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JVA TURE 



507 



simply to draw attention to the fact that the University of 

 London, created in order to encourage the pursuit of " a 

 regular and liberal course of education," no longer re- 

 quires candidates for degrees in Arts or in Science \o pass 

 through any collegiate course, but considers that she 

 sufficiently fulfils her mission by devising and carrying 

 out into practice a system of examinations. It appears 

 to me that this fact justifies all who are interested in the 

 progress of sound education in demanding that these 

 examinations should be so arranged as to encourage to 

 the utmost possible extent thorough study and conscien- 

 tious teaching. 



The present Regulations of the University do not in all 

 cases seem to me to fulfil this condition as completely as 

 they might do, and I therefore think that I may suitably 

 make use of this opportunity for trying to point out their 

 defects as definitely as I can, and for attempting, if pos- 

 sible, to suggest improvements. I need hardly say, how- 

 ever, that whatever criticisms or suggestions I may venture 

 to make will refer almost exclusively to the Regulations 

 affecting that branch of sc'ence, namely Physics, with 

 which I am specially connected. I believe, nevertheless, 

 that the general principles which it is of greatest import- 

 ance to keep in view in framing an examination in any 

 depsrtmcnt of knowledge are very nearly the same, and 

 therefore 1 venture to hope that if the reflections whicli my 

 expcrierce of the London University examinations, both 

 as an Eximincr and as a Teacher, has suggested to me, 

 are of any vylue in relation to my own subject, they may 

 not be quite worthless in relation to others. 



In order to apply to the case of Physics the gene- 

 ral principle tliat examinations and direct teaching 

 ought to bo only different ways of attaining the same 

 object, it is needful to consider first of all what reasons 

 there may be for including the study of Physics in "a 

 regular and liberal course of education," and what ought 

 therefore to be the aim of teacher and examiner alike. 

 With rcgird to this point, it will probably be admitted 

 that the educational value of the study of Physics 

 depends upon the mental discipline which it ensures, and 

 not upon the individual facts, or even on the general laws, 

 with which it stores the memory. It follows from the 

 nature of the phenomena with which this science dea's, 

 that, to a much greater extent than has hitherto been 

 the case with the phenomena of any other branch of 

 science, the exact conditions of their occurrence have been 

 ascertained, and the relations which they bear to one 

 another have been expressed by definite numerical laws. 

 In consequence of the precision which it is hence pos- 

 sible to give not only to statements respecting individual 

 physical phenomena, but also to statements involving 

 general laws, the reasoning by which the conclusions of 

 Physics are established assumes a stricter character 

 than can be attained in any other branch of natural 

 science. It may be confidently asserted tha!-, for 

 training the mind in habits of accurate thinking, no 

 other study can be compared with that of Physics 

 if properly pursued ; for, while it affords abundant 

 practice in deductive reasoning of mathematical strict- 

 ness, it obliges us to give no less attention to the 

 converse process of inferring general laws from particular 

 concrete phenomena and the direct impressions which 

 they make on our senses. It is this combination of de- 

 ductive with inductive reasoning which constitutes the 

 special value of the study of Physics for the purposes of 

 mental discipline. It is quite true that the deduciive pro- 

 cesses of Physics are borrowed from Mathematics, and 

 that it shares the inductive method with all the other 

 branches of natural science ; but the greater definiteness 

 of physical phenomena, as compared with those of other 

 sciences, not only, as I have already said, leads to a 

 greater definiteness in our general conclusions respecting 

 them, but, as a further consequence, makes it easier to 

 test the truth or falsehood of their conclusions by com- 



paring the results deductively derived from them with the 

 results of new experiments or observations. It may even, 

 indeed, be thought that the comparative definiteness and 

 precision of the problems with which the science of 

 Physics is concerned render the studv of it less service- 

 able, as a preparation for dealing with' the complex ques- 

 tions which arise in the common experience of life, than 

 the study of sciences in which the uncertainty and in- 

 definiteness of the data leave a greater scope for the exer- 

 cise of a judicious tact in the estimation of probabilities ; 

 but to maintain such an opinion would be very much like 

 saying that in order to become familiar with the laws of 

 chemical action and the nature of chemical combination, 

 we ought to study the transformations of albumen and 

 chlorophyll rather than the properties of such things as 

 potassium, oxygen, or sulphuric acid. It is of course 

 because physical phenomena are simpler and more acces- 

 sible to investigation than those of Chemistry or Biology, 

 that greater progress has been made in the study of 

 them, and that the explanations that have been reached 

 are of a higher degree of certainty and generality ; but it 

 is precisely the relatively advanced stage which has been 

 reached by it that gives to the study of Physics its high 

 value as an element in general education, and is the 

 reason why it furnishes us with fuller and more instruc- 

 tive examples of scientific reasoning than other sciences. 



The nature of the intellectual benefits that have been 

 pointed out as resulting from this study, suggests at once 

 the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to obtain 

 them. If in studying Physics we really undergo, as I 

 have said, a process of training to think correctly, this 

 can only be through the exercise of our minds in follow- 

 ing the demonstrably correct trains of thought whereby 

 the general conclusions of Physics have been derived 

 from the observed facts, and through our becoming so 

 familiar with them that, consciously or unconsciously, we 

 take them for our models, whatever may be the subjects 

 to which we require to direct our minds. It follows from 

 this that these benefits do not depend upon the direct 

 results of experiment or observation with which the study 

 makes us acquainted, nor upon the general laws of nature 

 which it reveals to us, but upon the reasoning processes 

 whereby facts and laws are connected together and both 

 are made part of the living body of science. And from 

 this again we see that the kind of teaching and study to 

 be aimed at is that which enables us to trace these pro- 

 cesses step by step and to understand their validity ; 

 while the kind to be anxiously avoided is that which 

 stores the memory with detached pieces of information, 

 either in the form of facts whose mutual relations are not 

 perceived, or in the form of theoretical conclusions hung 

 up between heaven and earth, and supported neither by 

 revelation from above nor by demonstration from below. 

 This latter, however, is the kind of teaching so much in 

 demand and so frequently offered, which is knoAfn by the 

 name of " cramming." 



By way of guarding against misconception, it may be 

 well to point out — what, however, is exceed ngly obvious 

 — that there can be no reasoning about Physics until the 

 facts of Physics are known, and therefore that the teach- 

 ing of these facts must always occupy an important place 

 as the indispensable groundwork of all that is to follow. 

 But still it must be remembered that, so long as we are 

 considering the study of Physics merely as a part of 

 general education, the facts of the science are of import- 

 ance only in relation to the reasoning that is based upon 

 them. T.iken by itself, one bit of information is of about 

 as little use in developing the mental powers as any 

 other ; it does us about as much good to be told that 

 " heat is a mode of motion " as that " the Government of 

 England is a limited monarchy," and to know the differ- 

 ence between a thermometer and a barometer enlarges 

 the mind to about the same extent as to know how to dis- 

 tinguish a pitchfork from a Dutch hoe. 



