NATURE 



\T'cb. 14, 1884 



by law. This doctrine I reject : not becau-se I am in a position 

 to di-prove it, but because I see no reason for accepting it. And 

 rejecting this doctrine in the sphere of the human mind, I feel 

 bound to reject it in the sphere of animal intelligence. But I 

 am not blind to the fact that many of my neighbours do not 

 reject it in the sphere of the human mind. To them two courses 

 are open : either to extend it into the sphere of animal intelli- 

 gence, or not so to extend it. If they do so extend it, they 

 thereby render the study of animal intelligence incipable of 

 scientific treatment, even from the objective standpoint, by the 

 introduction of a factor not subject to law. If they do not so 

 extend it, they must accept one of the three views next to be 

 considered. 



2. Aiilomatism. — Very little space need be devoted to a doc- 

 trine that very few believe. Those who accept the doctrine of 

 the parallelism (or identity) of neurosis and psychosis and add to 

 this a belief in evolution are logically bound to accept the corol- 

 Ury that the neuroses of animals are accompanied by some kind 

 of psychoses wrhich more or les; dimly foreshadow our own 

 psychoses. Those, however, who reject the hypothesis of evolu- 

 tion, or at least deny its application to the mind of man, and 

 who believe in the doctrine of free will as restricted to the human 

 being, will, not improbably, accept the doctrine of automatism 

 in animals. In any case it is a theory upon which the study of 

 organic processes, reflex, instinctive, and intelligent (or selective), 

 admits of scientific treatment. It is indeed " objective psycho- 

 logy " plus the dogmatic assertion that consciousness is absent. 



3. Conscious Automatism. — "Ma'erialism," says Mr. Romanes, 

 " is logically bound to argue in this way : We cannot conceive of 

 a conscious idea, or mental change, as in any way affecting the 

 course of a cerebral reflex, or material change; while, on the 

 other hand, our knowledge of the conservation of energy teaches 

 us .as an axiom that the cerebral changes must determine each 

 other in their sequence as in a cjutinuous series. Nowhere can 

 we suppose the physical process to be interrupted or diverted by 

 the psychical process ; and therefore we must conclude that 

 th jught and volition really play no part in determining action. 

 Thoughts and feellu'^s are but indices which show in the mirror 

 of the mind certain changes that are proceeding in the matter of 

 the brain, and are as inefficient in influencing those changes as 

 the shadow of a cloud is powerless to direct the movements of 

 that of which it is the shadow. . . . This is opposed to 

 common sense, because we all feel it is practically impossible to 

 believe that the world would now have been exactly what it is 

 even if consciousness, thought, and volition had never appeared 

 upon the scene — that railway trains would have been running 

 filled with mindless passengers, or that telephones would have 

 been invented by brains that cjullnot think to speak to ears 

 that could nit hear" i^Ninelceiith Cenluiy, December, 1882, 

 p. 879). How far the materialist— the logical results of whose 

 doctrine are apt to be forced on him fro u all sides — is ready to 

 accept this particular logical result I leave it for him to say. It 

 is at any rate a possible view, and, like that of uncmscious 

 automatism, is one upon whic'i a scientific treatment of organic 

 processes is admissible. 



4 Determiuiim — This view has already been incide itally 

 given under the heading of the directly opposed d ictrine of 

 free will. It is the d jctrine of the parallelism (or identity) of 

 neuroses and p ychoses, which, both in their subjective and ob- 

 jective aspect^, are rigidly law-bound. Determinisn may be 

 treated either froii the philosophical or from the scientific 

 standpoint. Fro a the point of view of the man of science we 

 may say that consciou<ness is a guide to action and has been a 

 guide in evoluti )n ; that during the process of evolution there 

 gradually emerged something distantly related to what we know 

 in ourselves as consciousness, which at a very early stage of evo- 

 lution became, so to speak, polarised into pleasurable and pain- 

 ful ; that those actions which were a-sociated wiih pleasurable 

 feelings were more frequently performed than tho,e .associated 

 with painful feelings ; that those organisms in which there w.as 

 an association between right action and pleasurable feelings 

 would stand a better chance of survival than th»e in which 

 the association was between wrong actions and plea-urable feel- 

 ings ; and that finally those organisms in which conscious 

 adjustments of all orders were m ire perfectly developed would 

 be the winners in life's race. Some such deductions as these 

 would seem to be admissible on the hypothesis of evolution. 

 With such questions as How have p. ychoses become associated 

 with neuroses? or Why have psychoses been associated with 

 neuroses? or How can p. ychosis exercise a guiding influence ou 



neurosis ? — with such questions as these the man of science, as 

 such, has nothing to do. These are questions for the 

 ]ihilosopher, and this is, therefore, not the place to discuss 

 them. Suffice it to say that we must either accept some such 

 view as that advocated by Clifford in his m.asterly essay " On 

 the Nature of Things in Themselves" (" Lectures and Essays," 

 vol. ii. p. 71) or be content to confess our ignorance. 



Upon this view of the place of consciousness in the animal 

 kingdom, the study of organic processes, reflex, instinctive, and 

 intelligent (or .selective), admits of scientific treatment. A 

 science of "objective psychology" is possible for us ; and a 

 science of ejective psychology is also possible, but not for us. 



3. Tht Lapse of Consciousness 



One of the mo-t surely established inductions of psychology 

 is this : that the more frequently an action is performed the 

 more perfectly automatic does it become — the more does it tend 

 to pass into stereotyped reflex action. Actions which are at 

 first performed with that definite conciousness implied in the 

 term close attention can, after frequent repetition, be performed 

 almost, if not alto ;ether, without even indefinite consciousness. 

 It would seem that after the definite establishment of the nerve 

 connections necessary for the performa ce of certain actions or 

 sets of actions the guiding influence of consciousness might be 

 withdrawn. 



This principle is too well known to require illustration here. 

 I shall therefore content myself with drawing attention to one or 

 two of its corollaries. 



1. Since the same action or set of actions may be performed 

 with full coTsciousness — a consciousness of the end in view, and of 

 the means necessary to that end — with indefinite consciousness, or 

 with a vanishiu'j amount of consciousness, it is impossible for me 

 to say what amount of consciousness, if any, an .action perforaied 

 by my neighbour involves. Again and again we see our neigh- 

 bours perform most compile ited actions — such as winding up 

 their watches — with so little consciousness as to leave no trace 

 upon the memory. Abernethy quotes a case of a lawyer writing 

 out an important opinion in his sleep. Still more impossible is 

 it for me to say what am unt of consciousness, if any, an action 

 performed by one of my d n mb companions involves. Decapitated 

 frogs — in which we have some grounds for believing that con- 

 sciousness is absent — perform a nu nber of seemingly purposive 

 actions. 



2. Since those actions which are frequently and persistently 

 performed by the individual have a tendency to pass into the 

 automatic and unconscious stage, it would seem highly probable 

 that those actions ^ihio'i have been performed not only by the 

 individual but by a long line of ancestors whose organisation he 

 inherits are, or very suon become, completely, or in a very high 

 degree, automatic and unconscious. Who can say what amount 

 of consciousness, if any, ii involved in the actions of newly-born 

 piglings or newly-hatched chicks? 



3. It would therefor; seem difficult or impossible to disprove 

 the hypothesis that all truly in>tinctive actions — in so far as they 

 are not modified (as they s > often are modified) by a little dose 

 of reason — are automatic and unconscious. I do not mean to 

 maintain that hypothesis. But I say that, having regard to the 

 known phenomenon of the lapse of consciousness, I do not see 

 how that hypothesis could be disproved. 



4. The Psychological Definition of Instinct 



"Instinct," says Mr. Romanes in his recently published 

 " Mental Evolution in Animals " (p. 159), repeating the definition 

 given in "Animal Intelligence" (p. 17), "Instinct is reflex 

 action into which there is imported the element of consciousness. 

 The term is therefore a generic one, comprising all those facul- 

 ties of mind which are concerned in conscious and adaptive 

 action, antecedent to individual experience, without necessary 

 knowledge of the relation between means employed and ends 

 attained, but similarly performed under similar and frequently 

 recurring circumstances by all individuals of the same species." 



To such a psychological definition of instinct there seem to 

 me to be two grave objections. First, there is the general objec- 

 tion, indicated in the fir-t section, .arising out of the ejective nature 

 of our knowledge of animal consciousness. Secondly, there is the 

 special objection raised under the head of " The Lapse of Con- 

 sciousness." These objections have not escaped Mr. Romanes' 

 n itice, but I think he underestimates them. "No dou'it," he 

 says ("Ment. Evol.," p. 160), " it is often difficult, or even 



