564 STUDIES ON THE MENTAL LIFE OF ANIMALS. 



than the care of obserring and retaining- the movements accomplished 

 by that guide. It is then that the consciousness of ph3'sical discom- 

 fort becomes an obstacle to tlie development of psychological life. 

 Doubtless the subject could have but one desire, that of getting out as 

 soon as possible; but in order to give real attention to the acts of his 

 comrade, to organize them into precise memories, the animal should 

 be disembarrassed from the consciousness of phy.sical suifering, which, 

 however, does not leave him for an instant. He should be capable of 

 the intellectual eftbrt, anticipating the future and representing to him- 

 self the series of movements going on before his eyes as being the con- 

 dition of his own deliverance. If the time the animal takes to escape 

 does not, then, vary in inverse proportion to these supposed observa- 

 tions, it is not because the animal is absolutely incapable of imitating; 

 it is because he has given no real attention. In order to put out of 

 his consciousness the painful feeling of hungei- that controls him and 

 to impress upon his mind the consecutive acts of his guide, he must 

 have a control over himself that is not possessed by any animals. It 

 would, above all, be necessary for the subject to comprehend that 

 these acts and movements were the only ones that lead to deliverance. 

 But can we ask of an animal such an etl'ort of intelligence and foresight? 

 Let us now consider the moment when, his guide having got out, 

 the subject is, in his turn, placed in that part of the cage. The state 

 of hunger that tortures it being present, what feeling can occup}^ its 

 mindC Mr. Thorndike takes for granted that if the animal imitates 

 he ought to execute in order the movements that he has seen accom- 

 plished ])v the other subject. But nothing could be more contestable. 

 The animal is already discontented from having been shut up; instead 

 of being out, his suffering is now prolonged; the changing of his 

 compartment has given him a momentary illusion of approaching 

 liberty; now here he is again with the doors all shut. He inevitably 

 becomes angry, and this new discontent is shown by the agitation, 

 sometimes quite excessive, which the author has noted. If the sub- 

 ject had at tirst some tendency to reproduce the acts of the model, 

 such tendency would be immediately obliterated by this brusque dis- 

 play of activity, the expression of his irritation. The cat and the dog- 

 do not immediately open the door, not only because they are incapable 

 of judging as to the efficacV' of their various movements, but also 

 because the memory of acts accomplished l)efore them is not suffi- 

 ciently powerful to repress this overflow of useless action which arises 

 from their anger; and when that anger has passed, the memor}^ of 

 these acts is already too distant to be utilized. This does not at all 

 prove, however, that under more favorable conditions imitation would 

 not take place; perhaps, indeed, the study of the pla}^ of animals 

 might lead to conclusions different from those of Mr. Thorndike. 



