1172 REPORT—1885. 
The author is of opinion that if the volume of our trade were once diverted from its 
present channels it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to restore it. Asa great 
manufacturing country we are not only dependent upon the economic supply of raw 
materials, but also upon having sufficient outlets for our finished goods. If the raw 
materials were not forthcoming the temporary stoppage of our industries would un- 
doubtedly lead to a transference of a large portion of our trade to foreign countries, 
The author further considers that a State guarantee against war risks would tend to 
strengthen our relations with our colonies and dependencies, and might lead to a con- 
solidation of the whole empire. In order tosafeguard the great interest involved, some 
improvements would be required in our navy, but the author does not consider that 
the maintenance of a huge standing army would become a necessity for this 
country. The cost of war risks must eventually be borne by the nation at large, 
but if these risks were undertaken by the Government the author maintains that 
the expense would be vastly less than that which would be incurred through extra 
premiums and the attendant evils in the event of a great war breaking out. 
The objections to the proposal, he maintains, are more apparent than real, and 
any difficulties could be easily overcome in carrying out the details by principles of 
procedure which are already well understood. The author claims that this subject 
is not brought forward in the interest of any particular trade, but upon economic 
and national grounds. He sums up with the following propositions, which convey a 
concise statement of his views :— 
The whole question can be practically summarised in the following propo- 
sitions :— 
1st. That as the existence of this country absolutely depends on foreign supplies 
of food and materials anything that would risk the failure or enhance the cost of 
those supplies must be a national loss. 
Qnd. That as the trade and carriage ia now mainly in British hands it is all 
important that it should so continue, and not be transferred to, or get into the 
hands of, our foreign competitors. 
8rd. That the international effect of such a declaration as we have advocated 
would be highly advantageous to our commerce throughout the world, and would 
prevent neutral nations taking that selfish interest in our position which the hope 
of future gain might encourage them to show. If any nation expected to gain 
large material advantages by our being engaged in war we could not as readily 
look for its sympathy or co-operation. 
4th. That if a large amount of our tonnage was transferred to neutral flags, or 
the neutral flag was largely engaged in our carrying trade, the volume of trade 
thus once shifted would be very difficult, if not impossible, to restore. 
5th. That the cost to the consumers, if Government failed to meet the emergency 
in case of war, would be enormously enhanced directly and indirectly. 
6th. That the effect of such a declaration would tend in the strongest way to 
bind our colonies and dependencies together, and to unite them to this country. 
The products of our colonies and dependencies are now so vast and varied that 
we could soon be independent of all other sources of supply. 
7th. That as the power of machinery has so much reduced the special advan- 
tages or facilities which we as a nation have enjoyed over others in the way of 
manufacturing, any temporary disadvantage to, or disarrangement of, our trade 
micht direct it into other channels, from which it could not afterwards be re- 
covered. 
I will only add that the question of indemnity against war risks has not been 
brought forward here with the idea of benefiting any particular trade, but on 
account of its direct bearing upon the economic supply of food and rough materials, 
and the distribution of our manufactures throughout the world. 
2. On the British Slandard of Value. By Dana Horron. 
