TRANSACTIONS OF SECTION F. 731 



Tlie drawback to this table is that it is one of values. Oonsequeutly tlie in- 

 crease of values in the later years may in part bo one of values only without corre- 

 sponding increase of quantities. But the general course of prices in the period in 

 question was not such as to cause a great change of values apart from a changeiu 

 quantities. The inference seems undeniable, then, that the Continental countries 

 named, especially Germany, have largely increased their imports of food and raw 

 materials of recent years — that is, have become increasingly dependent on foreign 

 and oversea supplies. The position of Germany, with its enormous increase of 

 food imports — from 907 to 1,819 mdlion marks, or from 45 to over 90 million 

 sterling, and its corresponding increase of raw material imports — from 1,507 to 

 2,247 million marks, or from 75 to 112 milliorf sterling — is especially remarkable. 



An examination in detail of the quantities imported of particular articles would 

 fully confirm the impression given by the summary figures. But it may be enough 

 to refer to the ' Statistical Abstract ' from which I have been quoting, as well as 

 to Mr. Crawford's paper. The figures are not out of the way in any respect, and 

 it is the idea we have now to get hold of. 



The inference is that the ditt'erence between the United Kingdom and Continental 

 countries, especially Germany, as regards dependence on foreign supplies of food 

 and raw materials, is only one of degree, and that, as regards Germany at_ least, 

 the conditions are already remarkably like those of the United Kingdom, while the 

 more rapidly Germany increases its manufacturing and industrial population, the 

 more like it will become to this country. In other words, in the future there will 

 be two great countries, and not one only, dependent largely for their food and raw 

 materials on supplies from abroad. What their position is to be economically and 

 otherwise relatively to the United States, which is at once the main source of 

 supply, and a competitor with European countries in manufactures, is obviously a 

 matter of no little interest. As a believer in free trade, I am sure that nothing 

 but good will come to all the countries concerned if trade is interfered with as little 

 as possible by tariffs and Government regulations. I believe, moreover, that the 

 practice of free trade, whatever their theories may be, will unavoidably be accepted 

 by all three countries before long. Obviously, however, as the new tariff in 

 Germany indicates, there is to be a great struggle in that country before the 

 situation is accepted ; and if some people in this country bad their way, not- 

 withstanding our long experience of free trade and its blessings, we should even 

 have a struggle here. 



There is another point of view from which the facts should be studied. _ \Ve 

 are accustomed, and rightly so, I think, to consider naval preponderance indis- 

 pensable to the safety of the Empire, and especially indispensable to the safety of 

 the country from blockade, and from the interruption of its commerce, which 

 would be our ruin. But our position in this respect is apparently not quite 

 exceptional. Less or more our Continental neij^hbours, and especially Germany, 

 are in the same boat. In the event of war, if they could not make up the loss by 

 traffic over their land frontiers, they would be just as liable to suffer from blockade 

 and interrupted commerce as we are. It is conceivable, moreover, that in certain 

 wars some of the countries might not be able to make up by traffic over their land 

 frontiers for blockade or interruption of commerce by sea. We may apprehend, 

 for instance, that Germany, if it were victorious by sea in a war with France, 

 would insist upon Belgium and Holland on one side, and Italy and Spain on the 

 other side, not supplying by laud to France what had been cut off' by sea. One or 

 more of these countries might be allies with Germany from the first. Contrari- 

 wise France and Russia, if at war with Germany and the Triple Alliance, might 

 practically seal up Germany if they were successful at sea, insisting that the 

 Scandinavian countries and Holland should not make up to Germany by land what 

 had been cut off" by sea. Germany in this view, apart from any possibility of 

 rupture with this country, has a case for a powerful fleet. It is not quite so much 

 liable to a blockade as we are, but there is a liability of the same kind. The 

 question of naval preponderance among rival powers may thus become rather a 

 serious one. If preponderance is to be nearly as essential to Germany as it is to 

 this country, who is to preponderate ? AVhat our practical action ought to be in 



