6 REPORT — 1870. 



or arbitrary and oppressive on the other — dangers against which the three 

 previous plans would not, they think, afford sufficient protection ; and thus 

 they regard the proposed national Steam Board or national system of district 

 Boards as adequate to the prevention of explosions without harassing steam- 

 users. 



Plai^ No. 5. — This plan differs from the preceding inasmuch as it does 

 not propose to enforce inspection directly by law, but to impose a heavy 

 penalty on the occurrence of every explosion, with the view of inducing 

 steam-users to take precautionary mea-sures, and have their boilers in- 

 spected*. With this penalty system it is proposed to ally the principle of 

 steam-boUer insurance by joint-stock companies, thinking that while boiler- 

 owners would be driven by the penalty to insure, insurance companies would 

 be driven to inspect, as the penalty, though falling in the first instance on 

 the owner, would be ultimately paid by the insurance company. 



On considering this proposition, it appears by no means clear that a penalty 

 would have the effect of inducing all steam-users to enrol their boilers. The 

 incredulity of many as to the possibility of their boilers exploding is so great 

 that nothing would convince them but the occurrence of the calamity itself. 

 It would therefore, it is thought, be some time before the penalty system 

 took effect, and, this beiag the case, several lives would be lost in the mean- 

 time. Indeed, unless the simple announcement that the Government had 

 established a penalty were sufficient to promote general enrolment, the system 

 could not come into force until the penalty was exacted ; and before this 

 coidd be done, explosions must happen, and thus lives be lost. StiU the 

 Committee cannot doubt, though the effect of the penalty might be tardy in 

 its operation, that in process of time it would induce many steam-users, if 

 not all, to avail themselves of inspection. 



Passing over the question as to the success of the penalty in promoting 

 inspection, the next question is as to the value of the inspections by com- 

 peting joint-stock insurance companies. This is by no means a simple 

 subject, and one on which a great deal of misapprehension occurs. A few 

 brief remarks upon it are all that can be offered in the limits of this paper. 



Commercial insurance is founded on the principle of a commutation of 

 risks. Given the number of fires that occur per annum on an average, and 

 we have the risk of fire-insurance. Given the number of deaths that occur 

 throughout the country per annum, and we have the risk of hfe-insurance. 

 Given the number of persons injured every year by raUway-travelling, and 

 we have the risk of railway-passenger insurance. Now, it will be seen in 

 these cases that the companies adopt little or no preventive measures. It is 

 true that before a house or a life is insured, a general examination is made 

 in each case ; but these are not followed up by a series of preventive measures. 

 In the case of accidental-death insurance, no precautionary measures axe 

 adopted whatever. A passenger, on taking his railway ticket, takes also an 

 insurance ticket, and thereby enters what may be termed a legalized lottery. 

 If he is injured in his journey he receives some return for his outlay ; if not, 

 he loses it, and the company gains it. This is a perfectly above-board trans- 

 action. It is qiaite understood that the company adopt no precautionary 

 measures. They do not inspect the railway-line, they do not inspect the 

 axles or tires of the carriages, the points and crossings, the signals or the 

 signalmen. The whole matter is understood on both sides to be simply a 

 commutation of risk ; and the company merely profess to iasure against 



* These penalties to be applied to forming a general fund for compensating those 

 injured by the explosions. 



