
Primary Series. Secondary Series. 
1. Logic. 1. Astronomy. 
2. Mathematics. 2. Terrestial Magnetism. 
3. Dynamics. 3- Meteorology. 
4. Sound, Heat, Electricity, &c. 4. Geography. 
5. Chemistry. 5. Geology. 
6. Physiology. 6. Mineralogy. 
7. Psychology. 7. Palzontology. 
8. Sociology. 8. Descriptive Biology. 
Taking the first in the list of secondary or compound 
sciences, Astronomy, we may define it as the application of 
the first five primary sciences to acquiring a knowledge of 
the heavenly bodies, and we can hardly say that any one 
of these sciences is more essential to it than any other. 
We are, perhaps, too apt to consider, as Comte did, that 
the application of the higher mathematics through the law 
of gravitation to the calculation of the planetary motions, 
is so much the essential feature of modern astronomy as 
to render every other part of it comparatively insignificant. 
It will be well, therefore, to consider for a moment what 
would be the position of the science at this day had the 
law of gravitation remained still undiscovered. Our vastly 
multiplied observations and delicate instruments would 
have enabled us to determine so many empirical laws 
of planetary motion and their secular variations, that 
the positions of all the planets and their satellites would 
have been calculable for a moderate period in advance, and 
with very considerable accuracy. All the great facts of 
size and distance in planetary and stellar astronomy, would 
be determined with great precision. All the knowledge 
derived from our modern telescopes, and from spectrum 
analysis, would be just as complete as it is now. Neptune, 
it is true, would not have been discovered except by chance ; 
the nautical almanack would not be published four years 
in advance ; longitude would not be determined by lunar 
distances, and we should not have that sense of mental 
power which we derive from the knowledge of Newton’s 
grand law ;—but all the marvels of the nebulze, of solar, 
lunar, and planetary structure, of the results of spectrum 
analysis, of the velocity of light, and of the vast dimensions 
of planetary and stellar spaces, would be as completely 
known to us as they now are, and would form a science of 
astronomy hardly inferior in dignity, grandeur, and inténse 
interest, to that which we now possess. 
Mr. Murphy guards us against supposing that the series 
of sciences he has sketched out includes all that is 
capable of being known by man. He professes to have 
kept himself in this work to what may be called positive 
science, but he believes equally in metaphysics and in 
theology, and proposes to treat of their relation to positive 
science in a separate work, which from the author’s great 
originality and thoughtfulness will no doubt be well worthy 
of perusal. 
ALFRED R. WALLACE 
