174 report — 1865. 



with their officers ; and how many horses of cavalry, artillery, and for staff of in- 

 fantry regiments, one truck would carry. The guns and equipments of each battery 

 of field-pieces, with number of trucks necessary to carry them, should be defined, 

 as well as the number of horses per battery of horse or foot artillery. To give an 

 idea of the amount of conveyance required for such forces, on one occasion, to trans- 

 port a battery of field-pieces, with its horses and carriages, and about 500 cavalry, 

 merely to a review, no less than six trains were required, consisting each of thirty 

 railway carriages. Viewing the very large means necessary for moving any but a 

 very moderate force, the embarrassments which would attend the undertaking, and 

 the rapid succession required to be effective, it became a matter of much interest 

 for railway engineers to consider and define how arrangements could be made in 

 providing, stationing, and working the trains that would tend to facilitate the ser- 

 vice, and what, with the adoption of these measures, would be the capabilities of 

 conveyance of troops of given strength to given distances in given times on emer- 

 gent occasions on any one railway ; whether, for instance, as the great traffic would 

 be in one direction, both lines of rails might not be used for it for certain distances, 

 under the best arrangements which can be made for the return of carriages, &c. 

 These researches are required not only to ascertain the best modes of accelerating the 

 movements, but also to come to a clear understanding as to what, even when duly 

 organized, can be obtained from railways in rapidity of transport for large bodies. 

 It is manifest that, as they approach the scene of action, the railways would have 

 less influence on the immediate theatre of warfare itself; it would be somewhat 

 dangerous to trust to them at all under the chance of the enemy interrupting the 

 communication between the divisions and resources of the army. For short dis- 

 tances there would rarely be much advantage, as regards time, in moving troops by 

 them, on account of the time required for getting to and away from the railway, 

 and into and out of the carriages. Their great advantage would be for concentrating 

 troops and means, by converging lines, from the interior to some appropriate point 

 forming a basis of operations ; for gradually bringing up reinforcements and other 

 resources to the rear of the army ; and for the speedy and better removal of sick or 

 wounded, prisoners, and all incumbrances. They would also be particularly favour- 

 able to retreating forces, by expediting their movements ; while, by the destruction 

 of the lines behind them, the enemy would be deprived of any use of them. . The 

 partial destruction and the repairs to railways will hereafter be an engineering duty 

 for which the service should be prepared. 



Every railway, even in the vicinity of the operations in a campaign, will be of 

 much value, so long as it can be used without danger of interruption, and therefore 

 it becomes a subject of interest to possess a knowledge of the best means for their 

 destruction, and how to apply them in cases where the lines are likely to fall into 

 the hands of the enemy, or for reestablishing any that may have been more or less 

 injured. It is clear that a portion of a railway might be for hours in temporary 

 possession of a part of an army, who might, from ignorance, or want of some trifling 

 means, be unable to take advantage of the occasion, and thus would leave it to be re- 

 possessed by its enemy in perfect order, when, by due instruction and a little pre- 

 paration, an influential amount of damage might have been done to it. The mili- 

 tary engineers of an army have attached to them in the field a selected assortment 

 of the most useful implements for the different services most frequently required of 

 them, the proportions of which they vary according to the prospect of the nature 

 of the approaching engineering operations, such as for sieges, entrenchments, de- 

 struction or repairs of roads and bridges, mining, &c. ; and they are practised in the 

 best modes of applying whatever means may be at hand for their purpose. To these 

 must now be added what is applicable to the destruction and reestablishment of 

 railwa} r s. In damaging a railway to impede the progress and available means of an 

 enemy's army, the object will of course be to do as little injury to a great conve- 

 nience of the country as is consistent with the primary consideration of crippling 

 the military resources of the enemy for the time. Should the exigencies of the pe- 

 riod justify extensive damage, it will be done by blowing in tunnels, bridges, via- 

 ducts, or embankments, by mines and processes as practised by military engineers, 

 with regard to the old routes, to the extent that circumstances will allow and may 

 admit. The object for consideration, however, here is, how the peculiarities of a 



