312 The Vegetable Individual, in its relation to Species. 
final cause of each particular life appears so distinctly. The ad- 
vocates of the physical view perceive this; but they explain the 
fitness of means to ends in nature as a whole, and in its individ- 
ual parts, by supposing matter, with its blind forces, to have been 
created by an intelligent being.* But we can regard this as a 
germ of an explanation only in proportion as it is also granted, 
that the intellect of the Creator lies not only behind and without 
nature and her processes of development, but that, as if incorpo- 
rated in nature, it is taken into the destiny of each created being, 
in proportion to its individuality. But this, again presupposes the 
admission of a substantiality of nature fit for such an hypothe- 
sis ;—a substantiality not grounded on mere matter, like a blind 
force ; but which, on the contrary, must comprehend matter as 
subordinate to itself, and must realize itself through matter :—an 
assumption which modifies the physical view essentially, and 
would seem to be a modification of some ideal, or teleological 
theory. 
Without underrating the great importance, which the phys- 
ical view possesses for vegetable physiology, still we must confess 
that we cannot find in it the key to a conception of vegetable in- 
dividuality: for, after all, this must be sought for, not in the ex- 
ternal conformation, but in the essence of the plant, determined 
from within. This leads us from the last negative results to an 
been usually done. We must seek a decision in the essential 
concatenation of all the steps in the plant’s development forming 
one whole, according to one idea. ‘This is the tendency of the 
concluding remark of Nageli, to which he is lead by the rela 
tions of growth and propagation in Caulerpa ; when he says that 
indivisibility of form is not an element essential to individuality, 
—which, indeed must be constructed upon a new, and somewhat 
ss material a basis. Link calls attention to this same unity, 
which is expressed in the whole development of the plant, 
which forms the essence of its individuality, in the following true 
words: ‘‘ We cannot recognize an individual unless we are con- 
vinced that it remains the same in different periods of its exist- 
ence.”{ Now the question is just this: how can we percely' 
* “The fitness of means to ends, in every orga’ 
this individual , cannot be denied; but in, 
of the not consist in the fact that e¢ 
dividual force tending towards a certain end. 
TMeans to ends in the inorganic w 
being.” Schwann, l. c., p. 221, and, in almost the same 
t Link: Elem, Phil, Bot., Ed. ii, p. 11. 
