138 REPORT— 1869. 



possible any longer to regard all men as belonging to one species or even to 

 one genus. 



The Duke is in error when he supposes that " mental powers and instincts " 

 afford tests of easy application in other parts of the animal kingdom. On the con- 

 trary, genera with the most different mental powers and instincts are placed, not 

 only in the same Order, but even in the same family. Thus our most learned 

 hymenopterologist, Mr. Frederick Smith, classes the Hive-bee, the Humble-bee, 

 and the parasitic Apathus, in the same subfamily of Apidae. It seems to me, 

 therefore, illogical to separate man zoologically from the other primates on the 

 ground of his mental superiority, and yet to maintain the specitic unity of the 

 human race notwithstanding the mental differences between different races of men. 



I did not, however, nor do I now, propose to discuss the origin of man, and pass 

 on therefore at once to the Duke's third chapter; and here I congratulate myself 

 at the outset that the result of my paper has been to satisfy him that " Whately's 

 argument *, though strong at some points, is at others open to assault, and that, as 

 a whole, the subject now requires to be differently handled, and regarded from a 

 different point of view." "I do not, therefore," he adds in a subsequent page t, 

 "agree with the late Archbishop of Dublin, that we are entitled to assume it as 

 a fact that, as regards the mechanical arts, no savage race has ever raised itself." 

 These are, indeed, important admissions; in fact the Duke, while supporting 

 Whately's conclusions, altogether abandons the arguments by which Whately 

 was convinced, and which he regarded as telling most strongly in their favour. 



I feel, however, less satisfaction on this account than would otherwise have been 

 the case, because it seems to me that though the Duke acknowledges the Arch- 

 bishop's argument to be untenable, he practically reproduces it with but a slight 

 alteration, and somewhat protected by obscurity. The Duke considers that "man 

 had instincts which afforded all that was necessary as a starting-ground." He 

 admits, however, that monkeys use stones to break nuts ; he might have added that 

 they throw sticks at intruders. But he says, " between these rudiments of intel- 

 lectual perception and the next step (that of adapting and fashioning an instrument 

 for a particular purpose) there is a gulf in which lies the whole immeasureable 

 distance between man and brutes." Yet in the very same page he adds the fol- 

 lowing sentence : — " The wielding of a stick is, in all probability^, an act equally 

 of primitive intuition, and from this to throwing of a stick, and the use of javelins, 

 is an easy and natural transition." These two passages seem to me irreconcileable. 



He continues as follows : — " Simple as these acts are, they involve both physical 

 and mental powers which are capable of all the developments which we see in the 

 most advanced industrial arts. These acts involve the instinctive idea of the con- 

 stancy of natural causes and the capacity of thought, which gives men the convic- 

 tion that what has happened under given conditions will, under the same con- 

 ditions, always occur again." Certainly I should never have supposed that any 

 one who had studied the lower races of men would have considered that when 

 one savage knocked another down he therebj- demonstrated his appreciation " of 

 the constancy of natural causes," or gave any evidence of "capacity for thought." 



The Duke blames the Ai-chbishop of Dublin for not having defined the terms 

 "civilization" and "barbarism." It seems to me that Whately illustrated his 

 meaning better by examples than he could have done by any definition. The 

 Duke does not appear to have felt any practical dirticulty from the omission ; and it 

 is remarkable that after all he himself omits to define the terms, thus being him- 

 self guilty of the very fault for which he blames Whately. In truth it would 

 be impossible in a few words to define the complex organization which we call 

 civilization, or to state in a few words how a ci^dlized differs from a barbarous 

 people. On the other hand, to define civilization as it should be, is surely as yet 

 impossible, since we are far indeed from having solved the problem, how we may 

 best avail ourselves of our opportunities, and enjoy the beautiful world in which 

 we live. 



As regards barbarism, the Duke observes, " All I desire to point out here is, 

 that there is no necessary connexion between a state of mere childhood in respect 

 to knowledge and a state of utter barbarism, words which, if they have any de- 

 * 'Good Words,' 1868, p. 156. f Ibid. June, p. .386. 



