424 
NATORAS 
[ Fed. 24, 1870 
PROTOPLASM 
As regards Protoplasm, in relation to Professor fuxleys 
Essay on the Physical Basis of Life. Pp. 68. By 
James Hutchinson Stirling, F.R.C.S., LL.D., Edin. 
burgh. (Blackwood and Sons. 1869.) 
HEN one of the most powerful representatives of 
the Transcendental school of philosophy, himself 
possessing a knowledge of biological science, consents 
to do battle against the modern doctrines concerning Life 
and its assumed material substratum, Protoplasm, we 
may expect, at least, that the strongest arguments which 
can be adduced will be brought to bear against the ob- 
noxious theories and their supposed materialistic ten- 
dencies. Still more especially must we prepare ourselves 
for battle @ otrance, when the champion that steps for= 
ward is one who has already grappled so manfully with 
the “ Secret of Hegel” and is otherwise so distinguished 
a leader amongst the adverse school of thinkers. 
Although differing altogether from Prof. Huxley on the 
main subject of his essay, we find that in one respect the 
opinions expressed therein are perfectly in accordance with 
those of Mr. Stirling. With reference to the views enun- 
ciated concerning Comte and his writings, Mr. Stirling 
says : “I acknowledge in Mr. Huxley’s every word the ring 
of a genuine experience.” Mr. Stirling is even more severe 
on the hitherto much-lauded Positive philosopher than 
Prof. Huxley himself. He says :— 
There is not a sentence in his book that, in the hollow elabora- 
tion and windy pretentiousness of its build, is not an exact type 
of its own constructor. On the whole, indeed, when we consider 
the little to which he attained, the empty inflation of his claims, 
the monstrous and maniacal self-conceit into which he was 
exalted, it may appear, perhaps, that charity to M. Comte himself 
—to say nothing of the world—should induce us to wish that 
both his name and his works were buried in oblivion. 
When the phrase “ Physical Basis of Life” was em- 
ployed, this was intended to convey the notion that there 
was one kind of matter, that is, one genus—including an 
almost infinite number of specifically different, though 
closely related, kinds—common to all living beings : this 
matter being named Protoplasm. In connection with this 
doctrine, though based upon other facts, there was a further 
inference. Life was believed to be a function of living 
matter rather than of living forxm—whether cellular or 
other. No secondary visible organisation, at all events, 
was supposed to be needed, though a primary but invisible 
molecular organisation was deemed all essential for the 
display of vital manifestations. Such a doctrine being 
once admitted, there is, as Mr. Stirling points out, no 
logical halting-place short of Prof. Huxley’s further con- 
clusion, “¢hat all vital action whatever, intellectual tn- 
cluded, is but the result of the molecular forces of the 
protoplasm which displays it.” 
Let us see, then, what is to be said in favour of a matter 
of Life, and how far Mr. Stirling’s objections to this 
doctrine are valid. 
At the time when the doctrines of Schleiden and Schwann 
—that the ‘cell’ was the ultimate morphological unit capa- 
ble of displaying ‘ vital’ manifestations—were announced, 
and long after, the simplest independent living things, 
whether animal or vegetable, were supposed to be unicel- 
lular organisms. 077 and visible organisation were, 
therefore, regarded by most as necessary for the manifesta- 
tion of Life: it was supposed that a more or less spheri- 
cal structure was needed, possessing a distinct cell-wall, 
with a nucleus, and other cell contents. But, of late 
years, increasing knowledge and faithful investigation has 
necessitated much change of doctrine, in regard to the 
nature of those simplest parts of complex organisms 
which are capable of displaying a vitality of theig own, 
and in regard to the nature of the simplest independent 
living things. 
Some of the principal modifications in the ‘cell’ doc- 
trine of organisation are thus sketched by Mr. Stirling 
himself :— 
The first step taken in resolution of this theory was completed 
by Max Schultze, preceded by Leydig. This was the elimina- 
tion of an investing membrane. Such membrane may, and does 
ultimately form ; but, in the first instance, it appears the cell is 
naked, The second step in the resolution belongs, perhaps, to 
Briicke, though preceded by Bergman, and though Max Schultze, 
Kiihne, Haeckel, and others ought to be mentioned in the same 
connection. ‘This step was the elimination, or at least subor- 
dination, of the nucleus. The nucleus, we are to understand 
now, is necessary neither to the division nor to the existence of 
the cell. 
Thus, then, stripped of its membrane, relieved of its nucleus, 
what now remains of the cell? Why, nothing but what was 
the contained matter, the intracellular matrix, and 7s—Proto- 
plasm. 
Thus, then, we seem to reach our elementary life-stuff— 
our living wa¢ter. But Mr. Stirling would warn us against 
coming to any such conclusion—he will not so easily 
yield. He tells us we are quite wrong if we think we have got 
rid of the cell and have reduced ourselves to a simple matter 
of Life. And why? “Because,” as he says, “all the great 
German histologists still hold by the cell, and can hardly 
open their mouths without mention of it.” But, if this be 
so, after what Mr. Stirling has himself told us, to what 
else can we ascribe the practice, save to a seeming reality of 
that reputed fondness in the German mind for courtesy 
or conventional titles? Some such excuse there may be, 
but assuredly no other. We would ask Mr. Stirling to 
reconsider the bearing of the statements which he has 
himself adduced. In place of the old morphological 
vital unit—the cell—with its definite characters, we are 
reduced to a mere naked, non-nucleated bit of protoplasm, 
as the simplest material substratum adequate to display 
all those vital manifestations, previously considered to be 
the essential attributes of the formed elements above 
mentioned. The power of displaying vital manifesta- 
tions has, in fact, been transferred from definitely 
formed morphological units, to utterly indefinite and 
formless masses of Protoplasm. Instead, therefore, 
of an obvious form of Life, we are reduced to a 
matter of Life, presenting no appreciable morphological 
characters. It becomes evident, moreover, that if the 
old term “cell” is still applied to these mere bits of living 
stuff or protoplasm—not because they are morphological 
units, but simply because biologists have been compelled 
to transfer the power of manifesting vital characteristics 
to such indefinite protoplasmic masses—then this term, 
thus employed, must be seen to have so entirely lost its 
old signification, that it can be regarded only as a mere 
courtesy title. Vital power has obviously been transferred 
from a definite morphological unit—the cell—to mere 
living matter, and if any people do persist in still calling 
a portion of such mere matter by the name of the morphe- 
