214 
NAT OTE 
[Dec. 23, 1869 
inseparable from knowledge in its essence, which implies 
discrimination of difference or agreement. We,in common 
with others, would rather believe that no sensation, not 
even the simplest, can exist without the elements of 
cognition being at the same time present in conscious- 
ness. 
The word perception has, undoubtedly, been used for 
the most part to signify something which may be termed 
an intellectualised sensation, and in the purest form of it 
the amount of mere feeling is reduced to a minimum, 
whilst the amount of intellectual action involved has 
undergone a corresponding increase. A perception is a 
fully elaborated sensation, from which we derive our 
notion of the nature of an external object—such object 
being recognised immediately and intuitively, not so much 
by the mere light of the single present impression, as by 
the blending of this with revived memories of all other 
impressions which have, at various times, been related to 
the one now present. Thus we get a comprehensive 
notion of the nature of the external object, though a notion 
which must, to a certain extent, vary with the individual 
according to the nature cf his previous experience. A 
savage who had never seen gunpowder before, would have 
a very different notion called up by the sight of it, from 
that with which a European would be inspired who well 
knew its composition and properties. Tothe one it would 
bea simple black powder, and by him it would be perceived 
more or less simply as belonging to this category ; whilst 
the others notion of the same substance would be more 
complex, containing ideas as to the ingredients of which it 
is composed, and as to the effects which it is capable 
of producing by explosion in various ways. But between 
such states of knowledge, and others which might be 
regarded as the simplest specimens of mere feelings or 
sensations, there is not a difference in kind, only one of 
degree. Any sensation, however simple, can only be 
recognised as such—can only be revealed in conscious- 
ness—inasmuch as it presents a certain quality or quali- 
ties, by which it can be differentiated from cr classed 
with previous states of feeling. Therefore even the most 
simple sensation does necessitate the existence of intel- 
lectual activity, since discrimination is the most funda- 
mental mode of intellect. And, in those more complex 
sensations, generally named perceptions, the only differ- 
ence, as previously indicated, is that the feeling, as mere 
feeling, is reduced to its lowest ebb, whilst the amount of 
intellectual activity, combined in the form of discrimination 
and memory, has proportionately increased. For by virtue 
of that association always occurring during the education 
of the individual between various related sensations, organic 
and organised relations have been established in the brain, 
so that a present sense impression rouses simultaneously 
memories of other past impressions derived from any 
given object, either by the same or through different 
avenues of sense ; and this blending either actually or 
potentially of all cur past knowledge concern:ng the same 
or similar objects with the new impression, goes to consti- 
tute our then present perception. “Thus,” as we have said 
clsewhere,* “I see an orange at a distance: this, as an 
object of visual sense, is simply a rounded yellow area; 
but past experience has led me to know what are the 
tactual and muscular sensaticns usually associated with 
the sight impressions—how it is really a spherical body 
with a somewhat rough surface. Then I have learned 
also that these impressions are usually associated with 
a certain odour, with a certain taste, a degree of suc- 
culence, and certain internal optical characters, in- 
cluding a divisibility into segments, and the possible 
presence of seeds within. A combination of any of 
these, or of a host of other revivable impressions, may 
go to constitute my perception of an orange, and may 
fash into consciousness more or less simultaneously on 
* “On the Muscular Sense, and on the Physiology of Thinking.” (Brit. 
Med. Journal, May 1869.) 
the presentation of the object to the visual sense.” But 
as we have previously said, between this comparatively 
complex resultant, and what would be called a simple 
sensation, some mere odour or taste, there are other 
sensations of all intermediate degrees of complexity ; and 
even such simple forms of sensation could not be realised 
in consciousness without our szow7ng them as sensations 
possessing such and such characters: to be £vowy at all, 
they must be known qualitatively, and to recognise their 
qualities is to know them in relation to certain other past 
impressions which we may have experienced ; and thus, 
in fact, we may look upon it as almost certain, that even 
the simplest conscious impression can only be known or 
realised in consciousness so long as intellectual action of 
some kind is brought to bear upon its recognition. 
Hence it may be legitimately maintained, that there is 
the strongest @ f7zor¢ objection to the view which has been 
so generally held amongst physiologists, that there is an 
inherent difference between a sensation and a perception, 
and that there are distinct nerve-centres, by the activity of 
which such states or acts respectively are called into being. 
And whilst psychological evidence is thus strongly in favour 
cf the supposition that all sensations, whether simple or 
complex, do reveal themselves in one organ only, we think 
we shall also be able to show that physiological evidence 
1s, Moreover, quite in harmony with the opinion that the 
cerebral hemispheres themselves are the sole seats of 
consciousness, whether for simple sensations or for complex 
sensations ; and that there is no lower organ for “mere 
sensations ” only, as they have been termed—no sensortum 
commune as ordinarily understood, in which impressions 
reveal themselves in consciousness before impinging upon 
the cortical grey substance of the cerebral hemispheres. 
H. CHARLTON BASTIAN 
MISTLETOE 
HEN the leaves are rotting on the ground, and the 
fruit has been converted into cider, the orchards of 
Herefordshire and Worcestershire still retain something 
of their verdant hue, and are green with what seems at 
first to be untimely foliage. But mistletoe cannot be 
unseasonable at Christmas, and there are those who would 
be glad to have it in season “all the year round.” The 
supply from the West Midland Counties is practically 
‘inexhaustible, for it has been calculated that from 30 to 
go per cent. of the apple-trecs are infested by this parasite, 
two or three boughs of which may sometimes be seen 
dependent from some old cankered limb. Its presence is 
at once the cause and the sign of incipient decay. A 
struggle for life between the tree and its enemy has begun, 
and, if the pruning-knife or the demands of Christmas do 
not interfere, the mistletoe will slowly and surely exhaust 
the branch upon which it grows, penetrating further and 
further into the wood as the supply of sap recedes, and 
ever sending forth fresh roots in place of those which were 
overpowered at first. The severity of the struggle between 
these seemingly unequal foes may be sometimes seen in 
the strange fantastic contortions into which the branches 
twist themselves, and sometimes in the withered aspect 
which the whole tree wears when, as Shakespeare says, 
it stands 
Forlorn and lean, 
O’ercome with moss and baleful mistletoe. 
The entire existence of this parasite is full of interest, 
even though the mystery of its birth has been removed. 
Modern research confirms the accuracy of the old distich 
which expresses thus its origin :— 
The thrush, when Le pollutes the bough, 
Sows for himself the seeds of woe ; 
and perhaps the increase of mistletoe may be partly 
attributable to the disuse of its product (bird-lime), and 
the greater immunity which thrushes in consequence 
enjoy. But those who desire to do so may easily propa- 
