NO. I ETHNOGEOGRAPIIIC BOARD BENNETT 95 



on all academic resources, those most conveniently at hand were 

 developed. 



With a Washington office estabhshed and a skeleton staff assembled, 

 the Board next had to determine what it meant by service. The man- 

 date was conveniently vague on this, which allowed ample liberty. The 

 general confusion and lack of orientation in Washington presented to 

 the Board an opportunity to establish an important information center 

 on regions and peoples. To achieve success in this, questions had to 

 be answered satisfactorily and without great delay. The Washington 

 staff started at once to equip itself for this function by assembling an 

 Area Roster, bibliography files, notes on library resources, local per- 

 sonnel lists, and other sources of quick answers. Out of this grew 

 an initial working definition of "service," namely, answering any 

 question which the Army, Navy, and war agencies asked. 



It was immediately apparent that information service, as well as 

 any future contributions that the Ethnogeographic Board might con- 

 sider, demanded widespread publicity of an effective kind in Washing- 

 ton. Promotion techniques were developed; a brochure was distrib- 

 uted, the Director built up his personal contacts, dinner conferences 

 were held, liaison was officially established with the Intelligence divi- 

 sions. The questions rolled in and were promptly answered by phone, 

 mail, short reports, conferences, and rarely by more extensive projects. 

 As the cooperating committees prepared their regional personnel lists, 

 the Board distributed them widely, which increased its prestige and 

 contacts. With but few exceptions, the activities of the Washington 

 staff were focused on this question-and-answer definition of service. 

 Some of the things which might have been exceptions are summed up 

 in the chapter on "Dead Ends." Others, like the Strategic Bulletins of 

 Oceania and the War Document Survey, were either prepared in- 

 dependently of the Board, or developed after the information service 

 went into decline. In some cases the staff encouraged the preparation 

 of reports like the survival articles, which, although not actually re- 

 quested, were so clearly in line as to raise no doubt about their ready 

 acceptance. The bulk of all this information service went to the Army 

 and Navy, which was consistent with the definition, and the stated 

 interests of the staff. Other Government agencies, although not ig- 

 nored, made far less use of the facilities. However, the only effective 

 liaison was with the Army and Navy, and their requests were given 

 definite priority. 



The service was highly successful. In spite of the pettiness of some 

 of the questions, the superficiality of some of the reports, and the 

 difficulty of judging the returns from the many circular letters, the 



