360 
WA TORE, 
[72d 3, 1870 
have gone on to consider what must be inferred if this assump- 
tion is not true; observing that ‘‘ awkwardly enough, its truth 
and its untruth are alike fatal to the conclusions of those who 
argue after the manner of Humboldt. Note the alternatives ” :— 
“On the one hand, what follows from the untruth of the 
assumption ? If apparent largeness of stars is not due to com- 
parative nearness, and their successively smaller sizes to their 
greater and greater degrees of remoteness, what becomes of the 
inferences respecting the dimensions of our sidereal system and 
the distances of the nebulze? If, as has lately been shown, the 
almost invisible star, 61 Cygni, has a greater parallax than 
a Cygni, though, according to an estimate based on Sir W. 
Herschel’s assumption, it should be about twelve times more 
distant—if, as it turns out, there exist telescopic stars which are 
nearer to us than Sirius, of what worth is the conclusion that the 
nebulz are very remote, because their component luminous 
masses are made visible only by high telescopic powers? ... . 
On the other hand, what follows if the truth of the assumption 
be granted? The arguments used to justify this assumption 
in the case of the stars, equally justify it in the case of 
the nebul. It cannot be contended that, on the average,» 
the apparent sizes of the stars indicate their distances, 
without its being admitted that, on the average, the apparent 
sizes of the nebulz indicate their distances—that, generally 
speaking, the larger are the nearer, and the smaller are the 
more distant. Mark, now, the necessary inference respecting 
their resolvability. The largest or nearest nebulze will be most 
easily resolved into stars ; the successively smaller will be suc- 
cessively more difficult of resolution ; and the irresolvable ones 
will be the smaller ones. This, however, is exactly the reverse 
of the fact. The largest nebulz are either wholly irresolvable, 
or but partially resolvable under the highest telescopic powers ; 
while a great proportion of quite small nebulz are easily resoly- 
able by far less powerful telescopes.” 
At the time when these passages were written, spectrum- 
analysis had not yielded the conclusive proof which we now 
possess, that many nebulz consist of matter in a diffused form. 
But quite apart from the evidence yielded by spectrum-analysis, 
it seems to me that the incongruities and contradictions which 
may be evolved from the hypothesis that nebula are remote 
sidereal systems, amply suffice to show that hypothesis to be 
untenable. 
37, Queen’s Gardens, Jan. 31 HERBERT SPENCER 
Kant’s View of Space 
In answer to my invitation, Mr. Lewes now ‘“‘ freely admits 
that Kant nowhere speaks of Space and Time as ‘ Forms of 
Thought,’” but still contends that ‘Kant would not have dis- 
claimed such language, as misrepresenting his meaning.’ As 
well might he argue that although Euclid never uses the word 
epipedon (our English word A/ane or Zlaznz), to signify a curved 
surface (emipavera), he would not have remonstrated against the 
use of the term cy/indrical epipedon or conical epipedon, to denote 
the surface of a cylinder or cone, in a professed exposition or 
critizism of his Elements of Geometry, because in common life 
we speak of rough or undulating plains, or because a plane 
admits of being bent into the shape of a cylindrical or conical 
surface. I think the ladies who are getting up their Planes and 
Solids at St. George’s Hall would be of a different opinion from 
Mr. Lewes in this matter, and with good reason on their side. 
Mr. Lewes, reiterating a statement contained in his previous 
letter, goes out of his way to affirm that he ‘‘ uniformly speaks 
of Space and Time as forms of Intuition in his pages of exposi- 
tion” of Kant’s doctrine in his ‘‘ History of Philosophy.”’ Were 
the fact so, it would not in any material degree excuse the 
inaccuracy of subsequently styling them ‘‘ forms of Thought ;” 
and, moreover, the real point at issue is not Mr. Lewes’s general 
accuracy or inaccuracy, but whether a mode of speech which he, 
along with others, employs, is right in itself and ought to be 
persisted in. 
However, as Mr. Lewes has thought fit to put in a sort of 
plea in mitigation of former wrong-doing, I have taken the 
trouble of looking through his exosetion and criticism: of Kant 
in his History (ed. 1867), and in no single instance have I come 
upon the phrase forms of intuition applied to Space and Time, 
either in the one or the other ; although he states he has zséformlv 
spoken of them as such in the former. I have marked the word 
intuitions as occurring once, and forms of sensibility several times, 
but forms of intuition never. If form of sensibility is as good to use 
as form of intuition, form of understanding ought to be as good 
as form of thought; but Mr. Lewes owns that the former is 
indefensible, whilst he avers that the latter is correct. If Mr. 
Lewes has ever called Space and Time forms of intuition in the 
Ilistory, it will be easy for him to set me right by quoting the 
passage where the phrase occurs, although that circumstance 
would not in any degree better his own position, and still less 
excuse the assertion of his z7zform use of the term. 
If Mr. Lewes cannot quote correctly from his own writings, 
it will surprise nobody that he misquotes the language of an 
opponent. He repeats, “Intuition without thought is mere 
sensuous impression,” and adds, “ Mr. Sylvester demurs to this.” 
““My words are” (NATURE, Jan. 13, 1870): ‘‘ To sucha misuse 
of the word energy it would be little to the point to urge that 
force without energy is mere potential tendency. It is just as little 
to the point in the matter at issue for Mr. Lewes to inform the 
readers of NATURE that zetetion without thought is mere 
sensuous impression.” So that, according to Mr. Lewes, to say 
that a proposition is Zitt/e to the point is demurring to its truth. 
I should not hesitate to say if some amiable youth wished to 
entertain his partner in a quadrille with agreeable conversation, 
that it would be “ttle to the point, according to the German pro- 
verb, to regale her with such information as how 
“ Long are the days of summer-tide, 
And tall the towers of Strasburg’s fane,” 
but should be surprised to have it imputed to me on that 
account that I demurred to the proposition of the length of 
the days in summer, or the height of Strasburg’s towers. 
In another passage, Mr. Lewes gives me credit for “ saying 
correctly that Intuition and Thought are not convertible terms ”— 
a platitude I never dreamed of giving utterance to; but that I 
am ‘incorrect in assuming that they differ as potential and 
actual ’—words which, or the like of which, in any sort or sense, 
never flowed from my pen. Surely this is not fair controversy, 
to misquote the words and allegations of an opponent. Itseems to 
me too much like fighting with poisoned weapons. I decline to con- 
tinue the contest on such terms ; and, passing over Mr. Lewes’s 
very odd statement about sfeczes and genus with reference to 
Intuition and Thought, shall conclude with expressing my surprise 
at hisand Mr. G C, Robertson’s confident assumption that Kant 
uses in the title of his book fuve reason in a far wider sense than 
in the body of his work, simply because to arrive at the Pure 
Reason he has to go through the Critick of the Sensibility and of 
the Understanding. Ifin a history of the Reign of Queen Victoria 
the author should find it expedient to go back to the times of 
the Norman and Saxon conquests, would it be right to infer 
therefrom that he used in his title-page the name Victoria in a 
generalised sense, to include not only her most Gracious Majesty, 
but also the Tanner’s daughter and Princess Rowena ? 
Perhaps by this time many of the Naturalistic readers of the 
journal who regard the human intelligence as forming no part of 
the scheme of Nature, wish Space at the bottom of the sea; but the 
more the subject is canvassed, and the greater the number of Eng- 
lish authorities brought forward to back up Mr. Lewes in wresting 
the words of Kant from their proper scientific signification, the 
higher meed of praise seems to me to accrue to Dr. Ingleby for 
stemming the tide of depravation, and banishing, as I feel con- 
fident this discussion will have the effect of doing, from the 
realm of English -would-be philosophy, such a loose and incau- 
tious way of talking as that of giving to Space and Time the 
designation which the Master has appropriated to the categories 
of his system, and to them alone. J. J. SYLVESTER 
P.S.—I should be doing injustice to the very sincere senti- 
ments of respect I entertain for Mr. Lewes’s varied and brilliant 
attainments (which constitute him a kind of link between the 
material and spiritual sides of Nature). and of gratitude for the 
pleasure the perusal of his ‘‘ History of Philosophy” has afforded 
me, were I to part company with him without disclaiming all 
acrimony of feeling, if perchance any too strident tones should 
have seemed to mingle with my enforced reply. In naming him 
in the original offending footnote (the fountain of these tears), 
my purpose was simply to emphasise the necessity of protesting 
against what seemed to me an unsound form of words, apropos 
of Kant, which went on receiving countenance from such and 
so eminent writers as himself and the others named; and I 
should be false to my own instincts did I not at heart admire 
the courageous spirit with which, almost unaided and alone (like 
a good knight of old), he has done his best to defend his posi- 
tion and maintain his ground against all oppugners. LES 
