1884.] OF THE IXDIVIDUAL AND OF THE SPECIES. 463 



As every object of study is made clearer by contrasting it with 

 other objects distinct in i\ind from it, so our " instinctive actions " 

 may be more clearly ayiprehended by contrasting them with such of 

 our actions as are said not be " instinctive." But we habitually 

 contrast " Instinct " with " Reason." What, then, are the characters 

 which distinguish actions which are attributed to " Reason"? Now 

 "reasonable," "consciously intelligent" conduct, is understood 

 by all men to mean conduct in which there is a more or less 

 wise adaptation of means to ends — a deliberate adaptation, not one 

 due to accident only. No one would call an act done blindly 

 a reasonable intelligent action on the part of him who did it, 

 however fortunate might be its result. Our highest mental activity, 

 our type of reason, consists of conscious, deliberate, intellectual 

 perceptions — explicit judgments — and our reasonable actions are 

 actions performed in accordance therewith. 



But besides these actions due to our self-conscious intellect, there 

 are a variety of other actions — such e.ff.ns our res])iratory actions— 

 which we ordinarily perform without advertence, though we can, if 

 we will, perform them with self-conscious deliberation. Again, we 

 may, when our mind is entirely directed upon some external object, 

 or when we are almost in a state of somnolent unconsciousness, have 

 but a vague feeling of our existence — a feeling resulting from the 

 unobserved synthesis of our sensations of all orders and degrees. 

 This wwintellectual sense of self may he conveniently distinguished 

 from intellectual " Cufisciousness" as " Consent ience." ' 



Nothing is more common with us than to experience modifications 

 of our organs of sense to which our intellect in no way adverts. 

 Such modifications constantly influence our actions (as in walking 

 and running) without our ever adverting to them, either at the time 

 of their occurrence or afterwards. M'^e may also, as everybody 

 knows, suddenly recollect sights or sounds which were quite un- 

 noticed at the time we experienced them ; yet our very recollection 

 of them proves that they must, nevertheless, have affected our 

 sensoiium. Such unnoticed modifications of our sense-organs may, 

 at least provisionally, be called " unfelt sensations." 



According to our preliminary definition and according to general 

 usage, actions, whether adverted to or not, cannot be called " instinc- 

 tive " unless they are generally useful ones directed to the accom- 

 plishment of j<«foreseen ends. But it is a familiar fact that we 

 often perform such actions. As examples of the kind may be 

 enumerated : — spontaneous, instantaneous actions directed to the 

 warding off of a blow or to the due maintaining of the body's 

 balance. Who also has not experienced how much better such 

 actions are performed (as e. g. the action of running up stairs) with 

 the mere aid of consentience, than when our intellect is brought to 

 bear upon our motions? 



The little boy as yet unable, or hardly able to speak, has no 

 expectation of future encounters when he begins unconsciously to 

 grasp at weapons ; and long before the little girl can represent to 

 I A term I believe fu-sl introduced by the hite Mr. G. H. Lewes. 



