BOTANICAL SUBJECTS. 17 



Philosophy requires the aid of a vivid imagination , which the 

 scientiiic investigator need not necessarily possess. Science, I 

 take it, ought to furnish the facts, and philosophy ought to frame 

 theories based on those facts. It would, perhaps, be an advantage 

 if the scientiiic man were also his own philosopher, but this is 

 not always possible, owing, perhaps, to the want of a suflficiently 

 vivid imagination, or to the attention being wholly occupied with 

 innumerable details. 



The imagination has played a greater part in the advancement 

 of our knowledge than many seem disposed to admit. Theorizing 

 must of necessity be the work of the imagination. It is the result 

 of the play, on the cells of our nerve-centres, of what is revealed 

 to our senses, aided by the ideas already stored there. 



From all this it would result that science provides the im- 

 pressions on our senses, while philosophy imagines their causes 

 and relations, and, therefore, their meaning. Of course, there can 

 be both false science and false philosophy, and that was so to a 

 large extent in past ages, but sound criticism should prevent a 

 recurrence of false notions to any harmful extent. 



The imagination of man invented many myths in past ages. 

 We are far from being rid of their influence. The study of this 

 mythical philosophy reveals that it always had some fact of nature 

 for its basis ; only the mind of man was then full of far more 

 poetry than science. We are reversing matters now, but we. 

 cannot do without the aid of the imagination. 



Now, one might ask, — is there any difference between science- 

 and ordinary knowledge ? None whatever, in my opinion, if 

 ordinary knowledge is sound. An established fact of ordinary 

 life is as much a scientific fact as one seen through the micro- 

 scope or the telescope, or by the aid of any other of the numerous 

 instruments and methods of human investigation. A fact is a 

 fact, and accurate knowledge, of whatever nature, is science ; nor 

 does a fact become more a fact because it is established. This 

 only gives it currency and makes it more generally useful. Nor, 

 indeed, does a fact of science become more a fact than one of 

 ordinary knowledge because it is given a Greek or Latin name. 

 If an ordinary name will suit as well the classical name will only 

 be an encumbrance. For instance, in microscopical botany we 

 have sieve-plates, sieve-tubes, vascular bundles, &c. I often 

 A p. 1724. B 



Jm 



