14 REPORT — 1901. 



of Lord Kelvin, and the strain-atoms (if I may call them so) suggested 

 by Mr. Larmor, are states of a primary medium which constitutes a 

 physical connection between them, and through which their mutual 

 actions arise and are transmitted. 



Properties of tho Basin of Matter. 



It is easy to show that, whichever alternative be adopted, we are 

 dealing with something, whether we consider it under the guise of sepa- 

 rate particles or of differentiated portions of the medium, which has 

 properties different from those of matter in bulk. 



For if the basis of matter had the same constitution as matter, the 

 irregular heat movements could hardly be maintained either against the 

 viscosity of the medium or the frittering away of energy of motion which 

 would occur during the collisions between the particles. Thus, even in 

 the case in which a hot body is prevented from losing heat to surrounding 

 oV)jects, its sensible heat should spontaneously decay by a process of self- 

 cooling. No such phenomenon is known, and though on this, as on all other 

 points, the limits of our knowledge are fixed by the uncertainty of experi- 

 ment, we are compelled to admit that, to all appearance, the fundamental 

 medium, if it exists, is unlike a material medium, in that it is non- viscous ; 

 and that the particles, if they exist, are so constituted that energy is not 

 frittered away when they collide. In either case, we are dealing with 

 something different from matter itself in the sense that, though it is the 

 basis of matter, it is not identical in all its properties with matter. 



The idea, therefore, that entities exist possessing properties different 

 from those of matter in bulk is not introduced at the end of a long and 

 rec(mdite investigation to explain facts with which none but experts are 

 acquainted. It is forced upon us at the very threshold of our study of 

 Nature. Either the properties of matter in bulk cannot be referred to 

 any simpler structure, or that simpler structure must have properties 

 different from those of matter in bulk as we directly knew it— properties 

 which can only be inferred from the results which they produce. 



No a priori argument against the possibility of our discovering the 

 existence of quasi-material substances, which are nevertheless different 

 from matter, can prove the negative proposition that such substances 

 cannot exist. It is not a self-evident truth that no substance other than 

 ordinary matter can have an existence as real as that of matter itself. 

 It is not axiomatic that matter cannot be composed of parts whose pro- 

 perties are different from those of the whole. To assert that even if 

 such substances and such parts exist no evidence however cogent could 

 convince us of their existence is to beg the whole question at issue ; to 

 decide the cause before it has been heard. 



We must therefore adhere to the standpoint adopted by most scientific 

 men, viz., that the question of the existence of ultra-physical entities, 

 such as atoms and the ether, is to be settled by the evidence, arid must not 

 be ruled out as inadmissible on a priori grounds. 



