NATURE 



477 



THURSDAY, APRIL 23, 1874 



HERBERT SPENCER'S SOCIOLOG Y 



The Study of Sociolos;y. By Herbert Spencer. (London: 

 Henry S. King and Co.) 



THERE are not a few signs, of which the book before 

 us is an important one, that thought is moving 

 in the direction indicated by Mr. Mill -in the quasi- 

 prophetical conclusion to his " System of Logic," where 

 he expresses his belief in the prominence of sociological 

 inquiries in the intellectual achievements of the next two 

 or three generations of European thinkers. What has 

 been called by Hegel the speculative historical method 

 has taken a considerable step in advance since Mr. Mill 

 wrote thus. History, written from the speculative or 

 philosophical stand-point, may be regarded as a special 

 Sociology — Sociology, that is, applied to the investigation 

 of the laws of growth and development of some one 

 society, as exhibited either throughout its whole career, or 

 within some limited period. General Sociology stands to 

 history in a position analogous to that occupied by general 

 physiology with regard to the special physiology of man 

 or of any other species of animal. This analogy will serve 

 to throw some light upon the fact that there has been 

 much greater progress made in the special department 

 of speculative history than in the wider field of Sociology. 

 Up to a certain point, the broader generalisations of the 

 higher science must be preceded by the more restricted 

 generalisations of the lower. But when this point has 

 been reached, when the higher principles have been 

 formulated with approximate completeness, then the ad- 

 vances along the lines of general and special thought will 

 proceed pan passu ; progcss in one will by its reflex in- 

 fluence make possible a correlative progress in the other. 

 The relations between Sociology and history appear to be 

 nearing this stage. 



Division of labour obtains in literature as well as in 

 industry. His special turn of mind, not less, perhaps, than 

 the character of the task to which he has devoted himself, 

 has made Mr. Spencer a labourer in the wider field of 

 Sociology. The volume under review, taken in connection 

 with the two parts already issued of the " Descriptive 

 Sociology," of which Part I. has been noticed here,* 

 enables us, to some extent, to anticipate the character of 

 the more elaborate and comprehensive work, the " Prin- 

 ciples of Sociology," the promised fourth division of Mr. 

 Spencer's " System of Philosophy." In the " Descrip'tive 

 Sociology" we have an insight into the laborious thorough- 

 ness with which Mr. Spencer is preparing the foundations 

 for his generalisations, while in the " Study of Sociology" 

 we are introduced to his conception of the nature of the 

 social science, of the difficulties in the way of the socio- 

 logist, and of the discipline necessary to the formation 

 of a habit of thought adapted to sociological inquiries. 



It is not necessary here to follow Mr. Spencer into the 

 polemic contained in the first two chapters of his book, 

 directed against the popular notions of sociological pheno- 

 mena ; against the dogmatic, unscientific, and off-hand 

 way in which important and complicated sociological 

 questions are decided not only by the vulgar, but also by 



* See Nature, vol. viii. p. 544. 



Vol.. IX. — No. 234 



men who are guided by a strict scientific method in the 

 less intricate questions of physical science ; and against 

 the supporters of the special-providence and great-man 

 theories of history. Mr. Spencer being the assailant, it 

 is almost superfluous to say that the polemic is a vigorous 

 one ; indeed it may be open to question whether the 

 assault would not have been more successful had it been 

 conducted with less vigour and more circumspection. To 

 use Mr. Spencer's own metaphor, a considerable cor- 

 rection for the "personal equation" of combativeness 

 will be found necessary. 



The possibility of a science of Sociology is shown 

 in various ways. One cause of the denial of this 

 possibiHty is to be found in the prevalent confusion 

 between a science and an exact science. Sciences 

 are either merely logical or mathematical also ; in Mr. 

 Spencer's phraseology, qualitative or quantitative. It 

 is not affirmed that Sociology can be a quantitative sci- 

 ence ; but this is not to deny its scientific character alto- 

 gether. Sociology presents in an extreme form that 

 absence of quantitative definiteness which geology, bio- 

 logy, and psychology present in a considerable, though 

 less, degree. Mr. Spencer puts his own case and that of 

 the objectors to the scientific character of Sociology very 

 forcibly in the following dilemma : — " In brief, then, the 

 alternative positions are these. On the one hand, if there 

 is no natural causation throughout the actions of incor- 

 porated humanity, government and legislation are absurd. 

 Acts of Parliament may, as well as not, be made to de- 

 pend on the drawing of lots or the tossing of a coin ; or 

 rather, there may as well be none at all : social sequences 

 having no ascertainable order, no effect can be counted 

 upon— everything is chaotic. On the other hand, if there 

 is natural causation, then the combination of forces by 

 which every combination of effects is produced, produces 

 that combination of effects in conformity with the laws 

 of the forces. And if so, it behoves us to use all diligence 

 in ascertaining what the forces are, what are their laws, 

 and what are the ways in which they co-operate." 



Sociology is concerned with men aggregated into socie- 

 ties. Aggregates derive their essential properties from 

 the natures of the individuals of which they are composed. 

 Aggregation, though it may foster the development of 

 some, and check that of others, of the characters of the 

 constituent units, cannot give rise to social properties for 

 which there is no foundation in those of the components. 

 Setting out from this axiomatic principle. Sociology de- 

 scribes " the growth, development, structure, and func- 

 tions of the social aggregate, as brought about by the 

 mutual actions of individuals whose natures are partly 

 like those of all men, partly like those of kindred races, 

 partly distinctive. . . . Not that the social science 

 exhibits these or those special truths, but that, given men 

 having certain properties, an aggregate of such men must 

 have certain derivative properties which form the subject- 

 matter of a science." 



Nowhere, perhaps, than in sociological phenomena is 

 the truth of the doctrine of evolution, the central doctrine 

 of Mr. Spencer's philosophy, more strikingly displayed, 

 and nowhere, subject to proper limitations, is it likely to 

 prove more serviceable- To borrow Comte's phraseology, 

 Sociology is either dynamical or statical. The dynamics 

 of Sociology is throughout an exemplification of evolution. 



