Feb. 14, 1884] 



NATURE 



371 



olher the results which each has obtained ; and each human 

 being is nble to submit these results to the test of subjective verifica- 

 tion^ For human beings therefore a scimce of psychology is 

 possible just in so far as the results obtained indirectly are 

 capable of direct verification. 



One of the most remarkable results of modern ?cientific inves- 

 tigation is the establishment of a more or less definite parallelism 

 between llie phenomena of ejective psychology (thus capable of 

 subjective verification) and certain objective phenomena of 

 physiology — a parallelism of psychosis and neurosis. But these 

 phenomena of physiology are not restricted to the human sub- 

 ject ; and we therefore have grounds for believing that running 

 parallel to the neuroses of animals there are certain psychoses. 

 And it would seem at first sight possible that corresponding to a 

 science of comparative neurosis we might liave a science of com- 

 parative psychosis. We must remember, however, that it is 

 only on the lower mental levels, so to speak, that we know any- 

 thing approaching to definiteness with regard to the parallelism 

 of neurois and psychosis. All, therefore, that, as scientific 

 investigators, we seem to have any grounds for inferring is that 

 accompanying the neuroses of animals there are in all probability 

 some kind of psychoses. We may speculate as to the character 

 of these psychoses — and in the case of the higher mammalia our 

 speculations are probably by no means worthless — but we cannot 

 construct a comparative science of these psychoses because the 

 results we obtain ejectively are inca| able of direct verification. 

 As a speculation modern constructive psychology has its value 

 — like other speculations it may give direction to our scientific 

 investigations — but let us not forget that the invaluable process 

 of verification is, from the nature of the case, impossible. 



To sum up. All our knowledge of minds other than our own 

 is ejective ; but in the case of human psychology the results 

 reached ejectively may be verified subjectively. Animal minds 

 are also ejective ; they are more or less distorted images of our 

 own minds. But such is the extraordinary complexity of the 

 human mind — a complexity largely due to the use of language — 

 that we may well suppose that any conception we can form of 

 animal consciousness is exceedingly far from being a true con- 

 ception. The results of comparative psychology — the science 

 which lias for its object the comparative study of these distorted 

 images of our own mental processes — are incapable of verifica- 

 tion. These are the facts which have to be taken into considera- 

 tion when we seek an answer to the question " Is there a science 

 of comparative psychology?" Notwithstanding that it has won 

 for itself a more or less recognised place among the sciences, I 

 venture to submit that our answer to this question should be an 

 emphatic negative. 



It must be noted, however, that I here mean by psychology 

 the science which deals with subject and eject. If we include 

 under psychology the science which deals with the " perpetual 

 adjustments of special inner actions to special outer actions which 

 acconijianies increasing evolution of the nervous system," or that 

 to which Mr. Herbert Spencer gives the name objective psychology 

 (" I'rin. Psychol.," vol. i. p. 142), our answer will of course be 

 different. Objective psychology, or the comparative pliysiology 

 of the nervous system plus a comparative study of the corre- 

 sponding adjustive actions, has eveiy right to be termed a science 

 because the results obtained admit of verification. And it is a 

 science in which Ferrier, Hitzig, Romanes, and others have done 

 good work. 



2. The Place of Consciousness 



There would seem to be four hypotheses with regard to the 

 place of consciousness in the animal world. 



1. That according to which consciousness is a motive power 

 (Free Will). 



2. That according to which conjciou-ness is altogetlier absent 

 (Automatism). 



3. Iliat according to which consciousness is a product 

 (Conscious Automatism). 



4. That according to which consciousness is a guide (Deter- 

 minism). 



I. Free IVill. — By free will I here mean the powerof initiating 

 actions by the mere volition of the self-conscious E^o. The 

 exercise of free w ill involves an interference ab e.\trd with the 

 normal w -jrking of the nervous system. 



This is not the place for a discussion of free will and deter- 

 minism. That battle must be fought out within the domain of 

 human psychology. From its bearing on the question of animal 



consciousness, however, I may be permitted to say a few words 

 on the subject. 



The answer which the ordinary believer in free will gives to 

 the determinist is contained in three words — I can choose — and 

 he thinks that there is an end of the matter. But the real point 

 at issue lies deeper down, and is involved in the question— - ff7m? 

 am I? Let us hear the answer which the determinist gives to 

 this question. I am, he replies, the sum of my states of con- 

 sciousness at any moment. Apart from the stream of my mental 

 states I, as a self-conscious individual, have no existence. Tliis 

 stream of conscious states or psychoses I believe to be the sub- 

 jective aspect of a stream of nervous states or neuroses. KrA 

 this stream is rigidly subject to law. But if these states of mind 

 — under which head must be included states of definite conscious- 

 ness, states of sub-consciousness, and states of submerged con- 

 sciousness — if these states of mind, I say, constitute me, then, 

 since these states of mind determine those which follow, these 

 following states, and the actions which accompany them, are 

 determined by me. But at the same time they are part of an 

 orderly sequence subject to law. The moment I identify inyself 

 with my states of mind I begin to see clearly that free will in the 

 common-sense acceptation of the term — that is, a sense of indi- 

 vidual choice— is perfectly compatible with the doctrine of deter- 

 minism — that my mind is completely subject to law. The sense 

 of choice I undoubtedly possess is due to the temporary equi- 

 librium of motives, and the eventual prevalence of one set of 

 motives over another set of motives. The freedom^ which every 

 man is conscious of possessing is freedom to act in accordance 

 with his own character. 



"Freedom," says Kant, "is such a property of the will as 

 enables living agents to originate events independently of foreign 

 determining causes." This at first sight seems utterly opposed 

 to determinism. And yet it contains a central core of truth 

 which every determinist nill accept. No determinist can deny 

 that every human being carries about wnth him a special some- 

 thing, peculiar to himself, which is a most important factor — 

 constituted as we are, the most important factor — in determining 

 his choice in any act of volition. This special something we call, 

 ejectively, his character, and, objectively, his organisation. Men 

 are not like inorganic clouds at the mercy of external forces, but 

 contain the springs of action iu themselves. The brain is not 

 merely a mass of inert matter ; but a mass of matter cunningly 

 organised, in which is locked up a vast store of potential energy. 

 The organism is, moreover, a variable piece of mechanism. 

 Hence at difi'erent times it reacts differently under the influence 

 of the same stimulus. And this difl'erence of reaction helps to 

 fix the idea that the will is absolutely free. On a certain occa- 

 sion we acted in a certain way. We see on reflection that our 

 action was not the best. On a similar occasion afterwards we 

 act differently. And we then imagine that we could have acted 

 differently in the first instance. But it is clear that tlie two 

 cases are not alike. Reflection has altered one of the deter- 

 minants of action, the character. The character having changed, 

 the action is different. Such a definition as Kant's— the essential 

 tiuth of which I take to be that a man's actions are the outcome 

 of his character — is as valuable to the determinist as to any one 

 else. At the same time "it is inconceivable," as Chaldai 

 Creskas said long ago [circa 1410), " that two men, being them- 

 selves of like temper and character, and hiving before them like 

 objects of choice in like circumstances, should choose differ- 

 ently" (quoted from F. Pollock's "Spinoza," p. 96). 



Determinism simply comes to this— that both on the objective 

 side and on the subjective side our actions are determined by 

 law. On the one hand a perfect knowledge of the organism 

 plus a perfect knowledge of any stimulus and the surrounding 

 conditions would enable us to say how the orijanism would act 

 under that stimulus. On the other hand a perfect knowledge of 

 the character //«i- a perfect knowledge of any motive andthe 

 circumstances of the case Avould enable us to say what feelings 

 would result (the actions being the objective side of thefeeUng-). 

 If by free will it is meant that our actions are the outcome of the 

 play of a motive-stimulus on our character-organisation, then free 

 will and determinism are at one. 



But this is not what is meant by those who maintain the doc- 

 trine of free will. What is meant' by them is this— that presiding 

 alike over our thoughts and actions, initiating, guiding, and inhibit- 

 ing, there is a certain " masterful entity," the self-conscious Ego. 

 This Ego, though in no wise connected with our bodily organisa- 

 tion, has nevertheless the power of interfering with the action of 

 that organisation. And it is absolutely free, utterly unfettered 



