TRANSACTIONS OF SECTION E. 797 



of one of the most powerful tribes in Arabia being supposed to be a petty inde- 

 pendent tribe of no consequence. 



In many instances the cattle posts of tribes during peace time by mutual 

 consent intermingle and overlap, yet are kept separate and distinct, so that no 

 geographical boundary is practicable ; in fact among such people it is the tribe 

 before the territory which is under the control of the chief. Thus it is quite 

 practicable to conceive instances of a tribe living on lands within the area 

 occupied by another tribe and yet governed by its own laws. Many of the diffi- 

 culties the British have encountered in South Africa have arisen from a complete 

 ignorance of, or wilfully ignoring, the native land laws. Under the tribal system 

 even the chiefs in council have not the power of disposing of any portion of the 

 land they use ; it belongs to every individual of the tribe and of the tribal 

 branches and to their children's children. Thus, when a chief gives over his 

 territory it does not follow that he gives over the land for disposal as crown lands, 

 but only the government of the people. It is on this account that the offer of 

 Khama and other chiefs of the Bechuanaland territory was of so great value. 

 They proposed by agreement in council in their respective territories to hand over 

 to Great Britain their territories, keeping for themselves the lands they used, and 

 offering for emigration purposes their vast extents of hunting lands, which are not 

 now of the same value for hunting purposes as they were in former days. 



But this proposal has not been accepted, and a parallel of latitude has been pro- 

 claimed without consent of the Bechuana chiefs as the northern limit of the British 

 Protectorate, dividing Khama's territory into two parts and cutting a portion of 

 Matabeleland off from Lobongolo's territory ; so that the Boers of the Transvaal 

 cannot raid upon the Matabeles without violating the British Protectorate and 

 vice versa, while we have no means of securing its protection. Again the Mata- 

 beles when making their annual raid upon Lake Ngami will violate the portion of 

 the State of Khama without the Protectorate, and he, if he wishes to oppose 

 them, must do so from his capital within the Protectorate. This will bring us 

 into conflict with the Matabeles or else will practically deprive Khama of part of 

 his territory. 



It is difficult to conceive any arrangement more likely to lead to complications 

 in the future. The Protectorate, based on geographical principles, should extend 

 as far as the Zambesi, taking in all Khama's certain territory and as much of 

 the neutral territory as might be necessary to provide a natural boundary to east 

 and west. 



In East Africa, again, the definition of spheres of action recently is anomalous. 

 A boundary ten miles from the coast for the Zanzibar dominions can of course 

 have only a tentative character, and the exact definition in the future cannot fail 

 to lead to conflicts. Far worse, however, is the adoption of the river Tana as the 

 northern boundary of the British sphere of influence — a river occupied on both 

 banks by the same agricultural tribes. It is not clear for what reason the commis- 

 sioners have left this difficulty for the future. 



It would not be difficult to give many recent instances in which those charged 

 with diplomatic definitions of international boundaries have failed in their duty 

 owing to a want of geographical knowledge of the localities with which they had 

 to deal. 



For example, the boundary treaty of 1783 with the United States was incapable 

 of being carried into efl^ect, as the geographical features did not correspond with 

 the assumption of the commissioners. This led to a dispute lasting thirty years, 

 resulting in the boundary treaty of August 9, 1843. The ignorance of the 

 geography of the country in this case led to very inconvenient and even disastrous 

 results. 



Again with the San Juan controversy. Historical and geographical knowledge 

 and ordinary care for the future development of Canada might have led to such 

 measures having been taken in the first instance as would have prevented 

 cession of valuable positions to the United States in 1846. 



In India, again, our want of knowledge of the country to the north of the Afghan 

 boundary has led to a series of unnecessary concessions to Russia. Had the 



