Bhs The Vegetable Individual, in its ela titie to Species. 313 
such a oneness of essence amid these soning of form and mate- 
rial? How do we perceive that, with all its mE 6 the 
t remains after all really one and the same individual ? 
_ Every development presents a succession of phenomena, — 
while they present themselves in a regular order, also s 
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conceived of, not only as an idea which i the whole pro- 
cess, or as a force determining the specific type of this plastic 
Succession, but also as a living essence, comprehending the idea 
as its internal determination, and the force as the means of its 
realization j—an essence which precedes and shapes the external 
existence ; as intentions sr and determine acts.{ If, in ac- 
* Du Petit-Thouars, \. c. ,» p. 284: “ Lindividu est un ¢tre dont toutes les parties 
sont gphencgty dun Re dchg unique d’existence.” a Elim. Phil. Bot, ie i, 
p. 3. “Nos individuum vocamus, quod ab uno eodemqu row int erno dete 
ei eae ad idealem potius quam ad realem respic! ientee oe 
Ueber d. Begriffe v. Gattung, a u. heat (1838), p. “ “Iti is this in- 
wile which r poe ‘the individual ; and in natural ees every body i 
in wt as it really exists as a single being, whose existence is deter- 
mined by a peculi udurclting vital principle.” Spring afterwards disting 
es systematical ro the phy siological individual: in the former one moment of the 
e latte i Si 
assemblage i 
by a casual observer as so many septic atical individuals—Still, a reed eee 
Must protest against such a purely subjective distinction of systematical and physi- 
ological individuals. However much ep mbryos os of mosses resemble Confers rve, or 
ma i e the 
ignorai a, Le epra, 
Must be given up by the systematist himself. True, Mh age a be amie spon at 3 ‘ 
later point in this inquiry to decide, whether a ephere of evelopment which really 
belongs to the individual can present itself to us so — that the divisions them- 
selves attain to the im — of ——. individu 
} Aristotle describes the internal essence of plants as ‘a Pb ara ¢ soul,” (Sperrim 
os, 108 CGrrer oduaros whi “3 aK cc Of int on Phe hs rist. ri Frag ii — e pl. 
= anima. The charge of ant st 
o! 
i rit ¢ of e p of lif 
his knowledge of nature must be connected with his coeeees of 
knowledge at the present stage of 
ethan meanly we ae this know a his : pen teger ‘Rol i 
Pas 
their exist “way? But év 
"Secon 3 Sein, XIX, No.7 ite Yi 1855. 
