1861.] ON TYPICAL SELECTION. 3 



trine that the living principle never loses its energy, and that the 

 power of life now at work on our globe has been transmitted, 

 unchanged in its essence, though infinitely richer in its manifestations, 

 from the first inhabitants of the earth to the generations inhabiting 

 it at the present day. 



If then, Mr. Darwin may appeal to the principle of change dis- 

 closed in living organisms, as a " true cause," capable of accounting 

 for the mutual affinities of species by the supposition of descent from 

 a common origin, those who are opposed to his views are no less 

 entitled to appeal to the principle of permanence, disclosed in these 

 organisms, as a real force, not to be explained away, but requiring to 

 be reconciled with the principle of change in any theory which shall 

 satisfactorily account for the origin of species. 



It appears to me that this reconciliation may be effected through 

 the intervention of a conception proposed by one of whose labours 

 and reputation we are justly proud, as an explanation of the " homo- 

 logies" of structure, which he has profoundly illustrated. I mean 

 the conception of the typical character pervading all organic life. 

 But to make this apparent, I mvist premise some remarks on the 

 characteristics of natural types. The types of nature must be care- 

 fully distinguished from the types of art. The types of art are forms 

 realized in their perfection in some particular individual. A Phidias 

 may produce a Jupiter, a Minerva, or a Venus, as the perfect out- 

 ward embodiment of the ideal of Majesty, or "Wisdom, or Grace. A 

 Danecker may toil for years, in labour with his conception of the 

 head of Christ. But in each case, the type, when realized, is a fixed, 

 individualized object, expressing some one predominant characteristic, 

 to which all others, though not necessarily lost, are subordinate. The 

 types of nature are, as I conceive, ideals not of external form, but of 

 internal relations, each realized in countless modifications of forms 

 differing from one another in infinitely varied particulars, but 

 balanced around central points common to them all. B)itthe pre- 

 servation of this balance depends upon the aptness of each variety of 

 the type for interbreeding with all the rest, and thus perpetually 

 recombining its own peculiarities with theirs. If any of the varieties 

 by the action and reaction of which a type is preserved become locally 

 distinct from the others, subtypes will arise ; as we find to be the 

 case in mankind. The original type becomes the centre of a circle 

 including many lesser circles, where we find the same tendency re- 

 peated. Now this character of natural types offers a mode of passage 

 from one type to another. Assume a subtypical variety to acquire 

 a special aptness for interbreeding with itself, to the exclusion of 

 other varieties, and it would become an independent type. But how 

 is this special aptness to be acquired ? That it does not accompany the 

 formation of subtypes we see in numerous instances ; and it would 

 clearly be inconsistent with the idea of a natural type that it should 

 do so, if, as has been suggested, it is the characteristic of such a 

 type to preserve itself by the mutual actions of its varieties. That it 

 should belong to some one variety and not to others, in virtue of the 

 general principle of variation, is a supposition inconsistent with 



